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

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A
DISCUSSION
ON UNIVERSAL SALVATION,

IN
THREE LECTURES AND FIVE ANSWERS
AGAINST THAT DOCTRINE.

BY REV. TIMOTHY MERRITT.

TO WHICH ARE ADDED
TWO DISCOURSES ON THE SAME SUBJECT,
BY REV. WILBUR FISK, A. M.

PUBLISHED BY REQUEST.



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INTRODUCTION.

If the opinion of a great philosopher in England, that every Christian who can write ought to leave something behind him against infidelity, be correct, I may be excused for writing against Universalism, seeing it differs so little from bare-faced Deism. This charge has often been brought against our modern doctrine of universal salvation; and it is worth the time of any person to trace the points of agreement between the two systems. The following are some of them. They agree,

1. In asserting the doctrine of *philosophical necessity*, or *fate*, as governing the actions of men, and rejecting the conditionality of salvation.

2. In rejecting the infallible inspiration of the Bible, or certain parts of it, as will be seen in the course of the following discussion.

3. In rejecting the doctrine of natural depravity.

4. In denying the Divinity of Jesus Christ.

5. In denying the incarnation of Christ.

6. In denying atonement by the vicarious sufferings of Christ.

7. In denying the doctrine of the Trinity.

8. In their representations of the law and of sin.

9. 2. 37. 113

9. In denying future judgment and future punishment.

10. In their moral influence upon society.

11. In the motives they hold out to reformation. And I might say that Universalists agree with Deists,

12. In treating experimental religion with contempt, and sneering at piety as though it were superstition.

13. In assuming a higher order of intellect, superior understanding, and freedom from the shackles of bigotry and superstition.

14. In overlooking the arguments of their opponents, and asserting what has been confuted again and again.

15. In the arts of sophistry which they employ in support of their cause.

These facts I cannot illustrate in this introduction; and with those who are acquainted with the two systems there will be no need of either illustration or proof. But if Universalism and Deism are substantially the same in these points, there is no difference between them except in name; and this renders the former more dangerous and more detestable than the latter. Here infidelity is seen stalking through the land in a garb which she has stolen from the sanctuary; by means of which she has deceived many of those who were "willingly ignorant" in a matter where inclination was opposed to duty, and where self-indulgence had the promise of impunity. But the moment you remove this partial covering

and look her full in the face, you may read *infidelity* and despair in every feature. I know the Universalists will be offended at this; and I say it only because the truth compels the unwelcome assertion. If they deny this charge let them meet us fairly. Let them show by facts and arguments wherein we are deceived, and wherein we misrepresent them. Till they do this we cannot cease to warn our fellow men against so dangerous a delusion. But I fear we are not all clear in this matter, and especially that the ministers of the Gospel have not sounded the alarm as loudly and repeatedly as they ought to have done. They have seen and lamented the baneful effects of this doctrine wherever it has obtained any footing; but the dread of controversy, and the fear that noticing it might give it a consequence to which it was not entitled, have induced many to stand aloof from the contest, and thus, this new-fangled divinity, meeting with little opposition, has spread itself through the land. Thus did not the apostles, and confessors, and martyrs, and reformers; but they attacked every prevailing error that threatened the subversion of true religion, however weak and contemptible, popular or powerful it might be. And this is a duty enjoined upon the ministers of the Gospel by the great Shepherd and Bishop of souls.

With these views and impressions I have from time to time raised my feeble voice against this pernicious error; and particu-

larly in the month of October, 1827, I concluded to give some lectures to my congregation on future punishment; and believing it might promote the cause of truth, invited the Universalist preacher in this town, the Rev. L. R. Paige, to a discussion of the doctrine of Universal Salvation, in the Methodist church.

In the course of the discussion I gave three lectures; the *first*, on "*Future Judgment*;" the *second* on the "*Conditionality of Salvation*;"—from both of which future punishment is inferred;—and the *third*, directly on "*Future Punishment*."

In these lectures I have made large use of Rev. O. Scott's "*Letters*" to Rev. T. Whittemore on these subjects. These letters were written in haste, and under a great pressure of pastoral duties, and for a newspaper; for which reasons less attention was paid to the language, to method and arrangement, than would have been given under other circumstances: in which respects, it is believed, the borrowed matter is improved in the lectures. But as these lectures were commenced without any thought of their being published beyond the congregation which heard them, and were written in haste that Mr. P. might have them the same week to make out his reply, the borrowed matter was not distinguished by the sign of quotation; and the object of doing it now would not compensate for the time it would require. And it is a question of no importance with the public whether this pas-

sage of Scripture was quoted by Scott or by me, or whether this or that argument were his or mine; but the only question of importance is, "What is truth?"—Between the Rev. Mr. Scott and me there will be no difficulty on this ground.*

In the course of the discussion I have also delivered *five answers*, given to my opponent's replies. Concerning these I have little to say, except that my opponent never replied to my first answer; that I did not answer his fourth "Reply" till since the discussion closed; the reasons for which delay are given in the introduction to that answer, and need not be repeated here. To that answer I have now assigned its proper place in the series, and numbered it IV. My opponent's last reply (and the order of the discussion gave him the privilege of speaking last) is of course unanswered, except in a note or two; and indeed there was nothing in it that I cared much to answer, as it contained nothing new, and very little of argument.

I have not expunged a sentiment nor an argument either from the lectures or answers;

* My opponent has shown great solicitude because I used Mr. S.'s words and arguments without "giving him due credit;" notwithstanding I informed him when I put my manuscripts into his hands, that they were in an "unfinished state."—He brought this subject into his reply, and has since published me as a "plagiarist." His concern on this account has been much greater than his zeal to answer my arguments, many of which he has never deigned to notice.

nor have I added an argument or a proof to either. . . In these respects I send them into the world as they were delivered. In some places I have changed one word for another where the sense could be improved by it, or the connection better preserved. In a very few places I have changed one phrase for another, or added a phrase for the sake of illustration. In the second answer at the end of the supposed speech of the Universalist minister on the word "hang," I have added the "concluding" paragraph to prevent abruptness and make the illustration more complete; and at the end of the fifth answer I have given a paragraph, (which was written but not delivered with the answer,) which merely recapitulates some things in that answer. In the reply in which my opponent gave his views of *necessity*, were some things not connected with that subject, and which, on account of the length of my answer, I could not notice at that time. These are now for the first time given to the public in an appendix to my fourth answer. See the note prefixed to the appendix.

Throughout the whole I have used great plainness of speech, for which, I conceive, I need make no apology. Some may think that I have not only used *plainness* of speech, but an unwarrantable degree of *severity* toward my opponent. This is possible. But before this conclusion is drawn, they are desired to reflect on St. Paul's direction in a similar case,

recorded Tit. i, 13. It was not my design to be severe with my opponent, except where he has identified himself with his doctrine or his manner of defending it. A man may honestly believe in error; but in this case he will not use *sophistry* in its defence, nor persist in asserting it when fairly beaten in argument. And when this is the case it becomes our *duty* to be severe. There is a difference, however, between *severity* and *bitterness*. The *latter* can never be justified.

I had thought of laying the whole correspondence between Mr. Paige and myself relative to the discussion, before the reader, together with that between the Methodist Society in this place and my opponent, relative to his joining with them in the publication of both sides of the controversy, with his reason for refusing; but he, having brought these subjects before the public in the newspapers, it may be sufficient to discuss them there. And his refusing to publish with the society is the less to be regretted, as I have made sufficient quotations from his manuscripts* to show his sentiments, and to enable the reader to judge of my arguments.

THE AUTHOR.

* Both sides of the controversy were written before they were delivered, and each had the other's manuscripts to make out his replies.

DISCUSSION
ON UNIVERSAL SALVATION.

LECTURE I.—*Future Judgment.*

“We shall all stand before the judgment seat of Christ,” Romans xiv, 10.

CHRISTIAN FRIENDS,—We are assembled here before God not to judge the Universalists, but Universalism. I trust that I am not insensible of what is due from me to an erring fellow creature, at the time that I am required to contend earnestly for the faith once delivered to the saints.

Were Universalism an error of moderate size,—did it affect the minor points only of our holy religion, charity and humility would enjoin forbearance and Christian fellowship. But I take this modern doctrine to be *another gospel*; and, when considered as a system, to be *totally unevangelical*. It lays another foundation than that is laid, which is Jesus Christ our Redeemer and atoning High Priest, by teaching that sinners are saved (and we are all sinners) not by the merits of Christ, but by suffering in our own persons, and in this life, the whole penalty of the Divine law: thus *excluding* the grace of God from having any proper efficiency, either in forgiving our

sins, or in renewing our souls after the image of God. And by holding salvation on the ground of personal suffering, it implicitly denies the necessity of experimental and practical religion in this life. According to this doctrine, mankind may reject the Gospel, treat the blood of the covenant as an unholy thing, blaspheme Christ, assert Atheism, and live accordingly up to their last moment, without incurring the displeasure of God or forfeiting their title to everlasting felicity.

The effects of this doctrine are what might be supposed. As far as it obtains among men, it banishes all concern about a preparation for heaven, and produces the most fatal neglect of their spiritual and eternal interest.

Are we deceived in these views? Is not Universalism an epistle known and read of all men? But on this point I forbear at present, as I would say nothing to prevent a calm attention to the points at issue. I have said enough to show our views of the doctrine; and if we are deceived respecting its effects, those who advocate it, instead of resenting what I have said, will produce its holy fruits, and thereby undeceive us. And I assure them that no one would rejoice more than the speaker to be enlightened on this subject, if he is in an error respecting it.

If the doctrine of Universal Salvation, as generally taught at the present day, be true, the transgressor receives his whole punishment in this life, even all that is threatened

by the law of God. There is another system which asserts a limited future punishment. With this I have nothing to do at present; but shall limit the discussion to that which denies all punishment in the future state. And my object will be to *prove* what that denies—*future punishment*. If I succeed in this, I overthrow the whole system as completely as though I took it up, piece by piece, and confuted each point separately. If the main pillar be taken away, the whole fabric falls to the ground.

The method I have adopted is this: to prove in the present lecture the doctrine of future *judgment*, or judgment in the future state; because if the judgment is in the future state, there will be punishment in the future state also. These cannot be separated. Of this the Universalists themselves are sensible, and therefore deny that the judgment is in the future state, and assert that all the judgment there is for the transgressor is in the present life. But, says the apostle, "We shall all stand before the judgment seat of Christ."

This is an allusion to courts of judicature, where criminals are arraigned, evidence produced, and the sentence of the law pronounced upon the transgressor;—where the innocent, when unjustly accused, may be heard and publicly acquitted. This process does not imply that the states of the righteous and wicked are not determined immediately on their leaving this world; it does not put in

“jeopardy” the souls of the righteous, as some Universalists have expressed themselves; much less is it needed for the information of the Judge: but for the all-important ends of consummating the purposes of the mediatorial kingdom of Christ: making a full disclosure of the moral characters of the righteous and the wicked, which cannot be done in this world—that the mysteries of Providence may be made clear, and the rectitude of the whole Divine administration disclosed to the view of the assembled universe: “That thou mightest be justified,” says the psalmist, “when thou speakest, and be clear when thou judgest.”

The proposition which, by the grace of God, I mean to support, is as follows:—

There will be a judgment of all mankind; for which a particular time is assigned at the end of the world.

My hearers, we have come to a subject which is infinitely interesting to us all! The question before us relates to our standing before the judgment seat of Christ, where the secrets of all hearts shall be laid open to the inspection of men and of angels, and where we shall receive, at the hand of the Judge, according to that we have done, whether it be good or bad. We have no need of the images of poetry, or the excellencies of speech on this subject. All that you have ever heard of the trappings of royalty; all that you have ever witnessed of the solemn and affecting in courts of judicature, where a fellow creature

was to be tried for his life, and sentenced to an ignominious death ; all, all that you can imagine will be immeasurably transcended by the scene before us. Here is the Judge himself, clothed with Divine Majesty, and invested with infinite power, from whose face the heavens and the earth flee away ; here is an innumerable company of angels, the attendants and ministers of his court ; here are all the generations of men that have lived upon the face of the earth, brought before him to be judged, and to receive that sentence which shall raise them to thrones of glory in the kingdom of their Father, or banish them from his presence and from the glory of his power, to dwell in the everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels, where the smoke of their torment shall ascend up for ever and ever !

And while this momentous question is pending, can you feel any desire but that of knowing the truth ? Can you suffer any prejudice against an unwelcome doctrine to blind your eyes, and hold you in unbelief, when light is offered you ? The disposition with which we ought to listen to this discussion is expressed in these words : " Lord, what I know not, that teach thou me." I hold it my duty to give up the doctrine of future judgment if it can be proved to be unscriptural ; and you are all equally bound to embrace it if it can be shown to be the doctrine of the Bible. And can we say, before Him who searches

the heart, that we are ready to listen to the pending discussion with a sincere desire to receive the knowledge of the truth, and with a determination to correct our errors upon conviction ?

O thou, who requirest truth in the inward parts, behold us thy creatures ; pity our ignorance and weakness, and suffer us not to err from thy ways. If thou seest that our hearts are not right with thee ; that any prejudice of education, pride of denomination, or secret bias whatever is about to pervert our judgment, to darken the eyes of our understanding, and thereby prevent our coming to the knowledge of the truth as it is in thee, take that deadly evil from our hearts, and inspire therein the love of thy truth. May thy Spirit help our infirmities, and reconcile us to all thy will, through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.

That there will be a future judgment may be inferred from the partial displays of justice in this world. If there be a righteous Governor of the world, he will fully reward the righteous, and punish the wicked. But this is not done in the present life. It shall therefore be done in the next.

To see the force of this argument, we must observe that many sins, yea, the greatest sins, often go unpunished in this world. Hypocrisy, fraud, robbery, murder, oppression in all its forms, and tyranny in all degrees, from that practised toward the African slave, up to that exercised over the lives and liberties of

millions of cringing vassals, through the forbearance of God, or through the imperfection of human laws, often go unpunished in this world. But though sentence against an evil work be not executed speedily, let it not be thought that justice will sleep for ever. For thus saith the Lord, "Because I have called, and ye refused; I have stretched out my hand, and no man regarded; but ye have set at nought all my counsels, and would none of my reproof; I also will laugh at your calamity; I will mock when your fear cometh."

We also infer a future judgment from the condition of man as an accountable creature. As a child, man is accountable to his parents; as a servant, to his master; as a citizen, to the laws of the land. And is he not also accountable to his God? If he be a subject of the law and government of God, he must be accountable; and if he now occupy a state of probation or trial, there must, in the nature of things, be a time, *subsequent* to his probation, when he shall be judged according to his works.

But it is not on arguments of this kind that I principally rely for proof of a future judgment, but on the plain and express declarations of the word of God. Such are the following passages, where the duties and conditions of the Gospel are enforced, and admonition given, by reference to a *judgment to come*, and which may be classed in such a manner as, with very little

observation or comment, to evince the truth of that doctrine.

1. I will produce some of those passages which refer the judgment to a future, indefinite time.

Acts xvii, 31, "God hath appointed a day in the which he will judge the world in righteousness by that man whom he hath ordained; whereof he hath given assurance unto all men, in that he hath raised him from the dead."

Rom. xiv, 10, 11, 12, "But why dost thou judge thy brother? or why dost thou set at nought thy brother? for we shall all stand before the judgment seat of Christ. For it is written, As I live saith the Lord every knee shall bow to me, and every tongue shall confess to God. So, then, every one of us shall give account of himself to God." Parallel to this is 2 Cor. v, 10, "For we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ, that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad." Here it may be observed that the retrospective phrase, *the things done in his body*, determines the time of the judgment to a period beyond this life.

1 Cor. iv, 5, "Therefore judge nothing before the time, until the Lord come, who both will bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of the heart; and then shall every (good) man have praise of God."

Matt. xii, 36, "But I say unto you, That every idle word that men shall speak, they shall give account thereof in the day of judgment."

Acts xxiv, 25, "And as Paul reasoned of righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come, Felix trembled."

In **Matt. xiii, 37-43,** we have our Saviour's exposition of the parable of the tares. "He that soweth the good seed is the Son of man; the field is the world; the good seed are the children of the kingdom; but the tares are the children of the wicked one; the enemy that sowed them is the devil; the harvest is the end of the world; and the reapers are the angels. As, therefore, the tares are gathered and burned in the fire, so shall it be in the end of the world. The Son of man shall send forth his angels, and they shall gather out of his kingdom all things that offend, and them that do iniquity, and shall cast them into a furnace of fire; there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth. Then shall the righteous shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their Father. Who hath ears to hear, let him hear." Once more.

Matt. xxv, 31-46, "When the Son of man shall come in his glory, and all the holy angels with him, then shall he sit upon the throne of his glory: and before him shall be gathered all nations; and he shall separate them one from another, as a shepherd divideth his sheep from the goats; and he shall set the sheep on the right hand, but the goats on the left, &c. And

these shall go away into everlasting punishment: but the righteous into life eternal."

These passages so clearly refer to the general judgment, that nothing need be said to establish this application of them, unless it be called in question: I shall wait, therefore, till I hear the objections, before I make any comments.

2. Another class of proofs clearly limit the *judgment* to a period subsequent to death and the resurrection.

John v, 28, 29, "Marvel not at this: for the hour is coming, in the which all that are in the graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil unto the resurrection of damnation."

Rev. xx, 12-15, "And I saw the dead, small and great, stand before God: and the books were opened; and another book was opened, which is the book of life: and the dead were judged out of those things which were written in the books, according to their works. And the sea gave up the dead which were in it; and death and hell delivered up the dead which were in them: and they were judged every man according to their works. And death and hell were cast into the lake of fire. This is the second death. And whosoever was not found written in the book of life was cast into the lake of fire."

Heb. ix, 27, "It is appointed unto men once to die, but **AFTER** this the judgment."

2 Tim. iv, 1, "I charge thee, therefore, before God, and the Lord Jesus Christ, who shall judge the quick and the dead at his appearing and his kingdom."

Acts x, 42, "And he commanded us to preach unto the people, and to testify that it is he which was ordained of God to be the judge of quick and dead."

1 Pet. iv, 5, "Who shall give account to him that is ready to judge the quick and the dead." Let it be observed on these passages that by the "quick" we are to understand those who shall be alive on the earth when Christ comes to judgment, and by the dead those who are literally dead. The dead shall be raised, and then, together with the quick, shall be judged. This is the order of these events, as may be seen in 1 Thess. iv, 15-17, "For this we say unto you by the word of the Lord, that we which are alive, and remain unto the coming of the Lord, shall not prevent," shall not be before "them which are asleep. For the Lord himself shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and the trump of God: and the dead in Christ shall rise first," that is, before the quick are judged. "Then we which are alive and remain, shall be caught up together with them in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air: and so shall we ever be with the Lord."

3. In the third class I will put those passages which speak of former generations, and

those who have long been dead, as reserved unto the future judgment.

Matt. x, 15, "Verily I say unto you, it shall be more tolerable for the land of Sodom and Gomorrah in the day of judgment than for that city," which rejects the Gospel. See also chap. xi, 22, 24. St. Paul, speaking of those Gentiles who lived before Christ, has these remarkable words:—"For as many as have sinned without law, shall also perish without law; and as many as have sinned in the law, shall be judged by the law—in the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ, according to my Gospel," Romans ii, 12-16.

St. Peter says, "If God spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down to hell, and delivered them into chains of darkness, to be reserved unto judgment," &c., 2 Pet. ii, 4. St. Jude, speaking of the same characters, is more explicit:—"And the angels which kept not their first estate, but left their own habitation, he hath reserved in everlasting chains, under darkness, unto *the judgment of the great day*," Jude 6. Although in the two last passages the subjects of the judgment are fallen angels, and not sinners of mankind; yet the argument from their cases, in support of the future judgment, is equally strong as though spoken of men: for it is not the subjects but the certainty of future judgment that is the object of inquiry.

4. I come in the last place to that class of

Scripture proofs which speak of the adjuncts of the judgment, or those accompanying circumstances, by which its period may be certainly known.

When Jesus Christ shall come to judge the world he shall be attended by his ministers of state, and his appearance shall be with flaming fire, the usual symbol of the Divine majesty. "The Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven with his *mighty angels*, in *flaming fire*, taking vengeance on them that know not God, and that obey not the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ," &c., 2 Thess. i, 7, 8. The inspired penmen speak of the visible heavens and earth as *waxing old* and *passing away*; yea, of a general conflagration, as connected with the judgment. Thus the Apostle Peter: "But the heavens and the earth which are now, by the same word are kept in store, reserved unto fire against the day of judgment and perdition of ungodly men. The day of the Lord will come as a thief in the night, in the which the heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat, the earth also, and the works that are therein, shall be burnt up," 2 Pet. iii, 7, 10.

Let these things be considered in connection with what is said of Christ's "coming with clouds" as he went into heaven; of his "*appearing*" or becoming visible; of his "coming in glory, with all the holy angels," &c., and you will be convinced that no event can be contemplated in those passages, except that of

the last judgment. Indeed when I consider the frequent mention of this subject in the Scriptures, the manner in which Christ and his apostles speak of it, calling it emphatically *the day, that day, the last day, the great day, and the day of judgment*; and, above all, when I consider that it is not often mentioned incidentally, but of set purpose; not seldom, but frequently; not obscurely, but in the clearest and strongest terms; not independently, but deriving support from other doctrines; not to amuse the credulous, or frighten the superstitious, but to arouse the attention of all,—to alarm the fears of the guilty, to quicken the good, to assert the rights, and maintain the justice of God's throne; I cannot but think it the greatest rashness to deny or call it in question.

I have now laid before you a part of the evidence which supports the important doctrine of a future judgment; and though the subject is far from being exhausted, you may perceive that few subjects are capable of being supported by evidence so full and satisfactory. I would ask the deniers of this doctrine how it ought to have been expressed to be entitled to credit?—Can they find any clearer expressions than those which have been employed? Observe, the judgment is uniformly described as an event still future. That we may not mistake its period, it is said to be *after death*, and otherwise described as following the general resurrection. As though to put it beyond

all doubt, the fallen angels, the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah, and the generations of the Gentiles who lived and died before the commencement of the Gospel dispensation, we are told, are reserved unto the judgment of the great day. And finally, the adjuncts of the judgment are such as clearly distinguish that day from all others; such as the *appearing* of the Son of man in glory, with his mighty angels; the burning of the earth, the melting and passing away of the heavenly bodies, &c. Have these circumstances ever existed? To what event, to the destruction of what city or kingdom will they apply? It will not be denied that *some* of these circumstances have been figuratively employed by the inspired writers to express political revolutions in earthly kingdoms. But every figure is taken from something real; and where shall we look for the *reality* of these things except in the circumstances of the last judgment? Let this be considered by those who deny a future judgment, and they will no longer pretend that they have found a parallel in the circumstances of the destruction of the Egyptian, the Babylonian, the Idumean, or the Jewish state. If the revolutions and changes in these governments are expressed in figurative language, as all admit, the same language must have a literal meaning somewhere; and yet upon the principles of our opponents the literal meaning cannot be found.

To deny a doctrine so well supported by

Scripture evidence as that of a future judgment is the direct road to skepticism and infidelity, and can hardly fail to produce the worst effects upon the minds of men. If such evidence can be set aside by sophistical exceptions in one case, it can in another and in all cases. And he who has conquered his faith in the doctrine of a future judgment, is prepared to go farther and will if inclination and interest serve, give up one point after another, till Christianity be reduced to the standard of a vain philosophy, or natural religion be substituted in its place. Beside, the mind being freed from the restraints of *the terrors of the Lord*, as St. Paul terms the future judgment, is more assailable by temptation and error, less likely to search diligently for truth, to judge accurately, or proceed with due caution in a case where inclination is opposed to duty. In this way a wide door is thrown open to error and irreligion, if not to downright licentiousness.

There has seldom been a time when it was more necessary to *reason of righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come*, than the present; and the assurance with which the judgment is denied, is a principal reason why it should be insisted on by the ministers of Christ. Our Saviour and his apostles frequently allude to it by way of admonition, and perhaps with less occasion than now exists. To how many towns and cities in our favoured land might we say, *Wo unto you!* "It shall be more tolerable for Sodom and

Gomorrhah, yea, for Chorazin and Bethsaida, in the day of judgment, than for you." For had the inhabitants of these cities heard as many Gospel sermons; and seen as much of the work of the Lord as has been wrought before your eyes, "they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes." Every minister of Christ, and every Christian, should continually say, "Knowing therefore the terror of the Lord, we persuade men."

If the doctrine of future judgment be true, that of future punishment must be true also. These doctrines stand or fall together. The sentence of the great day will confirm and consummate the sentence more privately passed both upon the righteous and the wicked as they left this world. Yea, the decisions of that day will close the administration of the mediatorial kingdom of Christ, and that kingdom shall then be given up to the Father, that God may be all in all. Every argument, therefore, which proves a future judgment, proves also future punishment. There is just as much evidence for one of these doctrines as for the other.

And though to prove the endless duration of future punishment was not the *object* of this discourse, I cannot forbear to notice how clearly it follows from the decision of the last day. Whatever the terms be in which the sentence upon the wicked is expressed, they must imply endless duration; not only because they are prospective, and look forward

into eternity, without any rate of time to limit their signification, but use the administration of the mediatorial kingdom will then have ceased. There is then no longer a mediator between God and men. Mercy is no longer exercised toward the guilty. The "clement, mediatorial" day is over. The harvest with them is passed, the summer is ended, and they are not saved. Then they may knock, but it shall not be opened! they may call, but he will not answer.

The use to be made of this subject is that of admonition. If there is to be a judgment, let us prepare for it. This is our time,—the accepted time, the day of salvation. And how shall we escape if we neglect so great salvation as is now offered! And remember that the time is short.

“Lo, on a narrow neck of land,
 ’Twi’x two unbounded seas we stand,
 Secure, insensible :
 A point of time, a moment’s space,
 Removes us to that heavenly place,
 Or shuts us up in hell.”

October 25, 1827.

ANSWER I.

Remarks on Mr. Paige’s Reply to Lecture I.

My opponent passes over in silence the whole of my reasoning on the evidence of future judgment, the importance of that doc-

trine, and the danger of denying it. He observes no rules in the interpretation of Scripture. Of the following rules of exegesis we should never lose sight:—

Explain the passage under consideration agreeably to the context, where there is a connection, and never fancy a connection where there is none.

Explain the passage by what is known of the subject to which it relates.

Explain the text by other passages relating to the same subject.

Explain literal passages by literal, and not by figurative passages.

Explain the same passage uniformly in the same manner, or be consistent.

My opponent infringes one or other of these rules continually, as we shall see in the progress of this discussion.

Thus, Acts xvii, 31, "God hath appointed a day in which he will judge the world," &c. He does not explain this by other passages relating to judgment, but by a passage relating to a different subject entirely, *the day of salvation*, where the Gospel offers mercy and grace to sinners. So also Rom. xiv, 10-12, "But why dost thou judge thy brother," &c., he refers to the time when our Saviour was upon the earth; although he has told us expressly that he "came not then to judge the world, but to save the world." Thus too in the parable of the *tares*, Matt. xiii, 37-43, he takes the phrase, *end of the world*, from its

connection with punishment, and explains it by the same phrase connected with the coming of Christ to redeem mankind. *Angels*, in the same parable, though ministers of vengeance, he explains by "angel," the bishop or pastor of a Church. Why this departure from all rule ?

Again my opponent violates all rule by explaining literal passages by figurative. In John v, 28, 29; we read, "Marvel not at this: for the hour is coming when all that are in their *graves*," &c. In this passage he takes *graves* to be parallel with Ezek. xxxvii, 12-14. Now the passage in John refers to a literal resurrection, that in Ezekiel to a figurative resurrection. In Ezekiel it is a political resurrection of the house of Israel. In this captivity they despaired of a restoration, and compared their hopeless state to dead people, whose "bones were dried." The prophet took the idea from them, and went on to prophesy of their restoration under the figure of a resurrection from graves. But is this the case in the other passage in St. John? Nothing like it: nothing in the text or context that indicates a political or figurative resurrection, but the direct contrary.

I cannot but mention one instance more of my opponent's explaining literal passages by figurative; and it shall be in that case which he thinks more of than any other as favouring his views of judgment. In Matt. xxv, 31-46, we have what all Christians, and the whole

stream of commentators, from the earliest times down to the present day, have taken to be a literal account of the last judgment. It begins thus: "When the Son of man shall come in his glory, and all the holy angels with him," &c. Frequently other phrases, relating to the same subject, have been connected with this passage;—such as his *appearing, coming with clouds, the dissolving of the heavens, the melting of the elements, &c.* My opponent finds several places in the same gospel, where similar language is used to describe a political revolution, and the passing away of the Jewish commonwealth. He finds several passages in the Old Testament where similar language is applied to similar events. Now, says he, this language in Matt. xxv, and in those other passages relating to the same subject, must be taken figuratively, because it is figurative in Matt. xxiv, 29, and this without due consideration of the passage before us; or the least reference to one of those passages which relate to the last judgment. Let us now examine this matter a little more closely.

In Matt. xxiv, 29; 30, we read, "Immediately after the tribulation of those days shall the sun be darkened, and the moon shall not give her light, and the stars shall fall from heaven, and the powers of the heavens shall be shaken; and then shall appear the sign of the Son of man in heaven." What are we to understand by the sun, moon, and stars here?

We understand by the sun, the supreme power or authority of the state; and by the moon and stars we understand the inferior powers; and by the powers of the heavens being shaken, we understand the loosening and dissolving of all connection between rulers and people, and the passing away of the Jewish polity. Were all these things figurative? We acknowledge that in this case they were. What were these figures taken from? They were taken from things real, that is, the figurative sun, moon, and stars, were taken from the literal sun, moon, and stars;—the passing away of the figurative elements was taken from the passing away of the literal elements; and the figurative coming of the Son of man, from the literal coming of the Son of man. And so in all the other cases of these figurative descriptions. Thus by means of the figurative judgments we arrive at the knowledge of the literal judgment. And in every one of these figurative judgments the literal judgment is implied. No, says my opponent; there is no literal judgment; the judgments are all figurative. Indeed, sir! this is something new under the sun. We rather think with St. Jerome that “a simile of the judgment would never have been used to signify the subversion of states and kingdoms, unless such a future judgment had been believed and known; because no one ever confirms a declaration by things which have no exist-

ence."* So much for my opponent's explaining literal passages by figurative. I called his attention to this subject in this view, in my lecture, but he took no notice of it there.

I must notice a few other things in my opponent's reply in a general way. It would seem from the reply, that to support Universalism is with him a paramount object, and that it must be done at all events. How else shall I account for his hardly looking one of my texts full in the face? For example, 2 Pet. ii, 4, and Jude 6, where these apostles speak of the fallen angels as "reserved in everlasting chains, under darkness, unto the judgment of the great day," which he passes over with this gentle remark, that "they are another order of beings." What then? Does that disprove the doctrine of future judgment?

Again, 1 Thess. i, 7, 8. This passage, which was certainly written for the purpose of admonition, and speaks of the "Lord Jesus being revealed from heaven in flaming fire, taking vengeance on them which know not God," &c., he explains by God's appearing in fire on Mount Sinai to give the law, and to Ezekiel to prepare him for the prophetic office. Why did he not speak out, with his elder brother H. Ballou, and tell us plainly

* The argument of St. Jerome was used to prove a literal resurrection from a figurative; but it is just as good to prove a literal judgment from a figurative.—See Dr. Coke on Ezekiel xxxvii.

that this fire of vengeance is the "law of God," designed to consume sin and save the sinner? He does speak out and tell us that "the revelation of one from heaven, in fire, proves nothing beyond this life." This *quaint* remark, in substance, my opponent has contrived to attach to nearly all my proofs, as though a text could not prove judgment after this life, unless it says "after this life," in so many words. But this is worse than weak; for if ten or five passages inform us that the judgment is after this life, surely five or ten more, which refer to the judgment, may be taken as proofs, though they do not say in so many words that the judgment is after this life.

My opponent passes over the context in every place where it is clearly against him, and in other cases imagines a connection where there is none. An instance of the former we have when 2 Pet. iii, 10, is before him, where the apostle speaks of the "heavens and earth which are now," being "reserved unto fire against the day of judgment and perdition of ungodly men." Here the connection is so strong and awful that if he were determined to support his doctrine at any rate I do not wonder at his passing it over. But in Heb. ix, 27, where the apostle tells us that "after death is the judgment," he would fain have us believe from some supposed connection that the passage relates to the high priest. But as I shall take up this passage again, I will not comment on it here.

My opponent puts the most arbitrary comments on the Scriptures when he cannot otherwise make them favour his doctrine. Thus in all the passages where Christ is spoken of as the "Judge of *quick* and *dead*," contrary to all rule, contrary to the sense of all mankind, and without the least authority from the word of God, he takes the *quick* to be those who are raised to a new and spiritual life, and the *dead* to be those who are spiritually dead in sin. Whereas by the *quick* is meant such as shall be alive on the earth at the time of Christ's coming to judge the world; and by the *dead* such as are literally dead; and that for this plain reason, because every passage is to be taken literally where we have no intimation to the contrary, and especially where every circumstance of the connection requires the literal sense.

I will mention one instance more of my opponent's departing from rule, even the rule of consistency. In Rev. xx, 12-15, we read, "And I saw the dead, small and great, stand before God—and the books were opened—and they were judged out of those things which were written in the books." On this passage he remarks, among other things, that "the book of Revelation is highly figurative in its language. It is then reasonable for us to conclude that this is a *figurative*, not a literal representation." And how does he prove this? Why, he goes to work here in the context, and he finds the phrase *day and night*;

and lest we should think that the text refers to a period in eternity, (a point he is ever anxious to guard against,) he takes it *literally*. Thus to prove that the text is to be taken *figuratively* he takes the context *literally*!

To conclude these observations. My opponent seems much more solicitous to prevent our believing in a future judgment, than to teach us what we ought to believe on this head. Indeed he appears to have no very definite ideas himself on this subject. We merely gather in a few places that he thinks the judgment refers to the destruction of Jerusalem; in a few others, that the time of the judgment is the same with the day of salvation; but in general he has given us no light on this subject, and seems at a loss to determine the application of those scriptures I have adduced in proof of a future judgment. In this way he may unhinge our minds on one point, without fixing them on another. He may take away our belief in future judgment, without giving us any thing in its place. Indeed, his method of reasoning in general seems better calculated to destroy, than to create confidence in the word of God. To show that this is not said without reason, I will give a specimen of it at length. I say there shall be a future judgment, because it is written, "God hath appointed a DAY in the which he will judge the world in righteousness." My opponent says, "This is no proof

of future judgment, because the word *day* is used for the time of preaching the Gospel." A third person says neither is right, for the word *day* is used in the Bible for a period of trouble and calamity in this world. A fourth says neither of these can be true, because the word *day* is used for the natural life of man. A fifth says it means neither of these, because the word *day* is used for a period of twenty-four hours; and this is the most common use of it. You are all wrong, says a sixth, for I find the word *day* is frequently used for that part of the twenty-four hours which is light, in opposition to that part which is dark. While many listeners to the "high debate" applaud this mode of reasoning, as showing that nothing can be proved by this word in favour of a future judgment, because the word *day* is used in so many different senses, I return to the starting point and say this conduct is ridiculous in the highest degree. It can no more *disprove* than it can *prove* a point of doctrine. It may amuse those who wish there were no future judgment, as one is amused with children's play; it may perplex and confound those who have not logic enough to reason correctly on the most common subject. But, I repeat it, it can never disprove a future judgment. That doctrine stands as upon a rock. The strongest arguments that have ever been brought cannot shake it. It is uniformly spoken of as an event yet future;—as taking place at a par

ticular time, and not successively, as the Universalists teach; and is emphatically referred to by the name of *a day, the day, that day, the last day, the great day, and the day of judgment*. But when it is said that "the destruction of Jerusalem was future when the apostles wrote, and might therefore be alluded to in those passages;" our reply is, that it is by no means certain that the destruction of Jerusalem was future when *all* the apostles wrote; beside, that was a partial event, affecting the Jews almost exclusively; whereas the judgment is general, affecting not only the Jews, but the Gentiles, and not those of a particular age only, but the whole world of mankind.

After these general remarks, it will not be necessary for me to follow the reply in all that has been said on the passages brought forward in my lecture; I will, therefore, confine myself to a few of the principal ones, and if it shall be found, after all that has been said to the contrary, that these still give their testimony in favour of a future judgment, it will be deemed sufficient.

I begin with Acts xvii, 31, "Because God hath appointed a day in the which he will judge the world in righteousness," &c. On which the reply proceeds as follows: "1. Do we read that this day is after death? No. Is it after the resurrection? We have no information of that fact. Why then refer it to another life?"

Ans. We refer it to another life because it refers to the judgment, and other scriptures inform us that the judgment is after death and the resurrection.

Reply. "The phrase, 'appointed a day,' does not necessarily imply a particular point of time. We read, 2 Cor. vi, 2, 'Behold now is the day of salvation.' The text quoted is similar in its nature."

Ans. 1. The texts are manifestly dissimilar in their "nature;" the one relates to the judgment, the other to the offers of salvation. **2.** The days are different in point of time; one is in the present time, "Behold *now is* the day of salvation;" the other is future, "God hath appointed a day in which he *will* judge," &c. **3.** The time in the one text is certain, "*Behold now is,*" &c.; in the other it is indefinite, "God hath appointed a day." The days, therefore, cannot be the same. The

Reply quotes the preceding verse, "The times of this ignorance God winked at, but now," &c., and remarks, "If God winked at the sins of men in the times of this ignorance, then they were not to be judged at the judgment spoken of in the text."

Ans. 1. God did not "wink at" (*overlook*) the *sins* of men, but the "*times* of this ignorance." **2.** God's "winking at the times of this ignorance" stands connected, not with his judging, but with the command given to all men every where to repent. He winked at those times in not giving the Gentiles a reve-

lation of his will; but "now commands all men every where to repent."

Reply. "The judgment in the text is the same mentioned John iii, 18, 19, 'He that believeth not is condemned already,'" &c.

Ans. The judgment in the one text and the condemnation in the other are not the same, 1. Because the condemnation was then present, the judgment was then future. 2. Because in the one, Jesus Christ himself is to be the Judge, but the other relates to the time when he came, "not to judge and condemn the world, but to save the world." Thus this passage is found to support future judgment after all. Rom. ii, 12, 16, "As many as sinned without law shall also perish without law—in the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ." The reply passes this without remark, "as it says not one word about judgment after death." But why so hasty, sir! If "it says not one word about judgment after death," it proves that fact in another way beyond the possibility of doubt. It will entirely clear up what is said of God's "winking at the times of ignorance," and show that those who lived in those times are not excluded from the judgment, as you suppose.—Speaking of them the apostle says, "As many as have sinned without law shall also perish without law—in the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ," &c. This text, therefore, proves two things, 1. That the judgment was future in St. Paul's

day; and, 2. That those Gentiles who lived hundreds and thousands of years before his day, were reserved unto that future judgment. Does not this prove judgment after death?

John v, 28, 29, "The hour is coming when all that are in the graves shall hear his voice, and come forth; they that," &c. As this passage is a very formidable one to Universalism, my opponent has laid out all his strength upon it. We will hear him patiently.

My opponent thinks this passage cannot relate to endless life and misery: "because we can discern no proportion between the virtues of men and endless happiness, nor between their sins and endless misery, which would induce us to believe the one to be *according* to the other."

Ans. In the case of the righteous we never supposed the proportion to lie between the proper merit of their virtues and endless happiness, but between endless happiness and the *evidence* their virtues shall give of their having performed the conditions of salvation, upon which the reward, as of grace, was promised; but in the case of the wicked, we do suppose an exact proportion between the demerit of their sins and endless misery. Between the guilt of rejecting eternal life, when offered upon gracious terms, and eternal death, there is an exact and *manifest* proportion. And on these principles the reward and the punishment are *according* to works.

Reply. "If this be the meaning of the text,

it clearly follows that salvation is of works."

Ans. It "clearly follows" that salvation is of the *evidence* of works, not of the *merit* of works.

Reply. "This explanation of the text is contradictory to the account of the resurrection given by Christ and St. Paul." See Luke **xx**, 33-36; 1 Cor. **xv**, 42-50; 1 Thess. **iv**, 13-18

Ans. There is not the shadow of a contradiction; for in these places the resurrection of the righteous is treated of; in the other, the resurrection of both the righteous and the wicked.

Reply. "Christ said in the same connection, 'The hour is coming, and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice,'" &c.

Ans. Why not speak out plainly, and say, as it is a figurative resurrection which is spoken of in the 25th verse, so it is the same in the 28th and 29th verses? I allow it to be a figurative resurrection in the former, but I deny it in the latter passage. The subject is changed in these verses from a figurative to a literal resurrection. As my opponent understands these passages, they must be read together thus: "The hour is coming, and now is, when those who are dead in sin shall hear the voice of the Son of God; and they that hear shall live.—Marvel not at this; for the hour is coming when all that are in the *graves* of *sin* shall hear the voice of the Son of God, and shall come forth," &c. This would be pure tautology. Beside, if by "all that are in the graves"

is meant "all who are in their sins," then their "coming forth" from that state would be "coming forth" to a holy, happy life, and not unto "damnation," as our Lord declares.

Heb. ix, 27, "And as it is appointed unto men once to die, and after this the judgment: so Christ," &c. My opponent goes round and round this text, as though he were afraid to speak his sentiment upon it. This I will do for him. He understands the text thus: "It is appointed unto men, who are high priests, once to die in their sacrifices; and after that the holy place." Mr. H. Ballou, I believe, has the honour of inventing this text, and all his brethren have adopted it after him. Now I will at once admit all that he says of the scope of the chapter—all, respecting the high priest going into the holy place with the blood of his sacrifice, and of his returning with the breastplate of judgment, &c.; but I cannot consent this new text should be foisted into the Scriptures: I object to it, 1. Because it is *far* fetched, and forced. 2. Because it is *false*. It is not true that it was appointed unto the high priest to die *once* in his sacrifice; but, if we must use that language for the sake of confuting it, it was appointed unto the high priest to die in this sense perpetually, year after year. 3. Because there is no such connection between the 27th verse and the foregoing part of the chapter, as he supposes; but the text is put absolute, and forms an *antithesis* to the 25th verse. This text is;

therefore, proof direct of judgment after death.

2 Cor. v, 10, "We must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ, that every one may receive the things done in his body," &c.

The Reply finds fault with the translation here, and after throwing out the words added by the translators, presents the text to us in this form:—"That every one may receive the things *in body*," &c., and says he "doubts not that I shall agree with him." But though we may not all be judges of correct criticisms on the Greek, yet, since he has set the example, I must be allowed to say, that I do doubt very much the correctness of his translation, and of using the preposition *in*, at all. The Greek is truly translated *by*, and not *in*, as in the common version. And so Dr. A. Clarke comments it, "The soul," says he, "is the *agent*, the *body* the instrument *by* which we act." This text, therefore, gives good testimony for the future judgment after all that has been said to the contrary.

2 Pet. iii, 7. I produced this passage for the double purpose of proving a day of judgment, and pointing out, by certain adjuncts, the time of the judgment. The

Reply merely glances at the passage, making it all figurative as in other cases. But the text speaks in strong terms of "the day of judgment and perdition of ungodly men," as future. The adjuncts which mark the time of the judgment are, "the heavens and the earth being

reserved unto fire." We learn from the context that the earth in this passage is the same that was once destroyed by water. We learn from this context also that "there shall come in the last days scoffers, walking after their own lusts, and saying, Where is the promise of his coming? For since the fathers fell asleep, all things continue as they were." And while all things go on in their usual course, (for a thousand years with the Lord are as one day,) and these objectors are crying "peace and safety," "behold, the day of the Lord will come upon them as a thief in the night, and they shall not escape."

Matt. xxv, 31-46. After what has already been said upon this passage in another place, I will only notice two things which determine its application to the future judgment: 1. "All nations shall be gathered together" on the occasion; and, 2. The final result of the judgment shall be, that the wicked "shall go away into everlasting punishment; but the righteous into life eternal." Thus the awful scene closes, and the future states of the righteous and wicked are fixed for eternity, by the same word.

Nov. 1, 1827.

LECTURE II.—*Salvation Conditional.*

"He that believeth shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned," Mark xvi, 16.

THE text teaches that salvation is offered to sinners upon conditions. By condition

I mean that which is required of man in order to salvation, and which he may or may not perform.

I will admit for the sake of the argument, that if salvation be unconditional, Universalism *may* be true; but on the contrary, if salvation be conditional, and those conditions, whatever they be, are not performed by man during the present life, he cannot be saved, but must suffer a future, everlasting punishment. The Universalists themselves are sensible of this, and therefore assert that future salvation is absolute and unconditional.

The Gospel regards mankind as sinners, guilty, ruined, condemned, and helpless; and offers them salvation upon certain *conditions*; and they remain in sin, and under condemnation till they perform those conditions. And he that is under condemnation cannot be, at the same time, an heir to the *heavenly inheritance*. The supposition is impossible, and too absurd to be admitted for a moment. And yet our opponents must say this, or allow that salvation is conditional.

Holiness is the grand condition of future salvation; "Because it is written, Be ye holy; for I am holy," 1 Pet. i, 16. "Follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see the Lord," Heb. xii, 14. "Verily, verily, I say unto thee, Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God," John iii, 3.

That *holiness* (I speak of moral holiness)

is required of man as the condition of his salvation, is reasonable from the consideration of the powers and faculties with which he is endued. He is an immortal, intelligent, *moral, accountable* creature. He is capable of knowing and loving the Author of his being. He is endued with the *power of choice and liberty of will*; and therefore he is capable, with the gracious succours afforded him, of performing the conditions of eternal salvation, and is justly accountable if he does not. Free agency has no place in the creed of a modern Universalist, and looks with a frowning aspect upon his whole system. The Scriptures, however, do not make this a question, but every where assume it as a fact; and we may add that, to prove the contrary is more than either philosopher or divine has ever yet accomplished. And we might, perhaps, adopt the sentiment of the late Dr. Chauncy, (who wrote a large book to prove redemption from hell,) that free agency in man is a *self-evident thing*; and that he who denies it is incapable of being convinced by argument, because no thing is more evident than the thing itself. I would, however, observe that necessity, much better than free agency, suits a system, the object of which is to diminish, if not entirely to do away, the criminality of sin. But there is certainly a very great difference in the moral characters of men. While some are the children of God by the assimilation of their desires, affections, dispositions, and

lives to the will of God, and hence are children of God, and joint heirs with Jesus Christ; others, by the assimilation of their desires, affections, dispositions, and lives to the will of the devil, are condemned by the law of God,—vessels of wrath, and heirs of everlasting punishment. Now who has made the difference between these men? They, that is, the wicked, have made it *themselves*, and in such a sense as to render them justly accountable to God for it, and worthy of everlasting punishment.

That holiness is the condition of salvation will be best seen by considering the duties and virtues implied in that term, which are also considered as conditions of salvation.

1. Faith is an important branch of our evangelical holiness, and a condition of salvation. The Scriptures give us this view of it. If God has made salvation dependent on faith or believing; if “he that believeth is justified,” and “he that believeth not is condemned already,” then faith is a condition of salvation. But God has *thus* connected salvation with faith. “The Gospel is the power of God unto salvation to every one that *believeth*,” Rom. i, 16. “For unto us was the Gospel preached as well as unto them,” the Israelites in the wilderness; “but the word preached did not profit them, not being mixed with faith in them that heard it,” Heb. iv, 2. We may remark here, 1. That either of these passages when taken alone, and much more both when taken together, prove that faith is the condi-

tion of salvation. 2. That the latter is proof in point that the condition has failed,—“they,” the Israelites, “were not profited by the Gospel” 3. That the apostle admonishes Christians, “lest a promise being left them of entering into his rest,” the future rest, “any of them should come short of it,” after the example of these unbelieving Israelites. “Ye are all the children of God by *faith*,”—“saved by grace through *faith*,”—“Thy *faith* hath saved thee,”—“the just shall live by *faith*,”—“justified by *faith*,” &c. In all these passages, and a multitude of others, salvation is not only connected with *faith*, but is *so dependent* upon it that without *faith* or believing there is no salvation.

Our Lord's commission to his apostles ought to be allowed to settle this question for ever. “Go ye into all the world, and preach the Gospel to every creature. He that *believeth*—shall be saved, but he that *believeth not* shall be damned,” Mark xvi, 16. “He that *believeth* on him is not condemned: but he that *believeth not* is condemned already; because he hath not *believed* on the name of the only-begotten Son of God. He that *believeth* on the Son hath everlasting life; but he that *believeth not* the Son shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him,” John iii, 18, 36. These passages are too plain, solemn, and important, to admit of any light criticism or cavil; and he that does this does it at the peril of his soul.

To see the importance of this subject we

must observe that all mankind are sinners, and under condemnation by the law of God ; that the Gospel is God's merciful method of saving sinners, and that he hath appointed *faith* as the condition of salvation. Therefore he that believes *is* saved from guilt and condemnation. The believer receives Christ as his wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption, and with him, pardon, and eternal life. He enters into covenant with God, and thus obtains eternal life. But he that believes not, enters not into the covenant, and of course receives none of its saving benefits, but remains in his sins, under condemnation by the law, and exposed to all its penalties. This enables us to understand the meaning and force of the apostle's words, "How shall we escape if we neglect so great salvation?" Heb. ii, 3. Jesus Christ came into the world to save mankind from everlasting misery, to which they were exposed by the breach of the Divine law ; but neglecting him their salvation, they remain exposed, and must suffer in their own persons the whole penalty of the law, and there is no way of escape. And if "eternal life is the gift of God through Jesus Christ," it follows that eternal death is the penalty of the law.

2. Faith is sometimes treated as a generic term in the Scriptures, including whatever is implied in previous repentance and subsequent obedience. *Repentance* is a condition of salvation, and is so considered throughout the

Bible. That eternal life depends on repentance as a condition is abundantly manifest from the word of God. "Repent ye, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand," Matt. iii, 2, and iv, 17. Repent "for the remission of sins," Acts ii, 38. "John did preach the baptism of repentance for the remission of sins," Mark i, 4. "Godly sorrow worketh repentance to salvation," 2 Cor. vii, 10. "After thy hard and impenitent heart, treasurest up to thyself wrath against the day of wrath, and revelation of the righteous judgment of God," Rom. ii, 5. "Turn ye, turn ye, for why will ye die," Ezek. xxxiii, 11. "Except ye repent ye shall all likewise perish," Luke xiii, 3. If repentance is not a condition of salvation according to these scriptures, there is no meaning in words.

3. Obedience is a condition of salvation.— But when I say obedience is a condition, I do not mean that it is in this sense a condition of pardon and regeneration; because obedience does not go before regeneration, but follows after it. And this observation is the more important as it shows that obedience is not, like repentance and faith, a condition of justification here, but of the continuance of that salvation which we have received by faith, and of future, everlasting salvation. "And being made perfect, he becomes the author of eternal salvation unto all them that *obey* him," Heb. v, 9. "God will render—to them who, by patient continuance in well doing, seek for

glory, and honour, and immortality, *eternal life*; but unto them that are contentious and do *not obey the truth*, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish," &c., Rom. ii, 6-10. The same apostle tells us that God will present the saints "holy," &c., "in his sight, *if they continue* in the faith grounded and settled, and be not moved away from the hope of the Gospel," Col. i, 22, 23. Again he says, "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling," &c., Phil. ii, 12. St. John says, "Blessed are they that *do* his commandments, that they may have right to the tree of life, and may enter in through the gates into the city" of the New Jerusalem, Rev. xx, 14. I say as before, if these passages do not prove that obedience is a condition of eternal salvation, there is no meaning in words.

4. The argument is strengthened by a multitude of testimonies which show that the "disobedient shall not inherit the kingdom of God." "If judgment begin at us, (the Church,) what shall the end be of them that obey not the Gospel of God," 1 Pet. iv, 17. "The Lord Jesus Christ shall be revealed from heaven with his mighty angels, in flaming fire, taking vengeance on them that know not God, and that obey not the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ; who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power," 2 Thess. i, 7-9.

Were I now to leave the subject with the

intelligent and candid, without saying another word upon it, it is impossible that Universalism should stand; because it is as evident as the word of God can make any thing, that salvation is conditional, and that those who neglect the conditions will miss of salvation. But I will pursue it farther, and in order to show you that this impleaded doctrine has no countenance in the word of God, I will anticipate an objection or two, because the answers to these will set the subject in the clearest point of light.

Obj. "The mistake, on which the whole weight of your cause rests, consists in supposing that when the inspired writers speak of *eternal life* and *salvation* on the one hand, and of everlasting punishment, condemnation, and wrath, on the other, they refer to the future state; whereas it is evident from a great variety of passages that they use these words and phrases with reference to the circumstances and states of believers and unbelievers in the present life: and hence your foundation is removed, and the system you endeavour to build must fall to the ground."

To this I answer: it was never denied by those who hold future punishment that the words and phrases, *eternal life*, *everlasting life*, *salvation*, *condemnation*, *wrath*, *punishment*, are sometimes used with reference to the states of believers and unbelievers in this life; not, however, to the exclusion of the future state. Because that life which is en-

joyed here by faith is the same in *nature*, and is the *beginning* of that which shall be enjoyed in the future state. If this "life" is called "eternal" for different reasons, we must wait till the objector informs us what they are, and till he show us how that can be strictly eternal which is limited to the present life. And so in the case of unbelief, condemnation, wrath, and punishment. They commence in this life.

In the mean time we thank our opponent for admitting that he that "*believeth not shall be damned*," that is, for agreeing with us that the verb in the former clause, *believeth not*, is in the present tense, and that the verb in the latter, *shall be damned*, is in the future, though it seems to give their argument some advantage against us. For, in applying this language to unbelievers at the present time, it enables them to say, with some degree of plausibility, "He that *believeth not now, shall*, some time before he leaves the world, *be damned*, that is, suffer according to the demerit of his sins."

But this advantage is only in appearance; for if we consider the unbeliever with reference to another period, this advantage all flows back, and leaves Universalism in ruins. The period to which I allude is the last moment of his natural life; the moment that separates time from eternity: that moment which all former generations have passed, which all that now live, and that shall hereafter live, must pass; that dark and dreaded

moment, involved in tenfold darkness by the mists of error thrown around it;—that moment, I say, shall reveal the *horrors*, the *falsehood*, and the *blasphemy* of Universalism! For that word is as true now as it ever was, “He that *believeth not shall be damned!*” Here *believeth not* applies to his *last* moment in *this* world; *shall be damned* applies to the *future state*.

O Universalism! what hast thou done? Thou hast deceived and ruined multitudes of immortal beings! Thou deceivest, with false assurances of peace, those who should be admonished, and leadest them down to the chambers of eternal death, as the unsuspecting sheep are led to the slaughter! Thou blindest them with the reasonings of sophistry, and leadest them to the brink of an awful precipice; and the moment which thou hast told them should bring them into the paradise of God, plunges them into the vortex of despair, and they sink down! down! down! into the *bottomless pit*, the lake that burneth with fire and brimstone!

Are these the vagaries of a distempered brain, as Universalism would persuade us, or are they the sayings of the true and faithful Witness? They are as true as the word of the Lord, “for the *mouth of the Lord* hath spoken them.” “He that *believeth not shall be damned;*” “*Except ye repent ye shall all perish;*” “*Without holiness no man shall see the Lord;*” “*Except ye be converted, and be*

come as little children, ye shall in no case enter into the kingdom of heaven," &c., &c., &c. The only question now is, are these threatenings true, or are they false? Are they true at *this time*, the sinner's *last moment* in this world? Universalism says they are false,—they were true once, but their truth has passed away with the life of the sinner. The word of God said to him in the morning of his days, "He that believeth not shall be damned;" "Except ye repent ye shall perish;" "Except ye be converted—ye shall in no case enter into the kingdom of God;" but now, that he has spent all his days in transgression, in abusing the mercies of God; now that he has grown old and hardened in sin, and has come to his last moments, the wrath of God no longer abideth on him, and all the threatenings in the word of God are sealed up, have ceased their hoarse murmurs, if they are not rather changed into sweet promises and assurances of everlasting life and happiness in the kingdom of God. When the sinner was twenty years old he was assured that the wrath of God abode upon him; but now that he has the accumulated guilt of four-score years upon him, and at last dies, perhaps, in a fit of intoxication, there is no wrath, no curse, no wo, but the gate of heaven is opened to him the moment he leaves the world, the bosom of God receives him to dwell with saints and angels for ever! Is this the doctrine of the Bible? It is as far from it as hell from heaven!

We will now hear the only remaining objection of Universalism that has any weight; and if that can be silenced, as I trust the foregoing has been, that doctrine must fall, and all the men in the world cannot uphold it.

Obj. "Universalists are calumniated, as often as they are represented as holding that men go to heaven in their sins, or without holiness. But cannot God produce holiness in the sinner at the last moment of his earthly existence? We believe that he can, and that he actually does produce holiness at the last in all who were not made holy before in the way of repentance, faith, and obedience to the Gospel. And if he can make them holy in death, who were not holy before, there is not the shadow of an objection to universal salvation."

Ans. 1. I cannot see, on the ground of Universalism, what need there is of holiness at all; for it is a part of the system that the sinner is saved on the ground of suffering the whole penalty of the law. Why then talk of another ground of salvation, even holiness? This looks like a condition after all. Beside, if we must talk of salvation on the ground of suffering, it would seem that he who has suffered according to his sins, is thereby made free from sin, and of course made holy; for most evidently while sin or unholiness remains, the cause of suffering or punishment continues. But were it otherwise, we affirm, and fear not

contradiction, that he who has suffered the whole penalty of the law can suffer no more in justice, and, whether holy or unholy, may demand his release from farther suffering.

2. I say that God cannot produce holiness in the sinner in a way that would make null and void the threatenings of his own law. But if he should make the impenitent sinner holy at the last moment of his earthly existence, he would defeat all the purposes of the threatenings of his law. It would make them without force, and without effect. It would make them the most ridiculous and contemptible things in the world. Who can believe that the great King, the everlasting Jehovah, would command repentance, faith, and obedience, upon pain of damnation, and in case his creatures choose to live in disobedience, hold *himself* bound to produce holiness in them, to save them from his threatened penalties? This is not all. The threatenings in this case are *falsehoods*, and were designed to deceive his creatures. They could not have been given with sincere intention. And what effect is this disclosure likely to produce upon the sinner? Will it produce the effect of admonition? Will it inspire fear and reverence of the Divine authority? Will it not rather produce infidelity and contempt both of the law and the Gospel?

3. According to the objection there are two ways in which sinners may be made holy; in one way they may be made holy through

repentance, faith, and obedience to the Gospel; and in the other, without either repentance, faith, or obedience. I will give an instance of the latter according to Universalism. A drunken man falls down in the street, —a heavy carriage passes over his head, and kills him in a moment. Now this man did not perform one of the conditions of salvation. He did not repent—he did not believe—he did not obey the Gospel. These things came not into his thoughts. And yet Universalism says there is no future punishment for this man; he is saved, and he is made holy too! This point must be cleared up before we can believe in the doctrine of universal salvation.

4. The objection tells us that "*God produces holiness in the sinner at the last moment.*" Does this language mean the same with the following? "*Repent—that your sins may be blotted out;*" "*Turn ye, turn ye, from your evil ways;*" "*Believe, and thou shalt be saved;*" "*Work out your salvation with fear and trembling;*" "*Save yourselves from this untoward generation.*" I produce not these sentences as though we could work out our own salvation independently of God, but to show that we must be workers together with him. Does Universalism mean the same thing? It does not. It means that God will produce holiness in those who put not forth the least desire or effort toward it. It must mean this in a multitude of cases, even in all those where sinners die so suddenly that they

have not a moment's space for repentance after the summons of death arrives. Why then should we listen to the siren song of this monster of the deep, seeing that she doth but allure to her treacherous and cruel embraces those who are pleased with the melody of her voice? And who that reflects but for a moment would dare to neglect the means of holiness and a preparation to meet his God, under pretence that if he should do so, that same God who has commanded him, under the severest penalty, to be holy, will, nevertheless, alter the thing that has gone out of his mouth, and produce holiness in him, himself, without his thought, desire, or care?

5. It must not be forgotten, however, that moral holiness *cannot* be produced in this way. Man is an intelligent creature and a free agent, and God deals with him as such. To produce holiness in man a system of means and agencies is put in operation. There is the Gospel, with its precepts, its declarations, its invitations, its promises, and its threatenings, all designed to have an influence to this end. There is the agency of God and the agency of man required in producing holiness. It is, therefore, worse than idle, it is absurd and dangerous, to teach that sinners can be made holy where motives can have no influence, and where human agency is excluded.

Repentance and faith are essential branches of Christian holiness, and necessarily imply

attention, desire, and effort, in the attainment, as well as in the continuance of them. Repentance implies reflection, contrition, and reformation. Faith comes by hearing, and hearing by the word of God. Man is, therefore, an agent in obtaining repentance and faith, as well as those virtues which are dependent on them; and it is impossible in the very nature of the thing, that holiness should be produced in him without his agency. Moral holiness cannot be produced in a stone, because a stone has not a moral nature. It cannot think, desire, or put forth any effort, and therefore is incapable of moral qualities. But man, possessing a moral nature, that is, being an intelligent, free agent, is capable of moral action, and moral holiness can no more be produced in him without his own agency, than it can be produced in a stone. We infer the same thing from the command given to men to *repent*, to *believe*, to be *holy*; and therefore conclude that God cannot produce holiness in them in a way that would supersede his own command, together with their moral powers, and that whole system of means which he has appointed for this express purpose. And we cannot regard this new doctrine, which teaches that God will produce holiness in men without their agency in the use of means, in any other light than as "another gospel."

To see the awful and deceptive tendency of this doctrine, we need only consider the

multitudes of our fellow creatures who die under circumstances which render repentance, &c., either absolutely impossible or extremely doubtful.

What shall we say of those who, being sick unto death, are nevertheless unwilling to hear serious discourse, or fervent prayers, or any thing said about death or a preparation for death, and whose cruel friends studiously keep them ignorant of their danger, till the pit swallows them up. Here, to say the least, repentance is extremely doubtful.

Consider the countless multitudes who, in the most fatal stupidity, and with the most horrid profaneness and impiety, full of envy, rage, and malice, have rushed into battle, and met death in a moment. In such cases the fair presumption is that there is no repentance.

Consider all those impenitent sinners in every country, who, being suddenly and strangely seized with palsy, apoplexy, plague, and fever, are deprived of reason, and die in a state of mental derangement. Repentance is the work of reason; if there be, therefore, such a thing as an impenitent sinner dying without reason, that sinner dies without repentance.

Consider the case of all those incorrigible sinners who have been cut off by the judgments of God. Such were the antediluvians, the inhabitants of Sodom, Pharaoh and his host, the troop of Korah, Dathan, and Abiram, the unbelieving Jews, &c. Did all these re-

pent? Or were they saved without repentance?

Consider the case of those who die in a state of intoxication. Some of these as they return from the revels of Bacchus, fall in the highway and perish with cold, or are smothered under the drifting snow; some fall into the water and are drowned; some are consumed in their burning houses; and others, some in one way and some in another, are overtaken by death while beastly drunk, or so far intoxicated that they have no power to save themselves. Here the Gospel can have no effect. Here motives, whether of grace or wrath, are entirely useless. Here then can be no repentance. And are these made holy and taken to heaven while they are drunk? In the name of the great and dreadful God, tell us how these people are made holy, give us Bible assurance of the fact, or cease to preach this doctrine.

Consider the case of those miserable human beings, who, having contemned the Saviour of the world, and despised religion, in their last moments are filled with despair and enmity against God, and die dreadfully blaspheming the name of God and of Christ, like the unhappy Altamont, and the once honourable Francis Newport. Here was a state of mind perfectly the reverse of repentance, and apparently forsaken of God.

Consider the case of those who commit murder and are executed in the same con-

tempt of God and religion in which they had broken all laws, human and Divine. Of this class I saw and conversed with one about thirty years ago. He was clearly convicted of murder. But neither the sentence of death, then soon to be executed, nor any consideration of his miserable condition, or of the freeness and richness of the grace of God, could induce him to submit to Jesus Christ for pardon. In the same obduracy of mind he remained to the moment of his execution. Here was no repentance, no holiness, and we believe no salvation.

Finally, consider that class of men who add *suicide* to murder. Witness the case of Wm. Bedle, of Weathersfield, in Connecticut. He was a professed *Deist*. He very deliberately killed his wife and children, and then, with his pistols held to his ears, launched himself into eternity! Many similar instances might be mentioned, as you all very well know. And here it is worth our while to pause and ask,—Does the law of God cease to condemn this last, murderous act, by which a man throws himself out of the world, and away from the place and means of repentance? Does God interpose for this bloody man, and, contrary to the only way revealed in the Gospel for the salvation of sinners, fit him for heaven without repentance? Surely he who can believe this, must have his understanding strangely warped by the love of system!

Lastly. The objection assumes every thing, and proves nothing. Where is the proof that God will, at the last, set aside the threatenings and penalties of his own law?—that he will release the sinner from the obligation of the conditions of salvation, and produce holiness in him in a way to supersede every desire and effort of the sinner?—that he will at last save those who have neglected their own salvation, and die as they have lived,—in their sins? The Saviour tells us of some, that they *shall die in their sins*. Can they die *in* their sins, and at the same time be saved *from* their sins? We have a demand upon the Universalists to tell us how those who *die in their sins* are made holy at the last moment, or saved from future punishment. If they have found the proof of these things, let them tell us *where* it is, and *what* it is. We cannot take assumption for proof in a case where so much is depending. We can take no indirect proof of the salvation of all men, while there is so much evidence of future punishment. In particular, we demand the most substantial proof that God will produce holiness at last, in all those who have broken his law, and abused his goodness through life. Nothing but the most direct and positive evidence will satisfy us on this point. The time of our death is an eventful crisis with our souls. To the natural gloominess of that hour, a thousand horrors are added by the least uncertainty respecting the future state.

To die comfortably and safely, we need the witness of the Spirit with our spirits that we are the children of God,—we need the evidence of grace in the fruits of a sanctified heart and holy life;—in a word, we need all the support and comfort which an application of the promises of God's word can give us, and in order for this, we must know that we are the characters to whom the promises belong. If we would die like Paul, we must be able to say with him, *I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith: henceforth there is laid up for me a crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous Judge, shall give me at that day.* But those who have neglected the conditions of salvation, who have made no preparation to meet their God, but come to their last hour with the sins of their whole lives upon them, cannot leave the world in triumph, cannot look forward into eternity with holy rapture, but generally die as they have lived, in spiritual lethargy, or, more frequently, are appalled at the thick darkness before them, draw back, utter a groan, give up the ghost,—and where are they? Thus if you inquire at the mouth of the “lively oracles” of God's word, they will show the importance of performing the conditions of salvation. If you “ask death beds, they can tell.” If you ask Christians, especially those who once were Universalists, but through grace have been brought to see the truth as it is in Jesus, (and their number

is not small,) they will give their consentaneous testimony in favour of the same great truth, the importance of the conditions of salvation, and to this also, that Universalism is a cunningly devised fable, calculated mainly to deceive and to destroy unwary souls.

Nov. 8, 1827.

ANSWER II.

Remarks on Mr. Paige's Reply to Lecture II.

“For the wages of sin is death : but the gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord,” Rom. vi, 23.

I WILL just remark upon this text, that if *eternal life be the gift of God through Jesus Christ, eternal death must be the wages of sin ;* because they are fully opposed the one to the other.*

In remarking on the reply to my second lecture, I shall begin with my opponent's second division of our subject ; because that will detain us but a short time. Here he notices some remarks of mine, which, in his opinion, are “unprofitable at the least.” I am not at all disappointed at this complaint. In my note, in which I gave him the offer of this house for his replies, I informed him that I was going to *warn* my congregation against

* There was a reason at the time for this motto and remark ; and though not immediately connected with the answer I let them remain.

the *evil tendency* of Universalism; and I never designed that discussion should shut out admonition. If I had charged that doctrine with being "a cunningly devised fable;" if I had made an apostrophe to it as a "deceiver and destroyer of immortal beings," without proving it to be such, my opponent might have complained; but to complain before he had confuted my arguments, is complaining out of due time. The propriety or impropriety of the expressions he complains of, can only be determined by reference to the importance of the subject treated of, and the character of the evidence in support of it. If it be true, that at the last moment of the impenitent sinner's existence he is as much exposed to *future wrath* as at any former period, then no language can adequately express "the *horrors*, the *falsehood*, and the *blasphemy* of Universalism;" but if it be true, on the other hand, that all the threatenings in God's word cease at that time—that God produces holiness in the impenitent, unbelieving sinner without his desire or effort, and this can be shown, then I have done wrong, and will retract what I have said. Till this is done, I am forbidden by a sense of duty to refrain from warning the sinner through fear of offending him.

I do not blame, neither have I blamed my opponent merely for "adopting" the sentiments or the language of another person. I have done this myself when I have found what I wanted in an author. All writers do the

same, not even excepting my opponent, whose method of treating the subjects in dispute, and whose comments upon the Scriptures, appear to be nearly all borrowed, and whose turns of thought are more destitute of originality than most other writers. Whether the manner of his lugging in this subject, and then informing the congregation that I had practised plagiarism toward my brother in not "giving him due credit" for his production, when no person had seen them, and when I confided them to him, informing him expressly that my manuscripts were in an unfinished state, and when his manuscripts also came into my hands in a like unfinished state—I say, whether his doing these things, under these circumstances, proceeded from reasons of brotherly love,* the audience will judge.

But when I applied the "lash," as he is pleased to call it, I did it not without reasons. He had adopted or at least appeared to adopt from *Rev. H. Ballou*, comments on two passages of Scripture which so entirely changed their character as to make them, in spirit and in word, new texts. At the same time he did not use his wonted perspicuity of expression, but a circumlocution, as though he thought the congregation might not be prepared to hear the sentiments nakedly expressed. In this case I thought it my duty to express the sentiments, and let the congregation see that

* My opponent has addressed me by the appellation of "brother" through the whole discussion.

when the inspired writers speak of the "fire of vengeance" in the way of admonition, they do not mean the "love of God," or the "fire in which God appeared to Ezekiel;" and when they tell us, "It is appointed unto men once to die, but after this the judgment," they do not mean that it is "appointed unto men who are high priests once to die in their sacrifices."

Perhaps I might be allowed a word in this place respecting the spirit and character of a disputant. I would say then that he should never engage in controversy but with an eye to the glory of God, nor with any weapons but those which are spiritual. But he is a soldier, and must use the sword of the Spirit. He should be severe or otherwise, according to the character of the error he opposes. Is it one of opinion merely? He should use all gentleness and forbearance. But if it be an error of magnitude and of manifest vicious tendency, and especially if it assumes a plausible appearance, and employs the arts of sophistry in its defence, it must be dealt with severely: its false colourings must be stripped off, its sophistry must be detected;—irony, and sarcasm, and the admonitions of Scripture may all be employed. If the principal character of the error to be opposed, and of the arguments in its defence, be that of *absurdity*, then ridicule may be resorted to to bring it into contempt. Sometimes the character of error is such that it can have no influence apart from the method of setting it forth, and the

character and talents of him or them who manage it; in which case its authors and abettors become identified with it, and cannot expect wholly to escape the "lash." And the whole success of a discussion depends on exhibiting error *as it is*, and in pointing out the weakness, the absurdity, and the sophistry of the arguments employed in its defence. This should never be done in bitterness, but always with frankness and plainness of speech. Nor should the disputant who defends the part of truth be disheartened, though the cry of cruel "buffetings" should be raised, and his arguments and appeals should be complained of as having an unfavourable influence upon discussion. These things are to be expected, and always come at the time when argument fails. Though it may happen that those who thus complain, and who affect a suavity of disposition and a softness of manner not necessary to polemics, may incur the censure of him of whom it is said, "The words of his mouth were smoother than butter, but war was in his heart: his words were softer than oil, yet were they drawn swords."

In coming to the first division of our subject, it may be necessary to settle the question, —What are we to understand by salvation? For ourselves, we confess that we always have supposed that the Gospel teaches, not only that we are saved from "evil propensities," and from "sinning in future," but also that Christ saves us from the guilt of our past

actual sins, and from the curse of the law, whenever we believe in him as the Scriptures require. If it be not clear from the Gospel that Jesus Christ came into the world, suffered, and died, to save us from the "curse of the law," then nothing is clear from the Gospel. The Gospel teaches us that "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us," Gal. iii, 13. That for this very purpose he offered himself "a sacrifice to God,"—"bearing our sins in his body upon the tree;"—that in consequence of this we have "redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins, according to the riches of his grace," Eph. i, 7. And no doctrine is more explicitly taught in the Scriptures than this, that "our sins are forgiven through his name," that we are "justified (that is pardoned) through faith," and "by faith, in him." And are we now to give up the doctrines of redemption, atonement, pardon of sins, and deliverance from the curse of the law? And what shall we gain in exchange? Why, to be sure, we shall gain this, that we are not indebted to the grace of God for any of these things, and that we must suffer the whole penalty of the law in our own persons!

The reasoning by which my opponent supports his hypothesis is of singular character. He tells us that "the penalty which God did attach to the law was either just or unjust. If unjust, we cannot believe in the justice of God. If just, then transgressors must suffer it,

if God treat them according to the principles of justice. If then this penalty be endless misery, all sinners will suffer it, in which case there is no hope." True, on the principles of Universalism there is no hope for any sinner, because that teaches he must suffer the whole penalty of the law in his own person; but on the principles of the Gospel there is hope, because he may repent and believe in Christ; in which case he "receives the atonement," is "pardoned," and the penalty of the law is remitted to him. And this is the first time, (I mean the age of Universalism,) we ever heard this display of mercy complained of as an act of injustice to the sinner. I wish you to look at this sentiment, because it was given you in the reply to my first lecture, and now is repeated and urged upon you: "God cannot show the sinner mercy in forgiving his sins and remitting his punishment, because that would not be treating him according to the principles of justice;" and not treating him according to the principles of justice would be treating him unjustly; and treating him unjustly would be treating him *injurious-ly*. We, who never studied divinity in the school of Universalism, never supposed that showing mercy to a criminal was treating him unjustly; but we have supposed, and declared upon the house top, that without the atonement and mediation of Jesus Christ, God could not, consistently with his justice as Governor of the world, have shown mercy to the sinner.

This at once shows the value and importance of the mediation of Christ, and the doctrine of atonement. Not that the atonement, as my opponent represented in his reply to my first lecture, makes God merciful toward sinners, but it enables him to extend mercy to them consistently with justice, and to be just as well as merciful, in justifying the ungodly.

Let us now see whether he succeeds any better in supporting his own views of salvation, than in opposing ours. You will bear in mind that he does not include in that salvation which is by Jesus Christ, either the forgiveness of sins or deliverance from the penalty of the law, but only deliverance from "evil propensities" and from "sinning in future." He tells us that this view of salvation "is entirely Scriptural." I doubt this exceedingly; for when you take away all but the smallest part of a doctrine, you mar that which remains, and it is no longer *the* doctrine of the Bible. He has quoted several passages of Scripture to prove, what nobody ever denied, viz., that "Christ saves his people from their sins." But neither this, nor any one of the passages quoted, makes the distinction he does between being saved from sins *committed* and "evil propensities." And till he has proved this distinction he has proved nothing in point.

Farther. He tells you that from his views of salvation you will be able to discover a mistake of mine in calling "certain things conditions of salvation, which are in fact *con-*

stituent parts of salvation." And he tells you that I have "quoted several scriptures to prove that unless men have faith and repentance, &c., they cannot be saved." Now here is a very capital mistake. I have not quoted one scripture to prove that men "must merely *have* faith and repentance or they cannot be saved." I have quoted many scriptures to prove that *men must repent, believe, and obey the Gospel*, or they cannot be saved. Now the difference between my design in quoting the Scriptures, and what he says was my design, as trifling as it may at first appear, is very great. If men must *believe, repent, and obey the Gospel as free agents*, then *faith, repentance, and obedience* are conditions of salvation; but if they must merely *have* faith, repentance, and obedience, in his sense, they may be passive as a stone, and may be made holy by the sole act of God, as he supposes the drunken man is made holy in the moment of death, without the least effort, desire, or thought of his own. Now I complain of him for two things; *first*, for representing me as quoting the Scriptures to show that men must merely *have* faith, repentance, and obedience, in his sense of these terms, and thereby countenancing the most awful delusion that ever prevailed in the world; and *secondly*, for sliding over the subject of conditions in the easy manner he has done. The subject of conditions is all important. It is important to the Universalists, and demands their serious atten-

tion;—for *if* it be a correct doctrine, they must own that their system is false, and all who are not holy are in danger of future punishment. And I did think, after the great stress laid upon this doctrine in my lecture; after what was said of the free agency and moral powers of man as the immediate foundation of conditions; after what was urged from these, and from the command given men to *repent, believe, and obey the Gospel*, and of the impossibility and absurdity of supposing that *moral holiness* can be produced in them without their own agency—I say I did think, as reluctant as I supposed him to be to touch this subject, my opponent would have taken it up, and attempted at least to confute some of my arguments, and to point out the error in my reasoning. And I should think that an irresistible conviction of responsibility would compel him to do this; for he must know that if the doctrine of conditions be maintained, his system is defective. And I now say that this audience, the public, and especially his own congregation, have a claim upon him to do this, and to do it in this place. I should not wonder, however, if he should still evade the point, and content himself with having said that I “call certain things conditions of salvation,” which he calls “constituent parts of salvation.” But does this confute, or is it a reply to what I have said upon conditions? Beside how does it appear that *faith, repentance, and obedience* are constituent parts of

our salvation from the penalty of the law which we have all broken?—They cannot be constituent parts here, but they are *conditions*; and every one who has broken the law, remains under condemnation till he performs them. I grant, and did in my lecture, that *faith*, *repentance*, and *obedience* are “branches of holiness” or “constituents” of *this* part of our salvation. But they are conditions also.—Their being “constituent parts” does not prevent their being conditions. Repentance and faith are conditions of forgiveness or justification and regeneration; and these, together with obedience, are conditions of our continuing in a state of salvation. We are never saved till we repent and believe the Gospel; nor do we continue in a state of salvation any longer than we continue to walk by faith and obedience. This shows that repentance, faith, and obedience; are conditions of salvation.

The verbs in the apostles’ commission have occasioned my opponent a great deal of trouble. He knows not what to do with them, nor how to dispose of them. He first considers the verb “*believeth not*” without reference to any particular time; and then concludes, if endless misery be the punishment of him that “*believeth not*,” that the heathen and all infants must inevitably suffer it, “because they *cannot* believe.” One word by the way,—if he will have the goodness to inform us how those who “*cannot* believe,” *may*, nevertheless, be *unbelievers*; we will acknow-

ledge his conclusion to be just. He then makes an attempt, by referring the verb to a particular time, as a certain day in the thirty-fourth year of the Christian era, previous to the death of Christ; by which he arrives at the important conclusion, that it would send "Thomas" and "the whole body of the apostles" to endless misery, because they did not believe the report of the resurrection of their Master. And hence concludes there can be no conditions in salvation. He adds, with all due formality, and solemnity, as though he had driven us from all our hiding places: "As a last resort, it may be said the text means that all who do not believe in this life, shall be damned in the next." He then concludes, "if none can be saved, or made holy in the *future* life, except such as have a living faith in Christ, repent, and obey God in *this* life," that the condition of the heathen generally—idiots—and all who die in infancy, is "hopeless," for the same reason as before, namely, that though they *cannot* believe, yet they "*die in unbelief.*" Now if it is clear that he has made a mistake in supposing that *they* may be *unbelievers* with respect to the Gospel, who never had it in their power to believe, then he has accomplished nothing. But unbelief is the rejecting of Christ and the Gospel; and therefore it is evident that those who never had the offer of Christ cannot be unbelievers, seeing that *they* cannot reject him to whom he was never offered.

But he has varied the argument a little in the case of infants, to show that moral holiness *can* be produced when there is no free agency or moral power. My position is this: "Moral holiness cannot be produced in man without his agency; but many *men* die under circumstances where they can have no agency;" therefore moral holiness cannot be produced in them.

Of this he says, "We shall not take them to prove the truth or falsity of this argument; we shall only show you its consequences.—Thousands die in infancy. Such can have no agency;" and "according to the argument they can have no holiness—no salvation."—Here is another palpable mistake. It does not follow, because they cannot have "moral holiness," that they can have "*no* holiness." God may, and I always believed, does impress upon such as die in infancy a holiness adapted to their nature and capacity. But no one can infer from the case of infants that he will impress holiness upon *men*, that is, *adults*, in the same way. The cases are dissimilar. An infant has no knowledge—an adult has. An infant has no free agency—an adult has. An infant has no capacity for moral holiness*—an adult has. An infant is not a subject of command—an adult is. You cannot, therefore, reason from the case of infants to that

* I use the word holiness here in the sense of moral action.

of adults. I am exceedingly sorry, therefore, that he did not "take time to prove the falsity" of my argument, if it were in his power to do it. He has left undone the very thing he ought to have done. Had he proved the "falsity" of my argument, he had accomplished much; but as it is, he has effected nothing.

He has, however, made another attempt to show that God produces holiness in men without their agency, by referring to the case of St. Paul; and this case is all he has to obviate the difficulty growing out of the tenses of the verbs in the apostles' commission, as applied to the last moment of the unbeliever, "He that *believeth not shall be damned.*" We will first hear him on the tenses of these verbs. To show that the tenses of these verbs are the same, and that the damnation does not follow, but is at the same time with "believeth not," he has recourse, *first*, to a criticism on the Greek word rendered "*believeth not.*" He says, "It is not a verb, but a participle; and this not in the present, but in the *aorist* tense. This tense does not determine the time precisely; it is variously used; and the time must be determined by the connection." Now let us see what this criticism amounts to. "The Greek word rendered 'believeth not,' is not a verb, but a participle." But does not the participle imply *time*, as well as the verb from which it is formed? *It does.* But "the *aorist* tense does not determine the

time." Then doubtless it *may* be the present time. "The time must be determined by the connection." Well, by the connection, and by the *aorist*, expressing what *is* always true, it is proved to be in the present time. The conclusion, therefore, is the same from his own criticism, as from the English version. But he contends that these words, "He that believeth not," have "allusion to the *future*," and says, "If they have not, then they must be *rigidly* confined to the time present when they were spoken: in which case all who did not believe at that moment must be damned endlessly," on my principles; and then gives me my choice "either to contend for a fact which will destroy the hopes of all, or admit that the explanation he has given is correct." I will choose neither, as he shall see.

The horns of this dilemma are not so formidable as my opponent thinks them to be. A fact which never seems to have come into his mind, and which will remove his difficulty at once, is this: the disputed text, "He that believeth shall be saved: but he that believeth not shall be damned," is a *statute* or *law* of the kingdom of Christ; and whenever the Gospel is preached, comes to all mankind, through all successions of future time, in the same way. This law, which, we will say, was first given in the thirty-fourth year of the Christian era, has remained the same down to the present day, and will so continue to the end of the world. Thus it is in all statutes.

They regard crimes of the *present* time only; and because punishment follows crime, or is subsequent thereto, it is expressed in the future. And while time passes on, and one generation succeeds another, the law remains the same, and its meaning is expressed in the same tenses, both in regard to crime and punishment. And to say otherwise would introduce confusion and absurdity into our laws, and into all legal proceedings. Who could ever be punished if the law forbid crime only in the future indefinite time, and not in the present? Thus it was under the law of Moses. The statute against murder said, "He that *sheddeth* man's blood, by man *shall* his blood be shed." Here the first verb is in the *present* time, the second in the *future*, the same as in the disputed text. And the same precisely is the case with the laws of this commonwealth. Take an example in the law of murder.—The statute against murder says, (whatever the words may be, this is the spirit and meaning of the statute,) "He that *committeth* murder shall be hung for it." Here observe the first verb is in the present time; the second, in the future. Now, says my opponent, "these words, 'he that *committeth* murder,' have allusion to the future, or they have not." If they have, then our brother's criticism avails nothing, and we may safely say that no man who *committeth* murder, in the present time, shall be hung for it, but only he who *shall* hereafter commit murder. If they have

not reference to the future, then they must be *rigidly confined* to the time *present* when the law was made; in which case all who had not committed murder at that moment must for ever afterward be exempt from the gallows, notwithstanding all the murders they may afterward commit.

This, if I can understand my opponent, is his own argument applied to a different case. But as I wish to make this subject plain to every one of my hearers, I will submit the following illustration:—

A rebellion breaks out in the United States, and thousands are involved in the guilt of it. The president issues his proclamation, and says, "You see what you have done, and you must know that there is no hope of your final success, but if you go on in this course you must all be hung without remedy. But I have no pleasure in your death—I had rather you would repent and live; and I will pardon you if you will throw down your arms, and return to your duty. And to this end I give you a space to consider and repent. He that *believeth* (that is, *submitteth* to) this proclamation, shall be saved: but he that *believeth* not, *shall be hung*." In the mean time he sends out his ministers and the heads of departments, in every direction, to publish his proclamation, and to use entreaty and admonition with the rebels. Many believe, are pardoned, and restored to all the privileges of citizenship; and these unite their

efforts with the ministers and heads of departments in trying to persuade the other rebels to believe and submit also. But some are offended at all this ado, zeal, and importunity; and having a mortal prejudice and hatred against the president and government of the United States, and wishing to live without the restraints of law, begin to speculate upon all these things in the following manner:—

Surely rebellion is no very great crime; and these ministers and heads of departments must be a class of weak and superstitious beings to make such a stir about it, and the necessity of being converted to the president and government, and to obedience to the laws. Wherein does it appear that we are not as good as those hypocrites who make such a noise about loving and supporting the government? We support our families, and pay our debts, and what more is required? Others say it is unreasonable to suppose that they shall be *hung* merely for refusing obedience to a government they did not like. They insist upon it that there is no proportion between the sin of rebellion and *hanging*. Hanging is a *disgraceful* and *cruel* death. And is the president such a tyrant as to delight in an act of cruelty that would disgrace even Nero? No, the president is a merciful man and the father of the people of these states. And whoever heard of a father *hanging* his own children, unless he were crazy? Beside, punishments are intended to reform those who

suffer them. But *hanging* takes a person out of the world—takes him away from the place of repentance, and from all means of reformation, and thereby defeats its own object. And will the president inflict a punishment that would defeat the end of all punishments? This cannot be. There is no such thing as hanging. Rebellion never deserved hanging. We would not pretend that we are perfectly innocent. All men have their failings; and we expect to suffer all that we deserve. And this is true of others as well as ourselves. *All* must suffer according to their deserts. This is a principle of our laws. And then where is the mighty difference between us, whom they provokingly call “rebels” and those they call “friends” of the government? Do not the latter suffer as well as we? We never could see such a mighty difference between the *worst* and the *best* of men as would justify the disgraceful and cruel punishment of *hanging*; thus depriving of life, liberty, and all the blessings of life, in the one case, and giving all these things by way of reward in the other.

While the discussion is thus going on, up comes the reverend——, with his head full of learned lore, his lexicon in one hand, and his Bible in the other, and says, “My friends, you may dismiss all fears respecting the word ‘hang’ in the president’s proclamation; for I will prove to you directly that it does not mean to *hang by the neck until you are dead*, as those

whining, interested, self-complacent ministers and heads of departments would fain make you believe ; but the word is variously used, as I will show. First, then, the word *hang* is used in reference to the Jews, in their dispersion among the heathen. ' And thy life shall hang in doubt,' says Moses, Deut. xxviii, 66. Here it can mean nothing more than that their life should be uncertain. And you are not concerned in this, since it refers to the Jews ; but if it were otherwise, you are no more concerned in it than all mankind are, whose lives are uncertain in times of public calamity. Again: the same word *hang* is used in Solomon's Song iv, 4, ' Thy neck is like the tower of David, builded for an armoury, whereon there *hang* a thousand bucklers, all shields of mighty men.' This is spoken in the way of commendation of the beauty and strength of the spouse ; and you, my friends, are of that number ; for is it not said, ' I am married unto thee ?' and again, ' Thy Maker is thy husband.' And beside, it clearly appears from the number of ' bucklers' which hang upon you, that you are completely covered and shielded from all harm. This word is used in a little different sense in Acts xxviii, 4, ' And when the barbarians saw the venomous beast *hang* on his hand they said,' &c. But you have nothing to fear here ; for it is said that Paul ' shook off the beast, and felt no harm.' And this is to show you that whatever appearances may be against you on account of any penalties of the law, there is

very little for you to fear. But whatever inconvenience you may suffer in this world, the result shall be *glorious*; for I find the word *hang* used in this sense, Isa. xxii, 24, 'And they shall *hang* upon him all the *glory of his Father's house*, the offspring and the issue, all vessels of small quantity, from the vessels of cups even to all vessels of flagons,' i. e. people of all ages, characters, and capacities. Here Eliakim is the person spoken of, and he represents Christ, and the 'offspring,' which are to be hung upon him, are all mankind; for it is written, 'We are all his offspring.' And this offspring, however sinful now, shall then be purged from every spot; because they are to be 'the *glory of his Father's house*.' And does not this prove that all rebels shall escape the gallows?

"To conclude. It is true, we read in the Old Testament of men who were hung: as Pharaoh's chief baker, Haman, the seven sons of Saul by the Gibeonites, the heads of the people who transgressed in the matter of Baal-Peor, by Moses. But then we are not to suppose that these men were *literally* hung; but that this was spoken by way of metonymy (a well known figure in rhetoric,) by which one thing is put for another. Some figurative or symbolical actions were performed, which were called the hanging of men; as Jeremiah's making and sending *yokes* to the surrounding nations, was called *his rooting out* those nations. And thus if those men were hung in *effigy*, it was all sufficient to justify the inspired penmen saying that the men themselves were hung.

“And this is still more evident when we come into the New Testament. There it is said, in reference to Jesus Christ, ‘Cursed is every one that *hangeth* on a tree.’ Now we are not to suppose that Jesus Christ was ever ‘*hung* upon a tree.’ The justice of God, and much more his delight in his own Son, forbid the horrid supposition. The thing intended when it is said that ‘Christ was *crucified* for us,’ that he was ‘*hung* on a tree,’ &c., is *his own action* in taking the ‘hand writing of ordinances that was against us, that was contrary to us, and *nailing it to his cross.*’ This ‘hand writing,’ you must observe, my brethren, represented Jesus Christ; and therefore when *he* ‘nailed that to his cross,’ it was said that *he* was ‘*hung* upon the tree.’—And farther: the cross is called *his cross*; not to intimate that he was *hung* upon it, but to show that it was *his property*. And probably, as he was a carpenter, he made this cross himself, for this very purpose of crucifying the hand writing of ordinances. And that this is the meaning of all the passages which speak of *his* being crucified, may be as easily proved as that the Greek word *anthropois*, translated *men* in Heb. ix, 27, means the high priests: and it has been demonstrated to you that that passage ought to have been translated thus, ‘It is appointed unto the high priests once to die in their sacrifices; but after this the holy place.’ Thus you see, my brethren, that there is no danger of the gallows, or

of any punishment beyond what you now suffer."

Last of all comes up my opponent and says, "The word '*believeth*' in the president's proclamation must be understood as having allusion to the future time; and if so, our brother's criticism, which was designed to show that it must be taken in the present tense avails nothing; and we may safely say that no man who *believeth not* in the present time *shall* be hung, but only he who *shall not* believe. If this word has not reference to the future, then it must be rigidly confined to the time present when the proclamation was issued: in which case all who did not believe at that moment *must* be hung, and there is no remedy for them. From which we may infer that the verb '*believeth not*' must be taken as implying the same time with the verb '*shall* be hung,' and hence we conclude that there is no difference between being *condemned* and being *hung*. These words, both in English and Greek, are of the same nature; and we may read John iii, 18, thus: 'He that believeth is not *hung*; but he that believeth not is *hung already*.'"

I acknowledge the affinity of the words *condemned* and *damned*; but contend that there is a vast difference, call it by what name you will, between *passing sentence* of condemnation, and *executing* that sentence. And this difference is still more visible when the execution of the sentence is deferred, that the condemned person may have opportunity to obtain pardon by

repentance. This may be seen by reference to the above illustration, where the rebels are *already condemned* by the law, but a space is given them for repentance, that they may obtain pardon. But if they do not repent during the space allowed for this purpose, the sentence of the law must be executed upon them. They must be *hung*. And thus in the case between God and sinners. While in unbelief they are condemned; but a space is allowed them for repentance, and to obtain pardon. If they repent, the sentence passed upon their crimes is remitted; but if they do not repent, it shall be executed upon them. And this is properly their damnation. This is the doctrine of the Bible, and this is what we believe. And he, whosoever he be, that persuades sinners that there is no difference between damnation and condemnation, and that they are "*already damned*," is as truly a deceiver of men (whether he designs it or not) as he who persuades rebels that there is no difference between condemnation and *hanging*. And thus easily do we avoid the dilemma which my opponent prepared when he told us that "if the verb *believeth not* have not reference to the future, it must be *rigidly confined* to the time present when these words were spoken; in which case all who did not believe at that moment must be damned endlessly." Not so. They may repent at any time while the space allowed them for repentance continues.

I now return to the case of St. Paul, whose

conversion my opponent has given as a solution of all the difficulties I had stated as lying in the way of the drunkard and the impenitent sinner being made holy by the sole act of God, at the last moment of their lives.

The appeal to the case of St. Paul for this purpose was most unfortunate, as my hearers will judge. The persons I had stated as being unlikely or impossible to be made holy at the last moment, were such as die drunk, or kill themselves, &c. Now, was the case of St. Paul like this? Had he come to his last moment? Did he commit suicide? Was he converted while drunk? Was he, in the common acceptation of the word, a contemner of God or religion; or a murderer? Far from it. In many respects he was an amiable man; and the most prominent feature in his character, his zeal in persecuting the saints, some would call the "fault of the *times* in which he lived," rather than the "fault of his *heart*."— He was a "Pharisee" of the better sort. He was "zealous, and profited in the Jews' religion." As to the "righteousness" required by the "law," he "was blameless." He "lived in all good conscience," and even in persecuting the Church he was sincere, and "verily thought he ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus." And yet this is the man whose conversion my opponent thinks will account for that of the drunkard and the self murderer, at the moment of death!

But he thinks Paul was made holy (for

this is the point of discussion) without his own agency. Where is the proof of this? There is none. My opponent does not pretend that there is any. He has not one single remark to this point. His assertion is all we have. He tells us that "he was a bitter persecutor, and continued his course until the moment when he was struck down by the mighty power of God, and converted to the faith of the Gospel." What does he mean by "conversion" in this case? If he means that Saul was "made *holy*" without his own agency, I deny it. If he means that he was convicted of sin, I admit it. From the ninth, twenty-second, and twenty-sixth chapters of the Acts, and from the seventh of Romans, it may be seen that he was not made holy without his own agency. If this be so, then there is nothing in all the reply to invalidate what I have said against the drunkard, the self murderer, &c., being made holy in the moment of death.

In relation to the necessity of holiness in order to salvation, which I have said I did not see on the principles of Universalism; my opponent, by changing the word "*need*," for "*advantage*," has found an opportunity to treat the subject with a little pleasantry. "This is," he tells us, "as if one should say, 'I see no advantage in a man's enjoying health, for if he be sick, he suffers all the pain himself. I see no advantage in a man's being careful of his limbs, for if he break his bones,

he suffers all the pain himself.' To us a contrary conclusion would appear more proper, that whole limbs, health, and holiness, were very advantageous, for this same reason—that broken bones, sickness, and sin, always produce pain." To correct the small error in the above I would say, on the principles of my opponent, I can see no necessity of being at the expense and trouble of sending for a physician when one is sick; for let sickness alone, and it will cure itself. I see no necessity in a man's taking care of his limbs; for if he break his bones, the pain will set them. And to us it appears, on the same principles, that, to show mercy to him who is suffering the penalty of the law for his sins, whether in the pain of sickness, broken bones, or otherwise, would be treating him "unjustly," that is, *injuriously*.

I have now gone over the reply as far as relates to the "argumentative part of my lecture;" and it is much easier to tell what I do not find, than what I do. And here I cannot but call your attention to a few particulars respecting my lecture. In order to establish the conditionality of salvation, I commenced with the moral powers of man, and noticed his free agency in a way that I thought would oblige my opponent to pay some attention to it. This done, it was easy to discern the sense in which I used the word condition, viz., as being the action of a free agent; and in this sense quoted many passages of Scrip-

ture to prove that faith, repentance, and obedience are conditions. I then pushed the argument, by showing what is the situation of the impenitent sinner at his last moment; when it becomes the imperious duty of the Universalist to dispose of the threatenings of the Divine law, by answering the questions, are they true, or are they false, at *this* moment? If true, how can the impenitent sinner be saved? If false, where is the sincerity of them? How can God condemn the sinner in the morning of his days; or at twenty years of age, and not condemn him at the last moment of a life of four-score years spent in sin, especially when he dies in a state of intoxication? Will God save a sinner in a way to make null and void the threatenings and penalties of his own law? Would not this be making his own law contemptible? And, finally, how can God make the sinner holy without the use of his moral powers? On these points, and on the reasoning in support of them, I did expect that something would be *attempted* in a direct way; but in this I am disappointed. There is only one of all these points that has been brought into view in the way of argument, that of making the sinner holy without his own agency; and the proof of that rests on the case of infants, (which has been shown not to be a case in point,) and that of St. Paul which is brought without a single argument or remark to support it. Perhaps my opponent may think that his

having said I "make some things conditions, which are in fact constituent parts of salvation," is proof that there are no conditions of salvation. Other argument than his bare word he has produced none; and if he thinks this is proof, I presume he is the only person in this audience that does.

Now, I ask the candid of every name, as well the Universalists as others, whether the doctrine of universal salvation can stand with the conditionality of salvation, and the free agency of man? and if not, whether these points ought not to have engaged the attention of my opponent? I ask again, can that doctrine stand against the truth of the threatenings and penalty of God's law? The question is already answered in the negative. How then is the sinner to be saved who continues in sin down to the last moment of his earthly existence, and then dies by his own hands? Finally, I ask, can that doctrine stand if the arguments and reasoning in the lecture are correct? Are you, any of you, willing to rest your souls on the truth of that doctrine, while those arguments and reasons remain unanswered? Perhaps you will say you are, because the Scriptures teach the doctrine: I therefore come, in the third place,

To the proofs of that doctrine, as exhibited by my opponent, in his reply. And I cannot but observe here, that he was too hasty in attempting to produce Scripture proof of his doctrine, before he had answered my Scripture

proofs and rational arguments against it: especially as we had mutually agreed to a discussion. But what discussion is there when the proofs and arguments on one side are entirely neglected on the other? But though he neglect my *proofs*, I shall not pass over his *arguments*.

My opponent has produced a large number of Scripture passages to prove the salvation of all men without future punishment. Here are properly two points—salvation—and that without punishment. To prove either of these points separately, and much more to prove them jointly, he will need the most powerful evidence, especially as it is to stand against all my proofs and arguments unanswered. Let us see whether his proofs are sufficient for these purposes.

You will recollect that when the future judgment was under discussion the other evening, my opponent urged, on nearly every passage I produced,—“Does this passage *say* the judgment is in the *future state*?—Not a word of that.” This was his parrying stick, which he never put out of his hand, and which, probably, did as much for his cause as all the arguments he brought. This argument is at least as good against future universal salvation as against future judgment; and being a “bill” of his own, he must pay it, or we shall declare him a bankrupt. I ask, then, which of all his Scripture proofs says a word about universal salvation in the future state? Tried by his

own rule, his proofs will all be found too short,—weighed in his own balances, they will be found wanting. But though this might be a sufficient answer, on *his* principles, we shall not rest the weight of our cause upon it alone.

The *first* proof he founds on the promise of a “seed to bruise the serpent’s head,” Gen. iii, 15; compared with Heb. ii, 14, which informs us that Christ took flesh “that through death he might destroy him that had the power of death, that is the devil.” If the latter of these passages explains the former, then both were accomplished when Christ died and rose from the dead; and by destroying the devil the apostle does not mean a literal destruction, as my opponent seems to think, but a destruction of his power, by which he had held the children of God in bondage through the fear of death, verse 15. And the apostle applies this to the time which then was, and not to the future state. If then it proves universal salvation, it must be that all men are now, and have been for eighteen hundred years, saved, and the devil actually destroyed.

We next meet with the promises made to the patriarchs of “a seed, in whom all the families and nations of the earth were to be blessed;” and for the accomplishment of these we are referred to Gal. iii, 8, “The Scriptures foreseeing that God would justify the heathen through faith, preached before the Gospel unto Abraham,” &c., and to Acts iii, 25, 26, “Ye are the children of the prophets, and of the

covenant which God made with our fathers, saying unto Abraham, And in thy seed shall all the kindreds of the earth be blessed. Unto you first, God having raised up his Son Jesus, sent him to bless you, in turning away every one of you from his iniquities." I have recited these passages at length, that you may see for yourselves that the promises here mentioned relate to the calling of the Gentiles, when "the middle wall of partition," which had stood between them and the Jews, was taken away by the death of Christ. To this they were applied by the apostles. They, therefore, afford no proof of the future salvation of all men. They have no aspect that way, unless being "blessed," means to be actually and for ever saved. But this is the thing to be proved, and not taken for granted. This, however, cannot be proved; because many Jews and Gentiles who were in the apostles' days, and since then, blessed with the offers of salvation, were not actually saved. But what surprises me most of all is, to hear my opponent say, and repeat it, that the blessing contained in these promises is "*justification through faith.*" I could hardly believe my own eyes, till I had read this passage again and again. He here gives up the whole ground work of his system, and assents to that which we have always contended for against Universalism, viz., "*justification through faith.*" This makes justification to be *conditional* to all intents and purposes; for if justification be *through* faith,

then faith is *first*, and justification is *dependent* on it as its *medium*. Thus if you say water is conveyed *through* an aqueduct, the idea is that the aqueduct was first laid, and then the water passed through it, being dependent on it for its passage. If you say that you received a letter from your friend *through* the post office, you do thereby acknowledge that the post office was *first*, before the receipt of the letter, and the letter was dependent on that medium for its conveyance. And this concession is the more important, as it occurs in the very place where he is labouring to prove the salvation of all men. He uses the word "justification" as synonymous with "salvation." If then salvation be "*through*" faith, he can have no reasonable objection to admit that repentance and obedience are conditions in the same sense; for they are both implied in *faith*. Here, then, if he will stand to what he has said, we will make up, and there shall be no more controversy between us. But something whispers me that this dropped from his pen in an unguarded moment, and that when he sees what he has done he will endeavour to be *off*: I think it, therefore, best to proceed in my answer.

We are told that "God promised to give his Son the heathen for his inheritance," &c. But this relates to the calling of the Gentiles, and has nothing to do with the future salvation of all mankind. He reasons from the "profiting" of the regenerate "children of

God" by the chastisements of their Father, that all will be saved, though all are not the regenerate children of God. "Must we not suppose," he says, "that all who are chastised will receive profit, and that all who receive profit will be saved?—If not, will not the purpose of God be frustrated?" If my hearers will have the goodness to refer to the foregoing illustration, they may recollect an instance of reasoning similar to this and to what follows: "Christ will draw all men unto him." But does this prove that all will "come" to him when he draws them? Has he not drawn thousands by the strivings of the Spirit, and the invitations of the Gospel, who never came to him—who perished in their sins?—"God hath revealed his purpose of gathering together all things in Christ, both which are in heaven, and which are on earth," &c. But this text expressly limits those who are to be gathered into one body, to those who are "*in Christ*;" but all men are not in Christ; for he tells us of some branches in him that are *taken away* and cast into the fire. Phil. ii, 9-11, is quoted, where it is said "that every knee shall bow—and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father." This passage is taken from Isa. xlv, 23—is quoted again in Rom. xiv, 10-12, and in every place it is used by way of admonition. In Romans the apostle applies it to the general judgment, where "every one must give account of himself to God." The bowing and confessing,

therefore, in this passage, are, on the part of the righteous, acts of voluntary worship; on the part of the wicked, they are constrained. I must here again refer to the specimen of reasoning in the foregoing illustration, for an answer to what follows, till we come to the last passage under this head, Rev. v, 13, which speaks of "every creature in heaven, and on the earth, and under the earth, and in the sea, as ascribing blessing, and honour, and glory, and power, unto him that sitteth upon the throne and unto the Lamb for ever." What if I should here also present my opponent with a piece of his own coin?—It may be remembered that when I quoted a passage from this book to prove a future judgment an exception was taken to it on account of the general character of the book as "figurative." We now have a quotation from the most figurative part of the book, and every thing is taken literally. Is this consistent? Does it indicate that his objection on the other occasion, or his argument on the present, proceeds on well-defined principles? But I follow him a little farther with his own rules: how does he know that this passage relates to the future state? It does not "*say*" this; and if a passage must always *say* what it means, in so many words, as he thought the other evening, why should he this evening bring a passage to prove what it does not *say*? Does this indicate any established rules for interpreting Scripture? But I spare him. I have no

pleasure in torturing a man as upon the rack ; and were he not identified with the errors he supports, and did not a sense of duty to the cause of truth and righteousness compel me, I should not have said so much as I have. One thought, however, spoils his conclusion from this text. If, as he supposes, the text relates to the consummation of the heavenly society, it is a period *subsequent* to the casting of the wicked into hell ; which will account for no mention being made of the inhabitants of those regions joining in the general chorus of praise to God and the Lamb.

I have only one argument more to notice and that is built upon the law which requires us to "love God with all our heart," &c., in connection with our Saviour's words, "heaven and earth shall pass away ; but one jot or tittle shall not pass from the law, till all be fulfilled."—When he says "that this law is binding on all the children of God," he speaks a great truth ; but when he adds, "And—Christ declares that all mankind shall fulfil it," he speaks a great—error. This "law has been binding," not only "on all the children of God," but on all mankind since the world began ; but we know that all have not fulfilled it ; and if my opponent's faith that it will be fulfilled by all mankind rest upon that phrase—"shall not pass—*till all be fulfilled,*"—then his faith rests on no better foundation than a mere *Hebraism* ; and he might just as well suppose that the man who was cast into prison because "he had *not* to

pay," could nevertheless, in close confinement, pay a debt of "ten thousand talents," because it was said "he should not come out *till* he should pay all that was due."

I had intended to go farther with this answer, and to follow my opponent's proofs with a large list of threatenings, declarative of the penalty of the Divine law, and calculated to throw light on our subject, by showing that both promises and threatenings, expressed in universal language, are generally figurative and conditional. The threatenings of the law are expressed in terms as general as the promises, and are, no doubt, as true. I had intended also to state arguments against the doctrine I oppose, which have not been brought into view, and perhaps will not be in the course of this discussion. But this answer being much longer than I expected, I am compelled to close.

Nov. 15, 1827.

ANSWER III.

Remarks on Mr. Paige's Reply to Answer II.

"He that believeth shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned," Mark xvi, 16.

As the discussion on the conditions of salvation has taken a wide range, and embraced some foreign matter, it is now thought best to confine it to the original question as far as

possible ; in order to which it may be proper to take a general view of my second lecture, that we may have before us the several points to which the arguments on both sides should be directed.

In the first place, in that lecture, I laid down the doctrine of free agency as the *basis* of moral holiness, and to show that the obedience of man to the Divine command is the *condition* of his salvation. I then produced a variety of Scripture passages to show wherein his obedience, as a free agent, is required, as in repenting, believing, &c., and to show that his salvation is *suspended* on such obedience, within a space of time allowed for this purpose : from which it results, that if he refuse the required obedience during that time, he most surely fails of salvation. And to show this with the greatest certainty I apply the conditions of salvation to the sinner at his last moment in this world ; and to strengthen the evidence in this case, I consider him as destroying his own life, or dying in a state of drunkenness, &c., in which cases any obedience is clearly impossible, and salvation without obedience, equally so, both on account of the Divine threatening, which God cannot consistently with his honour rescind, and because he cannot make a free agent holy without his own agency. These results grow out of the premises ; and to get rid of them the premises must be disproved. But if the premises are sustained by direct evidence, no evidence can be admitted

against them, seeing that indirect or inferential evidence can never supersede that which is direct.

My opponent, instead of attacking my castle of conditions, built upon the command of God and the free agency of man, goes to work by inquiring what we are to understand by salvation? And though we do not approve of this method of investigating the subject, we shall follow him to prevent his saying that we do not notice his objections and arguments.

What is salvation? Is it forgiveness of sins, remission of punishment, deliverance from evil propensities, and the implantation of holy affections? We say that salvation, in the sense in which we now use that term, means all these. My opponent, however, excludes remission of punishment due for actual sins, and lays this down as a fundamental principle, that every one must suffer, in his own person, his whole desert of punishment. And till now we did understand him to imply that our actual sins are *not* pardoned, but punished. We can now no longer misunderstand him on this point, as he expressly avows the sentiment that our sins *are* pardoned. Now here is a very singular case—a man's sins are pardoned, but his punishment is not remitted! A debtor is forgiven all demands against him, and yet he is holden to pay all he owes! A murderer is pardoned by the governor, and yet he is hung! God fully pardons the sinner, and yet holds him to suffer the whole penalty of the law for all his

sins! Pray, how is he pardoned? What is pardon but a revocation of the sentence of condemnation, and thereby a remission of the penalty of the law? We can form no other idea of pardon than this; and the reason is because sin,—I speak of the transgression of the law,—is an *action*, not a *substance*, and therefore it is untangible, and you cannot treat with it, either to forgive it, or to punish it, apart from the agent which commits it. A sinner is pardoned just so far as his punishment is remitted to him, and no farther. Thus in pardoning sin God revokes the sentence of condemnation, and thereby releases the sinner from his obligation to suffer the penalty of the law as it relates to the future state, but reserves in his own hands the right to inflict so much of the penalty in this life as his wisdom and goodness see his children will need in this state of trial, and as he sees he can overrule for their greater good. This, under the influence of his grace, constitutes a wholesome and necessary discipline for his children. And this discipline may be more or less severe, as their wants may require. In this case their punishment is not a curse, but a blessing. And this may sufficiently explain that poetic passage in the Psalms, "Thou wast a God that forgavest them, though thou tookest vengeance of their inventions," Psa. xcix, 8.

If my opponent can give any other account of pardon, it will behoove him to bring it forth, and tell us *how* a sinner is pardoned who is

held to suffer the *whole penalty* of the law ; and if he cannot do this, let him cease to complain that we misrepresent his doctrine in this point.

But he thinks the "express declarations of Scripture" favour his views of forgiving the sins of a person, and yet inflicting upon that person the whole penalty of the law ; because it is said, "The soul that sinneth, it shall die," — "God will by no means clear the guilty," — "He that doeth wrong shall receive for the wrong he hath done, and there is no respect of persons," &c. He does not consider that these, and a "multitude of passages like them," were designed to set before the transgressor the penalty of the law, and to show him what he is to expect in case he does not repent ; but were never designed to exclude the remission of that penalty in case he repents. To this the whole Gospel agrees. The Gospel is a merciful provision which comes in after the penalty of the law is incurred, and offers the forgiveness of sins, or which is the same thing, the remission of the incurred penalty, upon condition of repentance and faith in Christ. This may be illustrated by what takes place in the governments of this world. The law is express, "He that committeth murder, he that committeth treason, shall die for it ;" and yet there is a gracious, discretionary power lodged in the hands of the chief magistrate to pardon the transgressor, by which is al-

ways understood the remission of the penalty of the law.

This will enable us to understand what is said of our being "redeemed from the curse of the law" by the "death of Christ upon the cross:" and I assure my opponent that I did not omit this latter clause through any apprehension that it contained a sentiment unfriendly to my argument. He says, "By 'redeeming us from the curse of the law,' we understand that he *abolished* the Mosaic law or dispensation, which 'gendereth to bondage,' and was the 'ministration of death,' and thereby delivered us from its power, introducing a better dispensation." In this view of the passage he says "he is sustained by Archbishop Newcomb;" and thinks also that the phrase "Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree," in reference to Christ, "plainly shows" the same,—and not that he "bore the penalty of the law for us." To this we answer:—

1. That Christ has "abolished the Mosaic dispensation" we admit; but we can see no reason for giving this as an explanation of our redemption from the curse of the law. Indeed the "abolishing" a law, and redeeming from the curse of that law, are distinct and opposite things. To "abolish," is to *destroy*, or *repeal*; to "redeem from the curse of the law," is to continue the law in full force, while deliverance from its curse is obtained. In this case the law is so far from being destroyed, or repealed, that it is confirmed, hon-

oured, and magnified. This shows that it is from the curse of the *moral law* that we are redeemed.

2. Equally inapplicable is his remark founded on the phrase, "he bore our sins in his body on the tree." Here it is said that Christ no more bore our sins, or the punishment of our sins, than he took and bore in his own body the infirmities and sicknesses of those whom he healed in the days of his flesh. "By taking sickness and bearing infirmities," it is said, "Christ did not deliver from the consequences of past sickness, but only from the consequences which would have followed, had their sickness continued." And so in the other case, Christ, by bearing our sins, did not deliver from the consequences of our past sins, that is, "from the penalty due for sins actually committed; but by making us holy, we are placed in a situation to avoid sin and misery in future." In all his reasoning, my opponent assumes the absurd principle that a person may be saved from "sins actually committed, without being delivered from the punishment due to them." But this is purely ideal, as I have shown above. The passage in Matt. viii, 17, respecting Christ "taking our infirmities and bearing our sicknesses," is borrowed from Isa. liii, 4, "Surely he hath borne our griefs and carried our sorrows," &c., on which Dr. Coke has this judicious note:—"The prophecy of Isaiah properly relates to the sins of men, whereof diseases

are the emblem and the consequence; for which reason the original Hebrew words rendered here *our infirmities*, have been by the LXX, and by St. Peter, 1st epistle, ii, 24, translated '*our sins*.' It was natural, therefore, for the evangelist to represent the sympathy and kindness of Christ in healing the diseased, as taking their *infirmities* and *sicknesses* upon himself. His having come into the world to bear the sins of men, that is, the punishment due to them, it was natural, and the figure a very beautiful one, to represent him as bearing their sicknesses, which were the effects of their sins. These passages, therefore, when taken together, instead of weakening, strengthen my argument. They are, in fact, another proof that Christ bore our sins, that is, our punishment.

And this is confirmed to us by the origin of the word *redemption*, "which," says Dr. Gill, "is from the Latin tongue, and signifies buying again." Hence Christ is called our "Redeemer," Isa. lix, 20, because he delivered us from the curse of the law, by being made a curse for us, that is, bearing the curse in our stead. His being made a curse in the sense of one "hanging on the tree," or the cross, is not inconsistent with his being made a curse for us, in this sense also. I can see no proper affinity between Christ's being crucified, and his abolishing the Mosaic dispensation, other than that God designed that that dispensation should cease when the Gospel

dispensation should commence; but I do see an affinity between Christ's bearing the curse of the moral law for us, and our being delivered from that curse on his account. And I see a difficulty, an insuperable difficulty, in the way of God extending any mercy to the sinner while under the curse of the law, without a substitute to suffer that curse for him. And to this end we have the whole consentaneous testimony of the inspired writers who represent the death of Christ as a sacrifice, and a sin offering; who speak of mankind as being purchased or bought with the blood of Christ, and ascribe all our blessings to his merits alone. In these views we are "sustained" by the concurrent testimony of all formularies of Christian faith, both ancient and modern.

My opponent complains of me for not noticing two objections of his to this view of the subject, viz., "that Christ came to hinder the execution of justice,"—and "that in this case, the will and purposes of Christ and the Father were different and opposite." I really supposed that I had answered these objections in what I said on this subject on the former occasion; and if he had not passed over, or had attempted to answer my reasoning, he would have seen it. I now say, that Christ did come to prevent the execution of the just sentence of the law upon the sinner, and, as I said before, "to make it just for God to show him *mercy*;" in which case there is not

the shadow of opposition between his and the Father's will. In this they were both agreed. If he still think that these objections "have some force," against our argument, I hope he will have the goodness to show wherein it lies.

The question, "What is salvation?" returns. My opponent still adheres to his definition of salvation as being "a deliverance from sins, and from evil propensities, and the implantation of holy affections," (and blames me for omitting to mention the latter clause, when it was fully implied in what I said,) but excludes the penalty for actual sins; and also repeats his assertion that repentance, faith, &c., are constituent parts, and not *conditions* of salvation: and adds, "till they are proved to be something else it is idle to spend time on the subject of conditions." But who disputes that these are "constituent" parts of *holiness*, or of *this part* of our salvation? I do not; for I admitted it in my lecture, and again explicitly admitted it in my remarks the other evening. And who is there that can prove to him that they are *conditions* at the same time that they are constituent parts, seeing that he declines to notice the arguments I used for that purpose on the other occasion? Why ask for more proof before he has answered those? But in addition to my former arguments, I add the following observations to show that a thing may be a *condition* and a constituent part also. In a state of life

which is made up of several things, some of them may be conditions and constituent parts also, and all of them may be conditions of something else. A man loses his health by intemperance, and all means prove ineffectual to restore it; at length the physician informs him that a return to temperance is the only condition of his obtaining his health. He complies, his health returns, and he continues temperate and healthy. In this case temperance is a condition, and yet it is a constituent part of health, as much as repentance is a constituent part of holiness. Once more. A man loses his character by lying and dishonesty, and there is no way for him to recover it but by reforming these habits. He reforms, recovers his character, and lives in good credit. In this case reformation is both a condition and constituent part of good character. And thus repentance and faith are conditions of our spiritual regeneration, or, in other words, of our becoming holy, and they still remain as "constituent" parts of that holiness; and holiness itself is both a condition and constituent part of our future happiness and eternal salvation. And this view of the subject, and only this, is consistent with the Scriptures, which require repentance and faith of us, and thereupon promise salvation. And I cannot approve of my opponent's comparing repentance and faith in their connection with salvation, to the resurrection of the human body and its con-

nection with the future life; because the resurrection depends on God alone, whereas repentance and faith are duties which he requires of men.

I hope my opponent will now feel himself bound to pay some more attention to "the all-important subject of conditions;" and, indeed, he has at length brought one argument, founded on the foreknowledge of God, and that designed to disprove free agency, and evince the necessity, the *philosophical necessity*, I suppose, of all human actions. I cannot but feel a little regret here on two accounts; *first*, that he did not bring forward his arguments in his first reply, seeing that by bringing them forward one at a time in this manner, our discussion may run into that season when we shall be driven from this house by the cold; and *secondly*, that he should go out of the Scriptures, in order to bring an objection against two doctrines of the Gospel, free agency, and conditions. But better late than never, and better of this sort than none. He says, "If God be omniscient he must know all things. He then infallibly knows who and how many will be saved. And if any are to be eternally sinful and miserable, he knows their number and persons with equal certainty. The *ultimate fate of all must be certain, or God could not know it.*" Here he undoubtedly means that the actions, as well as the future states of men are *necessary*, and unalterably fixed by God Against

this I have many bucklers to oppose, but can only use two or three at present.

1. If it be true that God regards mankind as free agents, then this objection is false. But God does so regard mankind every where in the Bible, and therefore gives them his commands, tells them they are accountable for their conduct, makes promises and threatenings, addresses motives of mercy and wrath to their hopes and fears, as though they were free. The conclusion, therefore, is that their actions are free, and not predestinated; because it would be utterly inconsistent with the veracity, goodness, and justice of God to deal thus with his creatures unless they were free.

2. We are not *conscious* of any necessity governing our actions; but we think, deliberate, compare, choose, and act; and when we have done wrong, blame ourselves, being *conscious* that we might have done otherwise; all which would be absurd and false if our actions were governed by *necessity*. This might be sufficient to show that necessity does not result from foreknowledge, and that my opponent's conclusion is false.

3. Actions and events are not dependent on foreknowledge for their existence; but foreknowledge of actions and events is predicated of their existence. Thus the objects which here surround you, and which you behold, do not exist because you see them, but you see them because they exist. Now

suppose that one year ago you had possessed intuitive knowledge, and could have looked through the twelve months before you, and seen how each person in this congregation would choose and act, you would have seen this meeting with all these surrounding objects, as they *are*, without your knowledge having the least influence in causing them to be what they are. Now it is only to apply this observation to the omniscient God, who sees through all futurity, and how each individual of the human race will choose and act, with as much certainty as he sees their actions the present moment, and you may see how actions and events that are not necessary; may yet be seen with certainty. If this and the two foregoing arguments are sound, then the objection built on foreknowledge, has not weakened the evidence of free agency and conditions in the least.

My opponent proceeds,—“If our brother is still anxious to discuss the subject of free agency, of which he says so much, and finds so much fault with me for avoiding, I hold myself ready to defend, by Scripture and reason, the doctrine that man is an agent—free to do what God may choose and no more,—that he is free to act according to the will of God, but not free to frustrate his purposes.” This challenge of my opponent I consider of a most singular character. When I advanced free agency in my lecture as the ground of conditions, it became his duty to

bring his objections, if he had any, to that doctrine. This he owed to the cause he had espoused, to his friends, and to the audience which has attended to hear the discussion. But not a word of this in all his first reply. This omission I noticed, complained of it, and as Paul in another case, tried to "provoke him to emulation." This produced in his second reply one solitary objection, that founded on foreknowledge, after which he tells me, "If I am still *anxious* to discuss this doctrine, he is *ready*." But I must inform him that if he has not love enough for his own cause to do that which is absolutely necessary to its existence, it is nothing to *me* whether it be discussed or not. But I thank him for giving his undisguised sentiments upon the subject of necessity, though he has withheld the arguments in support of them. But when does he expect a louder call than the present, "to defend by Scripture and reason, the doctrine that man is an agent,—free to do what God may choose, and no more?" His cause is bleeding for want of this defence, and will bleed to death without it, and may bleed to death with it. But surely he will have a hard task to perform whenever he shall attempt to prove that it is God's *choice* men should sin against him, rather than that they should be holy;—that some should be drunkards, and abuse themselves, their friends, and relations;—that some should steal and lie;—that others should commit highway robbery and murder,

and that others should kill themselves. He must show also wherein the criminality consists of doing the will of God, and how God can *choose* that men should live in sin, and yet *forbid* them to sin on pain of his sorest displeasure. Here are facts which can never be reconciled with the doctrine of necessity.

It is said if there are any conditions required of us "God is deprived of a part of the glory of our salvation." Not at all. God will eternally have the glory of our redemption, of pardoning our sins, making us holy, saving us from deserved punishment, and bringing us to heaven, and all this in the way of grace, upon conditions. It would bring no glory to God, after making man a free agent, and requiring his obedience as such, to save him in a way that would supersede both his free agency and obedience. This is a fine argument indeed—"we will not repent, believe in Christ, or perform one jot or tittle of obedience, lest God should not have 'all the glory of our salvation.'" There are too many who practically profess *this* regard for God's glory; and shall the professed ministers of Christ assert and defend it?

Why should a man raise a *dust* where *light* is wanted? My opponent said in his first reply that I quoted Scripture to show "that we must have faith," &c., in order to be saved, and said that no Universalist would object to it. I saw that this turn was given to the argument because he could not meet the evi-

dence of those passages as requiring conditions, and complained of the misrepresentation, and withal pointed out the difference between *believing*, as a *free agent*, and *having faith*, &c., in a passive sense. Instead of meeting this distinction as a fair disputant would have done, either by showing that my sense of those passages was wrong, or that his was right, he persists still in representing that there is no difference between *believing* in *my* sense of the word, and *having faith* in *his*; and now tries to turn this distinction into ridicule by saying, "When he will show us how a man can *believe*, without having faith, &c., then, and not till then, shall we perceive a propriety in this distinction." But if it be evident that in both his replies, and in all that he has said upon this subject, he has seen, and acted upon "this distinction," will not all candid judges say, at least, that he has trifled with a serious subject, and evaded the point? I "take no exceptions" at my opponent's "presenting a bill" which I drew on the Rev. H. Ballou, some nine or ten years ago, and which *last* Thursday evening came back protested; and I hold myself ready to pay it the moment he shall prove that the sentiments contained in the "story of rebellion" are not genuine Universalism; and till he does that I think we have his own consent to call those sentiments "smoke."*

* The circumstances alluded to is this: Some years ago, in a little discussion I had with Rev. H. B., to ex-

My opponent has now as much difficulty with his own comment upon the verb "believeth not," in the apostle's commission, as he had before with the verb itself. I contended that this verb is in the present time. - This he disputed, and said it must have "allusion to the future," and to this end gave us his criticism upon the Greek participle. I still urged, in my reply, that it must be in the present tense, for this reason, that if it be not in the present, but in the future, it will follow, that he that "*believeth not*" is *not* condemned, but only he who "*shall not believe*;" and to obviate his difficulty, observed that this is a "statute in the kingdom of Christ," and that while it remains the same, and time passes on, it comes to all the successive generations of men in the same way, that is, in the present time. He now attempts to make you believe that I have adopted "one of the horns of his dilemma"—that which points to the future, and that we are quite well agreed on this point! "He does adopt one horn, and admits that the words 'believeth not,' had allusion to time *future to the period* when the words were spoken. And this is a fact for

pose his artful method of diverting the reader's attention, I related an anecdote of a robber, who said to the man he wished to rob, "Do you see that smoke yonder?" and while the man was gazing to see the smoke, he lost his property. This anecdote my opponent has found somewhere, and applied to what he calls my "story of rebellion."

which we also contend." But that was not the point in dispute, but whether the verb "*believeth not*" is to be taken in the present or future time. This is little better than downright equivocation.

He makes a farther attempt to support his conclusion from our argument, that it would damn all heathen and infants. He informs you that I said 'infants cannot be unbelievers, for the reason that they have no *belief* or knowledge of the subject.' Here he has omitted three of my arguments to show that infants cannot be unbelievers, and has ascribed to me one that I did not use. I did not say that "infants cannot be unbelievers for the reason that they have *no belief*." I should have concluded that this was an accident, were it not that he says; I said this "to evade the force of his argument." But surely he ought not to accuse me of "evasion," and then to make it out, ascribe to me an absurd argument that I did not use, and omit three sound ones that I did use. But he says "he has been in the *habit* of thinking that an unbeliever was one who did not believe, and that unbelief signified *simply* a want of belief." This then was not a hasty thought, or sudden conclusion with him, but what he was in the *habit* of thinking. But we have "been in the *habit* of thinking" that *unbelief*, as well as *belief*, implies moral action; and that if it be not so, a horse may be an unbeliever as well as a man; for I ask, does a horse believe? The answer must be, no;—then, says my opponent,

a horse is an unbeliever, "because unbelief signifies *simply* a want of belief."

Again. He thinks that our argument built on the words, "He that believeth shall be saved, but he that believeth not shall be damned," "hangs up the heathen between heaven and hell as fit for neither:" because if they have not faith in Christ they cannot be saved; and "if they have not unbelief they cannot be damned." Had he attended properly to Rom. ii, 12, and to the observations on it, when that passage was under consideration in the discussion on future judgment, he would have seen that different nations are under different dispensations of light, and that each is to be judged according to the light of his dispensation. Those under the Gospel will be judged by the Gospel; those under the law of Moses, by the law of Moses; and those under what is called "the law of nature," by the law of nature; and according to their respective dispensations will be saved or lost. And therefore the heathen who never had the offer of Christ, can have neither faith nor unbelief in the Gospel sense of those words.

In my last answer I considered the case of Paul, as I supposed my opponent intended it, as one of his two arguments to show that the self murderer, the drunkard who dies while he is drunk, &c., may be made holy without their own agency; and proved, if I mistake not, that it was not a case in point. My opponent now gives us to understand that he produced that

case for another purpose, viz., to show that sinners receive their whole desert of punishment in this life. Whether he has given it this turn to evade the force of my remarks, (as he has not replied to them,) I cannot tell; but he has again fallen into a little inaccuracy in representing me as saying "that Paul was a very good man before he was converted." I neither *said*, nor *implied* this. My words were, "in many respects he was an amiable man." I never disputed, however, that on the whole, he was a great sinner: and as it respects his suffering the whole penalty of the law in his own person, I still feel justified in saying, notwithstanding the loud complaint of my opponent, that if he did so, he was never pardoned. And if I "fight a man of straw," when I assert this, my opponent will have to encounter a *giant*, when he undertakes to show that the man whose sins are all forgiven, is nevertheless holden to suffer the whole penalty of the law in his own person. And this he must now do, or cease his complaints in future.

Once more. To show that he who dies in a state of intoxication may be made holy, it is said, 1. "That all things are possible with God." We dispute this, unless it be qualified; for "God cannot lie,"—"God cannot deny himself;" and if God has made man a free agent, given him his law, and required his obedience as the condition of his salvation, he cannot save him in a different way without denying himself.

2. It is said, "If it be a fact that the Scriptures declare that God will make all men holy in his own time, this *supposed* case (is it not a *real* case?) cannot prove that such person shall never be made holy."—True, "if the Scriptures declare" this: but this is the point to be *proved*, and not taken for granted.

3. A case is supposed, of two men born at the same time, one lives a notoriously wicked life, and at last is executed for murder: but just before his execution experiences converting grace, and goes to heaven. The other lives a good, moral, and Christian life, till just before he dies he gets drunk, dies in that state, and goes to hell. Now it is supposed that these cases form a strong objection to our doctrine, because the one is not rewarded according to his good deeds, nor the other punished according to his sins. But we cannot see that these cases form any objection at all to our doctrine, since they take place according to the statute of Christ's kingdom, "in such case made and provided." This case may be fully illustrated by reference to "the story of rebellion and the president's proclamation," which you no doubt remember. One of the "rebels" stands out till the last hour of the space allowed by the proclamation for the submission of the rebels, when he submits, is pardoned, escapes the gallows, and enjoys all the privileges of society. Another, who had been true to his country all his days, or had been pardoned on the first promulgation of the proclamation, rebels at the

last hour, and is hung for it. I leave you to make the application.

I have now gone over with all that part of the reply which was intended to apply to my lecture, and what do we find? We find, as before, that the principal points in my lecture remain untouched. To this hour my opponent has never examined one of the many texts alleged in proof of conditions, to see whether they require repentance, faith, and obedience, as the actions of free agents, or only express what they must *have* in a *passive* sense, as when it is supposed that God impresses these virtues upon the soul in a state of intoxication. Nor has he applied a single remark to obviate the awful consequences of asserting that God makes the impenitent sinner holy at the last moment of his life, while he dies in a state of intoxication. What becomes of the truth of the Divine threatenings, and of the honour of the Lawgiver in this case, we are left to conjecture. He has not brought a single text of Scripture to bear directly on the point of free agency, conditions, or God's making the sinner holy at the last moment of his life. He has in no instance, except that of the verbs in the apostles' commission, attempted a close examination of my argument,—and we have seen how he has succeeded in that. In general he entirely overlooks my arguments, as in the case of conditions being parts of salvation, or has merely glanced at them. If I wrongfully accuse him here, he has it in his power

to convince you of it by facts, since the whole is in writing, and he no doubt will do it.

In regard to my opponent's Scripture proofs of universal salvation, though I thought them unseasonable, I consented to consider them, as I have consented to him in other things, that he might not have it to say, he had not an "equal ground;" but I did consider his course foreign to the subject of my second lecture, which was then under discussion. I demanded proof, direct and substantial, that God will make the impenitent sinner holy in the moment of death; but that proof is not to be found in those scriptures. Having admitted his course, I should have considered all his proofs, had time permitted, and I contented myself with barely noticing those I thought the most important to his cause. With respect to those which have been commented on by us both, I agree with him to refer what has been said to the judgment of the audience. For the argument on the others I referred, as you may recollect, to the speech of the Rev. —, upon the word "hang," in the story of "rebellion," and that speech is a fair specimen of my opponent's reasoning on those passages. See in the following case:—"No man can call Jesus Lord but by the Holy Ghost." "As many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the children of God," "Every knee shall bow, and every tongue shall confess that Jesus Christ is Lord," &c. The argument is,* "that all shall be led by the

* This argument was not in form in the reply, nor

Holy Ghost to call Jesus Lord, and all who are led by the Spirit are children of God; therefore all shall be made holy—all shall be saved." I have observed to you that the last of these passages is twice quoted from the Prophet Isaiah, and is never used as a promise, but always by way of admonition, and in Rom. xiv, 11, is applied to the last judgment, when the righteous shall "bow," and "confess," in pious homage, the wicked by constraint. I might add, that, "Not every one that saith Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; but," &c. 1 Tim. ii, 4, "God will have all men to be saved," &c. "If this be the will of God will it not be accomplished?" We ask, is the will of God accomplished by mankind *now*? or is it not the will of God they should *now* "be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth" now? "Tell us not," says my opponent, "that men will not come when God draws them. 'My counsel shall stand and I will do all my pleasure.'" But God does his pleasure as truly when he punishes the unbeliever, as when he saves the believer; and this is the "counsel and purpose of God."

The subject of the fifteenth chapter of 1 Cor, is the resurrection of the human body; and the text so much relied on by our opponents, "For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive," is to be understood of the natural death and resurrection of the
were the passages given at length, and the whole indicated perturbation of mind.

body alone. And as we have "borne the 'image of the earthly' Adam in a frail, corruptible body; so shall we bear the image of the heavenly" Adam, Christ Jesus, in his spiritual, incorruptible body. In Luke xx, 34-36, our Saviour answers the question of the Sadducees, respecting the right of seven brethren to one woman in the resurrection: he says, "In the resurrection they neither marry, nor are given in marriage; neither can they die any more;" but in both these respects are like the "angels," and are the children of God—not because they are holy, but because they are "the children of the resurrection." There is nothing in this text or context that favours universal salvation in the least. In Rom. v, 20, the apostle tells us that "where sin abounded; grace *did* much more abound;" not to intimate that death by sin is "temporal," and the life by grace, "eternal;" for of this there is not the least trace in the chapter: but to show among other things of a spiritual nature, that the grace by Christ was greater than the curse by Adam, in that "the judgment was by *one* offence of Adam unto condemnation;" whereas, "the free gift by Christ is of *many* offences unto justification," to all who receive that grace. Thus "where sin abounded, grace did much more abound."

I have now considered all my opponent's principal passages, but do not find universal salvation in one of them; and how any person who reflects seriously, and thinks closely, can

satisfy himself that that doctrine is true, on so slight grounds, is not easy to conjecture. On the general character of his proofs we may observe that not one of them speaks to the point of universal salvation, but he is obliged to infer it from every one of them. This is indirect proof at the best, and can never stand against the direct proof on the other side of the question. And is it not a little singular that my opponent should rest the whole weight of his doctrine on *inferential* proof, and yet require that *my* proof should all be *explicit*? When the doctrine of future judgment was under discussion, as I have before observed, he never forgot to ask, on any text, "does this passage *say* the judgment is in the future state?" But now he can rest his whole cause on *inferential* proof. I called his attention to this inconsistency and want of rule in interpreting the Scriptures in my last, in a way which I thought would compel him, either to make concession, to vindicate himself, or deny the charge. But not a word do we hear from him on any of these points. And after all, he calls upon you to "search the Scriptures, whether these things are so." I heartily join him in this request, confidently believing that a candid attention to the word of God will bring all to the knowledge of the truth as it is in Jesus.

You may observe also that his proofs are taken independently of their context, which gives them a decided character against his main position. See Luke xx, 34-36; Rom,

v, 20, and xiv, 11; 1 Cor. xv, 22; &c. His proofs are generally arbitrarily construed, and can never disprove the doctrine of future, everlasting punishment.

And wherefore do we urge these things? Is it because we love you not? God knoweth. We are shortly to leave this world, and the great question is, what shall be our state hereafter? You are told not to fear, not to be anxious about your future state, for you will all do well enough. But will you believe this on slight grounds? Will you not pause and examine? Will you not inquire what effect the belief of this is likely to have upon your conduct? Can you believe it will make you more watchful, and prayerful—more ready to deny yourselves, and bear your daily cross—more desirous of dying unto the world and sin, and living unto righteousness? Will it inspire a greater hatred of sin and love of holiness? Will you not examine yourselves to see what powers and faculties God has given you? And will you not look into his word to learn what he requires of you? If you find that he requires repentance, faith, and universal obedience, will you not, ought you not to attend to them? And can you feel safe while you do not render to God his due? While you are loitering do you not hear his threatenings? And are you not afraid of them? While you feel an inclination to believe this new doctrine, do you never suspect the purity of your motives? Do you not consider it as a kind of release from the obligations of ex-

perimental and practical religion? And can you feel safe while neglecting the duties you owe your God and Saviour? Have you considered that religion is designed for your moral and spiritual improvement, and to fit you for the enjoyment of the heavenly state? If then you neglect religion, do you not neglect your own mercies, your own salvation? And can you be sure you shall be saved if you neglect your own salvation? On what does your faith rest? Do you say "on the Scriptures?" But where do you find in all the Scriptures a single passage that teaches you that all mankind shall be saved without suffering any punishment in the future state? Do you say that you infer it from such passages as have been considered in the foregoing pages? But are you sure that you understand those Scriptures? The whole Christian world has, for eighteen hundred years, understood those Scriptures in a different sense; nay, all former Universalists, and one half of the present Universalists understand those Scriptures differently from you; and what assurance have you that you understand them better than all the rest of the world? Have you searched more diligently? Have you better means of knowledge than others? Can you look over the arguments which have been brought against this doctrine in the course of this discussion, and pronounce that they have no weight in them? Are you *sure* that you are not free agents—*sure* there are no conditions in salvation—*sure* that if you should

die in a state of intoxication, or kill yourselves, God will produce holiness in you at the last moment? Can you meet the objections to this, or say that they have been fairly met in the course of this discussion?

Finally. The doctrine now proposed for your acceptance involves the greatest responsibility. In this respect it differs from all other systems ever proposed to the children of men. The question is, shall all men be saved in the future state? If you say, yes, and trust to the doctrine, and it should prove false, you are of all men most miserable, because the most deceived, and disappointed, and nothing can retrieve your loss. In view of this subject, and in view of the arguments which, in the course of this discussion, have been urged against the doctrine of universal salvation, I ask you, in the fear of God, whether there is one in this assembly who is so fully satisfied of the truth of the doctrine, that he is willing, without repentance, without faith, without holiness, to meet his final hour—and—his Judge!

Nov. 23, 1827.

ANSWER IV.

Remarks on Mr. Paige's Reply to Answer III.

“Turn ye, turn ye, from your evil ways; for why will ye die, O house of Israel!” Ezek. xxxiii, 11.

IN my opponent's reply of Nov. 23, he advanced the doctrine of necessity, as founded

on the Divine foreknowledge of human actions and events; but I declined discussing this subject with him any farther at that time, for the following reasons:—

First, he did not bring this subject forward till the evening of the third discussion upon my second lecture. Previous to this he had pursued a course which had the appearance of design to wear out the congregation by protracting the discussion till the cold season should drive the congregation from the place of meeting;—particularly his playing off from the points at issue, neglecting many of my proofs and arguments, and bringing in foreign matter, as he did in his second reply. Upon this I took the resolution not to discuss any more new matter upon the second lecture; and waited on him with this view. I observed to him that we had gone over a good deal of ground—that the points in dispute had not been closely discussed, and that I thought it not proper to bring in any more new matter till the old was disposed of. He made no objection, but said he thought as I did upon the subject. If these are not the exact words made use of, the conversation was *substantially* as here related.

Secondly. In my second answer upon this lecture I had anticipated his views of foreknowledge and necessity, and framed an article explanatory of the former, and offered three arguments against the latter. And yet in his third reply, contrary to the mutual un-

derstanding between us, and without noticing my arguments against necessity, he brought in that doctrine, and argued it at length, making more new matter than he had brought into any reply since the commencement of the discussion. My principal reason, however, for not discussing the doctrine of necessity with him was his passing over my arguments on that subject without noticing them. It was evident that in this way we might continue the discussion all winter, without bringing any thing to a close. Rather there can be no discussion when the arguments on one side are entirely overlooked on the other:

I now propose to examine closely the ground of his doctrine of necessity, and the arguments by which he attempts to support it. His particular views of necessity,—whether the moral necessity contended for by our Calvinist brethren, or the *philosophical fatal necessity* contended for by the Deists in general, he has never given us; but I suppose they accord with the latter, not only because he has used the word *fate* in this connection with arguments of this character, but because these are the views of Mr. Ballou, with whom he appears to agree in all points.* He was

* My opponent was understood to say on the evening of the last discussion, that though the *Treatise on Atonement*, by Mr. Ballou, had been before the public thirty years, it had never been answered. This is a mistake, as may be seen by the 6th volume of the *Methodist Magazine*. I believe also that the Rev. Mr.

called upon to make this expression of his particular views on this subject, but never did it; and this is one circumstance among many, that shows with what reluctance he brought this subject forward. He probably anticipated that this would not only be unpopular with the public at large, but with many of his own brethren in particular, who, it is said, are known to be opposed to the doctrine of necessity.*

The proposition which he lays down, and endeavours to support, is the following:—

“*Man is an agent, free to do what God may choose and no more.*” This proposition is at variance with itself; for if man be an *agent*, he is not a *patient*—if he be *free*, his actions are not necessary: and to say that man is an *agent*, and a *patient*—that his actions are *free* and are *necessary*, is not less absurd than to say, a man is a *slave* and has *full liberty* at the same time. *Freedom* and *necessity* are as much opposed to each other as any conditions of life, or any principles that can be imagined. There is a perfect contrariety between them. We will, however, hear my opponent, and we will consider his arguments.

Hudson, of Westminster, a Universalist preacher, has answered this work in connection with some other of *Mr. Ballou's*.

* Since the discussion closed, he has said that “he advanced and defended the doctrine of philosophical necessity,” in his “account” of the discussion published in the *Universalist Magazine*.

I. He "offers some reasons in support of this doctrine: and,

II. Produces some of the Scripture proofs of the same."

I. He "offers some reasons in support of this doctrine."

1. His *first* reason is founded on the "certainty of an event that is foreknown;" and the *second* is an inference, "that man is not free to do what God knows he never will do." Now I shall admit the *certainty* of an event that is foreknown, but deny the *necessity* of that event. Let it, however, be observed, that by *event* here, is meant *human action*.

I am happy to agree with my late opponent in one thing respecting foreknowledge, viz., that when we speak of the Divine foreknowledge, we speak after the manner of men, and according to the conceptions of men;—that properly speaking, there is no such thing as foreknowledge, or afterknowledge with God, but only *present* knowledge. This follows, of course, if God fills all time, past and future, as he fills all space, that is, if he pervades and comprehends eternity, as he pervades and comprehends all space. And that he does so, will appear from the Scriptures. "A thousand years with him are as one day, and one day as a thousand years." And, says the prophet, "Thou art from everlasting to everlasting." Here, if you divide *æternitas a parte ante*, from *æternitas a parte post*, that eternity which is past, from that eternity which is to

come, you may see how they are brought into the present moment by the prophet,—"Thou art from everlasting to everlasting."

And indeed our reason will tell us that if God be infinite, and his knowledge absolute, it must be so. *Past* and *future* have respect to man, who had a beginning, and must have an end in this world, and whose progress through life is measured by the lapse of time; but the duration of the Divine existence is not measured by days, months, and years, nor does he obtain his knowledge in the way that man doth. Man is dependent on a course of instruction and education for all his knowledge; but we cannot say this of God. There is a time, that is, before they are instructed, when mankind are ignorant; but we cannot say this of God. Man is dependent on means for all his knowledge, and obtains knowledge by slow degrees; but we cannot say this of God, whose knowledge is *absolute, intuitive, and infinite*. Man knows with certainty only a few future events, namely, those which are dependent on the uniform operation of the laws of nature, as the phases of the moon, the ebbing and flowing of the tides, &c., but God, whose knowledge is independent, sees all the volitions and actions of free agents with as much certainty as those events which are dependent on the laws of nature. While we have an imperfect knowledge of the objects which surround us in this place, and of the actions which are going on here, we are igno-

rant of what is going on in another place because we are not there; but God has a perfect knowledge of whatever *is*, in every part of the earth, and throughout the universe, because he is not confined to one place, but is present in all places at the same time. We know not what we, or others, shall be doing a year hence; but God knows perfectly what shall be our condition, and what we shall be doing at that time, because that time is *present* with him. And he knows how all his creatures will act in all future time, because all their actions, and all future time, are *present* with him.

And hence it will follow, that if we can have an imperfect knowledge of the objects which now surround us, and of the actions of the present moment, without those objects and actions being necessary, and without our knowledge having the least influence in producing them, God may have a perfect knowledge of all future events, even the volitions and actions of free agents, without those events and actions being necessary, and without his knowledge having the least influence in producing them. Of course, when we say that God cannot know the future actions of men, unless their actions are made unavoidable by a previous necessity, we *humanize* his knowledge, and place it on the same ground with that of our own. Short-sighted, imperfect man cannot know the future actions of men, unless he can first see some law of

necessity operating to produce them; and therefore he says God cannot know their future actions unless by the same necessity. This represents his knowledge as dependent and imperfect like that of man. But change the terms and say that man may have knowledge of *present* actions, which are not necessary; and then I would ask, on the evidence that all future time and future events are *present* with God, whether he cannot know the actions of his creatures which are not made unavoidable by a previous necessity? If you say no, then you represent his knowledge as less perfect than that of man; because man can know present actions which were not necessary.

But it is said, "that man has no power to do an action which God saw he would not do; and the conduct of the Jews and of Judas toward our Lord is appealed to in this view. Their conduct was foreknown and foretold; and, therefore, it is said, they "could not possibly have done otherwise than they did." This is as false in logic as it is in divinity. If it be said that the conduct of the Jews and of Judas was foreknown, and therefore it would take place, it is correct; but when it is said that because it was foreknown it was *necessary*, or *unavoidable*, it is false. We will put the argument into the form of a syllogism, and we shall see how it will stand.

If God foreknows the actions of men, their actions are certain;

But God foreknows the actions of men; —
Therefore their actions are certain.

This is now a good argument, because we have got the same in the premises and in the conclusion, namely, the *certainty* of the actions of men. But when you change the term *certain*, for the term *necessary* or *unavoidable*; you make a false argument of it, because you bring more into the conclusion than you have in the premises. In the premises you have simply the *certainty* of their actions; but in the conclusion you have more than the *certainty*, you have the *necessity* of their actions, and the *impossibility* that their actions should have been different from what they are: in other words, the premises relate simply to the actions of men as agents; but the conclusion relates to the *physical power* of the agents, and asserts that they have not *power* to act differently from what they do.

Let us now apply this distinction between the certainty and the necessity of human actions to some familiar cases, and we shall see that actions may be certain which are not necessary.

A man is convicted of a crime. It is therefore *certain* that he has committed a criminal action. The question, therefore, is not now respecting the *certainty* of the criminal action, but concerning the *necessity* of it; and though after the action is performed, it cannot be altered, yet it is certain that before it was performed it *might* have been prevented. But, says the objector, the criminal action in this

case was foreknown, and therefore it was *necessary*, and *could not possibly* have been otherwise. To this it may be replied, that foreknowledge, as well as present knowledge, being dependent on the action, and not the action on the knowledge of it, the action might have been different, that is, a virtuous action might have been performed instead of a criminal one, in which case the criminal action would not have been foreknown, but the virtuous one. And it is abundantly evident that he who performed the criminal action, had, at the time he performed it, all the ability necessary for avoiding it, and for performing a virtuous one in its stead.

And this is the sentiment of all mankind in practice, and therefore it is just; but the contrary would be absurd and dangerous in practice, and therefore must be false. All punishments, human and Divine, proceed on the principle, that he who has done wrong, *might* have done right. The necessity of wrong actions, is, therefore, universally rejected. Let us suppose a man to be brought before a judge in an action of theft, and to plead in extenuation of guilt, that the theft was foreknown, and therefore *could not possibly* have been prevented. Would his plea be admitted? But suppose the thief should urge this plea with the judge, and should say, "Your honour foreknew that I should commit this theft; and therefore I could not possibly avoid it." What reply would the judge make? Would he not say, "I

merely foresaw how you, as a free agent, would act; and I saw, at the same time, that you had power to act differently; you cannot, therefore, exculpate yourself on the ground of *necessity*." Every master, and every parent who has occasion to administer punishment would say the same. And God himself says the same in all the administrations of the penalties of his law. He never admits the plea of necessity arising from foreknowledge, which he no doubt would do if it were true.

If I mistake not, we may conclude, from the foregoing observations, that the only difficulty arising from foreknowledge is in a mistake of our own, in supposing that the actions foreknown are dependent on the knowledge of them for their existence; whereas foreknowledge is as much dependent on the actions foreknown, as present knowledge is. And in all cases the action foreknown, in the order of nature, precedes the knowledge of it; though in relation to God, there may be no difference in *time* between the action and the knowledge of it. And were we careful to observe that the phrase "foreknowledge," is a phrase "after the manner of men," and conveys an idea of human knowledge which is always imperfect; and that the Divine knowledge is all *present* knowledge, we should have no more difficulty about the foreknowledge of God, than we have about our present knowledge. And who that should learn at any time the objects, persons, and actions surrounding

him, would suppose from the bare fact of his knowledge of them, that they were dependent on his knowledge for their existence, or that they existed of necessity? Yet the inference of necessity in this case would be just as correct as in the case of foreknowledge. When therefore, the question of necessity arising from foreknowledge comes up, we have only to reflect that present knowledge does not imply such a necessity of the existence of human actions as that they could not have been different from what they are, and that the Divine knowledge is all present knowledge, and the difficulty vanishes at once.

That prince of English poets, the author of *Paradise Lost*, has some striking thoughts on this subject, which are so just and beautiful that I cannot withhold them from the audience. He represents the Father as speaking to the Son on the apostasy of Adam, thus:—

“ So will fall,
 He and his faithless progeny. Whose fault?
 Whose but his own? Ingrate! he had of me
 All he could have; I made him just and right,
 Sufficient to have stood, though free to fall.
 Such I created all th’ æthereal powers
 And spirits, both them who stood and them who
 fail’d;
 Freely they stood who stood, and fell who fell.
 Not free, what proof could they have given sincere
 Of true allegiance, constant faith or love,
 Where only what they needs must do appear’d,
 Not what they would? what praise could they
 receive?

What pleasure I from such obedience paid,
 When will and reason (reason also is choice)
 Useless and vain, of freedom both despoil'd,
 Made passive both, had served necessity,
 Not me? they therefore as to right belong'd,
 So were created, nor can justly accuse
 Their Maker, or their making, or their fate,
 As if predestination overruled
 Their will, disposed by absolute decree
 Or high *foreknowledge*: they themselves decreed
 Their own revolt, not I: if I foreknew,
 Foreknowledge had no *influence* on their fault,
 Which had no less proved certain unforeknown."

In my opponent's arguments for necessity, there is a manifest want of method, the same argument recurring repeatedly in different words. His third and fourth arguments may be taken together, and expressed thus:—

"From the omnipotence of God we may infer that he would not suffer his creatures to act contrary to his own choice."

Now when we look around us we see much irreligion, much neglect of Christ and the Gospel; we see much obscenity and profaneness; much gross intemperance and fraudulent dealing; much of murder, suicide, and duelling; in a word, much of all kinds of wickedness, and all, according to the argument, the "*choice*" of God, that is, he *preferred* that his creatures should be guilty of unnatural, beastly, and diabolical conduct, to their being *innocent, pure, and holy*. That there is much of this conduct among men is the plain matter of fact, and cannot be denied; and the argument tells us that "God will not suffer his creatures to act con-

trary to *his own choice.*" Is not this a *pleasant*, not to say a *safe* doctrine to preach to every part of the community? I trust that with this enlightened audience it requires no argument to prove that this doctrine is as much at variance with the Bible, as it is with the reason of man and the interests of society.

The next argument is a very singular one. My opponent gives us to understand that "God could not be *happy* if men acted *contrary* to his choice." According to this, God is dependent for his happiness on the conduct of his creatures; and what is still more singular, he could not be happy if his creatures were all holy, he could not be happy if a vast proportion of mankind were not guilty of all that is implied in impiety, corruption, and wickedness, seeing that this is *his will* concerning them. And what must be the character of that being whose happiness is dependent on the wickedness of others?—*Father, forgive thy creatures, who thus represent thy character, for they know not what they do.*

We come now to his Scripture proofs of the doctrine of necessity. The first class he calls "inferential;" the second, "direct proofs."

1. "Inferential."—"We have proof that man cannot effectually resist the power of God." We remark here *first*, That, according to this, God governs the actions of men by his "power;" and, *secondly*, That not only when he exerts his power to make men *virtuous*, but also when he exerts it to make them

wicked, they "cannot effectually resist his power." To present these sentiments without disguise is to confute them.

2. "God commissioned his prophets to foretell future events;" and it is inferred that "if these were certain, men had no power to prevent their accomplishment;" and my opponent appeals to the conduct of the Jews and of Judas toward our Saviour, to show that they had not power to do otherwise. These cases have been considered in the article upon foreknowledge; where, if I mistake not, it is shown that the bare certainty of an action does not imply the want of a *physical power* in the agent to act differently from what he does. If what is there said be not sufficient, we now say, that if the Jews and Judas had *not power* to do differently from what they did, we cannot see that they were in the least to blame.

3. "God has declared his will in many ways;—and if he has power to accomplish it, then man has no power to frustrate it." To this we answer,—If by not "frustrating" the will of God, is meant not acting contrary to his will, then we have had this argument before, and need not spend time upon it here. But if my opponent uses the word "frustrate" in the sense of to *deceive*, or *disappoint*, then we have nothing to do with it; because God is no more *deceived* or *disappointed* on our principles than on his own. To be deceived or disappointed would argue imperfection of

knowledge in Deity, which our principles do not admit, and which cannot be true.

4. "God has made promises to mankind. But if man has power to frustrate the designs of God, he may not be able to accomplish his promises." This implies that the promises of God are absolute and unconditional, and cannot fail of being accomplished. You, my hearers, will judge whether this be correct. The promises relating to the land of Canaan which were made to the Israelites, and which wore the most absolute aspect, were nevertheless conditional, and failed of their accomplishment; for thus saith God to them. "Doubtless ye shall not come into the land concerning which I *sware* to make you dwell therein, save Caleb the son of Jephunneh, and Joshua the son of Nun—and ye shall know my *breach* of promise,"—that is, ye shall know that my promises are conditional, and that when you wickedly neglect the conditions, I am not bound to fulfil the promises, Num. xiv, 30, 34. It was thus also in the promises made to the house of Eli, "Wherefore the Lord God of Israel saith, I said indeed, that thy house, and the house of thy father, should walk before me for ever: but now the Lord saith, Be it *far from me*; for them that honour me I will honour, and they that despise me shall be lightly esteemed," 1 Sam. ii, 30. See also the promises made to David, where God says, "Once have I sworn by my holiness, that I will not lie unto David.

His seed shall endure for ever, and his throne as the sun before me. It shall be established for ever as the moon, and as a faithful witness in heaven. But," says David, in the very next words, "Thou hast cast off and abhorred, thou hast been wroth with thine anointed. Thou hast made void the covenant of thy servant; thou hast profaned his crown by casting it to the ground," &c., Psa. lxxxix, 35-39. Again, God says by Jeremiah, "At what instant I shall speak concerning a nation, and concerning a kingdom, to build and to plant it: if it do evil in my sight, that it obey not my voice, then I will repent of the good wherewith I said I would benefit them," Jer. xviii, 9, 10. Once more. "When I shall say to the righteous, that he shall surely live; if he trust in his own righteousness, and commit iniquity, all his righteousness shall not be remembered; but for his iniquity that he hath committed he shall die for it," Ezek. xxxiii, 13.

These passages may serve to show that the promises made to the children of men are conditional, and that if they fail of performing the conditions they have no claim upon the promises. And that the promises of pardon, of sanctification and final salvation are conditional is manifest from the whole word of God.

We come now to what my opponent considers the "direct proof" that all the actions, particularly the evil actions of men, are pre-determined by God, made necessary and

unavoidable. For this purpose he quotes Isa. xlvi, 10, "My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure." If the sentiment of my opponent be correct, we have nothing to do, in order to know what the "counsel and pleasure" of God is, but to look around us and see what the actions of men are. Let us then take the account which St. Paul has given of the Gentiles in his day, and which is true of many in our day, and let us see whether we ought to resolve it into the "*counsel and pleasure*" of the Lord, or into another cause as different from that as hell from heaven. The apostle tells us that they were "backbiters, haters of God, spiteful, proud, boasters, inventors of evil things, disobedient to parents, without understanding, covenant breakers, without natural affection, implacable, unmerciful: who knowing the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them." Here is twofold proof of the depravity of these Gentiles; *first*, they did these things themselves; and, *secondly*, they had "pleasure" in such as did them. And shall we say that God also has "*pleasure*" in them that do these things, and that he has taken *effectual measures* in his "*counsel*" to secure the commission of all this wickedness? The text speaks, not only of the "*counsel*" and "*pleasure*" of God, but shows also that he will *do* his "*counsel*" and "*pleasure*" himself. Now, I leave

it with you, my candid hearers, to say, whether the counsel and pleasure of the Lord, which *he will accomplish*, refers to the wickedness of mankind, or to those events which are to be brought about by his overruling providence; such as the restoration of the Jews from the Babylonish captivity; which is the subject of the disputed text. This was the "counsel and pleasure" of God, which he would accomplish in spite of the idols of Babylon, and of all his enemies.

Again, Isa. lv, 11, is quoted for the same purpose, viz., to show the necessity of all human actions. "So shall my word be that goeth forth out of my mouth; it shall not return unto me void; but it shall accomplish that which I please, and it shall prosper in the thing whereto I sent it." My opponent has much to say of the "purposes of God;" and every where assumes that his purposes relate to the *actions* of his creatures. But this is the point to be *proved*, and not assumed. None of his proofs, however, touch this point. We do not deny the purposes of God, but admit that many things are included in his purposes, as that Christ should come into the world to redeem mankind—that mankind should be free agents, and have a day of grace, and the means of grace—that they should die,—be raised from the dead and brought to judgment, &c.; but we deny that the actions of moral agents are so included in the purposes of God that they cannot be different

from what they are. The "word" in the text which shall "not return void, but prosper in the thing whereto it is sent," is the prophetic word relating to the times of the Gospel, and which shall be effectual in all that believe, to save from the guilt, pollution, and condemnation of sin; and we might add, which shall be effectual in the final condemnation and punishment of all who reject the Gospel. But all this is done while their actions are their own, and are *free*.

Dan. iv, 35, is also produced to show the necessity of human actions. "He doeth according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth: and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, What doest thou?" These words were spoken by Nebuchadnezzar, on occasion of his former insanity, and subsequent return of reason, in which he acknowledged the power of God; and they may be applied to any of those events in the life of man, or the kingdoms of this world, which are brought about by the providence and power of God; but were never intended to teach the necessity of the actions of moral and accountable creatures, and much less that "God works all things in all men, even wickedness in the wicked." We now see how little reason my opponent had to draw this horrid and blasphemous conclusion of the necessity of all human actions, from any of those passages which he adduced in proof of his position. And yet he calls the

evidence of these passages "direct proof" of his doctrine.

We have more of this kind of "direct proof" in the following passages, which are designed to show that "actions which we call sinful, and for which we incur punishment, are in *accordance* with the will of God." The first produced is Gen. xlv, 5, 7, 8, where Joseph says to his brethren, "Now, therefore, be not grieved, nor angry with yourselves, that ye sold me hither; for God did send me before you to preserve life. And God sent me before you to preserve you a posterity in the earth, and to save your lives by a great deliverance. So now it was not you that sent me hither, but God: and he hath made me a father to Pharaoh, and lord of all his house, and a ruler throughout all the land of Egypt."

We may remark here, 1. That God had a wise and merciful design in sending Joseph into Egypt, while his brethren had an envious, malicious, and murderous design in sending him thither. 2. We may remark that God so overruled their evil design as to accomplish his own merciful design, and produce great good to them, to their father's house, and to the Egyptians. 3. We remark, that Joseph, deeply penetrated with a sense of the wisdom and mercy of God, and full of the spirit of forgiveness and brotherly affection, apologized for his brethren, and directed their attention rather to the providence of God, than to their

own conduct in sending him into Egypt. And 4. That there is not in this whole account, or elsewhere, the least intimation that their conduct in selling their brother was in "*accordance* with the will of God," but the supposition is absurd, blasphemous, and abhorrent to the nature and will of God.

The next passage adduced to prove that the wicked actions of men are in "*accordance* with the will of God," is Exod. vii, 1-5, where we have an account of God's hardening Pharaoh's heart, and of his refusing to hearken to Moses and Aaron. The following remarks will comprise all that need be said on this subject, and will show whether Pharaoh's conduct was in "*accordance* with the will of God," or not.

1. Pharaoh was a haughty, tyrannical, idolatrous prince, the measure of whose iniquities was now full, and God determined on a course of retributive justice toward him, as well as of mercy to the Israelites.

2. Pharaoh's disobedience was the cause of his heart being hardened. Thus it is repeatedly said that "Pharaoh hardened his heart;" and "Pharaoh hardened his heart at this time *also*."

3. When it is said that "God hardened Pharaoh's heart," it is not to be understood that he did this *efficiently*, but *judicially*, that is, by leaving him to the consequences of his own wickedness. And this he did, that he might "multiply his signs and wonders in the

land of Egypt." In this sense the Prophet Isaiah made the "heart of the people fat, and their ears heavy, and shut their eyes," that is, these effects followed his preaching when the word of the Lord was rejected by them: see Acts xxviii, 26, 27. In this sense also the Gospel ministry proves a "savour of death unto death," to all such as disregard it, when they are finally "given over to a reprobate mind." And we may observe that if we lay wax, and soft clay, before the fire, the same heat that softens the wax will harden the clay. This is not owing to a difference in the heat which affects these substances, but to the difference in the substances themselves. And thus it is with sinners under the Gospel. While one is made contrite, another is made more obdurate; but these different effects are not to be ascribed to a difference in the design and operation of God upon them, but to the difference in their conduct toward the Gospel. And thus it was with Pharaoh. Had he hearkened diligently to the voice of the Lord God, as he might have done, he would have been saved; but saying practically, as well as in word, "I know not the LORD, neither will I obey his voice," he became hardened in sin, and was finally destroyed.

4. There is no evidence in the whole account of Pharaoh, that his conduct was in "*accordance* with the will of God," but the direct contrary. God certainly expressed his will to Pharaoh in very plain terms, and

Pharaoh as certainly went *contrary* to his will.

Acts ii, 23, is produced as "direct proof" that the most wicked actions of men are in "*accordance* with the will of God." "Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain." Dr. Clarke observes upon these words, that "God had determined long before, from the foundation of the world, to give his Son a sacrifice for sin; and the treachery of Judas, and the malice of the Jews, were only the *incidental means* by which the great counsel of God was fulfilled: the counsel of God intending the sacrifice; but never *ordering* that it should be brought about by such wretched means. This was *permitted*; the other was *decreed*." We may add, that God foreseeing the treachery of Judas, and the malice of the Jews, "determined" to deliver his Son up to suffer all that was in their power, as free agents, to inflict upon him, and to overrule the whole for the good of mankind. But this was a very different thing from *determining* their wickedness, and is no proof that their wickedness was in "*accordance*" with his will.

There is only one passage more adduced by my opponent for the very strange purpose of showing that the worst actions of men are in "*accordance* with the will of God," and that is Acts iv, 27, 28, "For of a truth against

thy holy child Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles, and the people of Israel, were gathered together, for to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done."

We remark on this passage, 1. That the person "anointed," who is the "holy child Jesus," was the person appointed "to do whatsoever God's hand and counsel determined before to be done." And 2. That against him, as though to prevent the accomplishment of the Divine will in the redemption of the world; both "Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles, and the people of Israel, were gathered together." And accordingly many of the learned tell us, what indeed must be obvious to every reflecting mind, that there is a parenthesis in the 27th verse, which should be read in connection with the 28th verse, thus:—"For of a truth against thy holy child Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, (for to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done,) both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles, and people of Israel, were gathered together." And the passage thus understood gives us an easy, natural, important, and holy doctrine; whereas that of my opponent gives us a harsh, unnatural, unholy, and shocking sentiment, namely, that the worst actions of the worst men in the world, were in "accordance with the will of God."

On the evidence which my opponent sup

poses the foregoing passages of Scripture afford in support of his doctrine, he proceeds to remark,

1. That "these actions were performed from passion and malice, and without motive to do the will of God;" and,

2. That "notwithstanding they"—actions implying wrong motives—"were in *accordance* with the will of God;" and,

3. That "it is the same with regard to all the other actions of men;" and,

4. That "man, acting according to the *determinate counsel* of God, is *not free*."

According to these remarks and this doctrine of necessity, God is the only agent in our world, because he alone produces the actions and motives of all mankind. And hence his conclusion "accords" with his premises when he tells us that all the actions of men, bad as well as good, are in "*accordance*," that is, *agreement* "with the will of God." But then it can no longer be said, "What fellowship hath righteousness with unrighteousness? And what communion hath light with darkness? And what concord hath Christ with Belial? And what agreement hath the temple of God with idols?" 2 Cor. vi, 14-16. For according to this doctrine there is the most perfect fellowship and agreement between the will of God and sin; because he hath "*chosen*" it in preference to holiness, and it is in "*accordance* with his will." This is no exaggeration of the sentiments of my

opponent; for he teaches that men cannot act contrary to the "choice" of God: and therefore when they sin, it is proof that this is the "choice" of God, who must have preferred sin to holiness, or he would have chosen holiness. And if it was his "choice" that men should sin, then sin was, no doubt, in "accordance with his will."

Whether my opponent has done his cause a service, or a disservice, by expressing his sentiment on this subject so unequivocally, remains to be seen; though if we might express a conjecture, his doctrine of necessity, which is the foundation of his whole system, will ultimately work its ruin. But be this as it may, we are glad that he has at length given us his undisguised sentiments on this subject. Those who have heretofore advocated the doctrine of necessity, have generally expressed themselves with great caution, and have sedulously maintained that there is *no agreement*, but a perfect opposition between God and sin; except the ancient sect of the *Manichees*, who, not being able to maintain the doctrine of necessity on this ground, contended that there are two principles in Deity, one good, the other evil: and that all the good, and evil in the world proceed from these two principles. And I would recommend it to the abettors of the present doctrine of necessity, to inquire whether it is more likely that moral good and evil flow from the *same* principle in Deity, or from *contrary* principles

My opponent having finished his arguments in favour of necessity, proceeds to draw several inferences from it to show that there are no conditions in salvation. It will not be necessary for me to notice these inferences; for if his premises are without foundation, as I trust has been made to appear in the foregoing part of this discourse, and will more fully appear in the sequel;—his inferences fall of course, and the doctrine of conditions is supported by the authority of inspiration.

I will now close with a few brief arguments against the doctrine of necessity, and in favour of that of free agency. And here I would repeat the substance of two or three arguments which my opponent passed over without noticing in his Reply, to which this is an answer.

1. My *first* argument against necessity is founded on the general character of the Bible, as abounding with commands;—with promises to the obedient, and threatenings to the disobedient;—with commendation or censure, according as men behave well or ill;—with the presentation of life and death before mankind, together with every motive to induce them to choose the one and refuse the other;—with expostulations with the presumptuous sinners who slight their own mercies, and solemn declarations by God, that it is not his will that they should continue in sin and be punished, but that they should repent and be saved;—and finally, with lamentations over the finally impenitent and ruined, ac-

accompanied with this asseveration on his part, that "he *would* have gathered and saved them; but they would not." Now, who can reconcile all these things with the necessity of human actions,—the necessity of sin? If mankind are not free agents, if their actions are all predetermined and necessary, they are at best mere sensitive machines, and there is no more propriety in addressing commands and motives to them, than addressing them to wind mills and water wheels. And suppose the master of one of your water shops should take his stand, when every wheel was at rest, and gives his commands to the various machinery, ordering every wheel to move instantly and with a certain degree of velocity and regularity, and threatening that they should be cut to pieces and burnt in the fire if they did not obey; or suppose, when every wheel was in motion, he should command them instantly to stop, upon pain of his sorest displeasure; would you not think he was beside himself? And shall we attribute to the God of heaven a line of conduct infinitely more ridiculous?—Shall we represent him as first predetermining the actions of men, making them all as necessary as the motions of a machine, and then commanding, prohibiting, promising, threatening and expostulating with them? This course is proper to be taken only with free agents; and he who takes it with *necessary* agents, if I may use the expression, not only makes himself ridiculous

but says, by his conduct, that they are free, when they are not, and herein he dissembles, as well as acts the part of a tyrant. And the being who could do this, might, with equal justice, make holy creatures both sinful and miserable to interminable duration.

“No,” says my opponent; “for although it would be unjust in God to make man eternally miserable for performing *precisely* those actions which he had determined before to be done; yet it would not be unjust to subject him to a course of disciplinary punishment for those actions; seeing that thereby his greatest good would be promoted.” According to this the penalty of the law is not a curse, as we are taught in the Scriptures, but a blessing; and sin itself is not an evil, but a good, seeing it is the *necessary occasion* of our greatest happiness.

2. My *second* argument is taken from what we feel in ourselves. We are *conscious of freedom*. We deliberate,—compare,—decide,—re-examine and decide differently; we hope and fear; we feel complacency when we have done right, but remorse and guilt when we have done wrong; because we are conscious we might have done otherwise. We have a very different sensation upon performing an action necessarily, from what we have when our actions are free. Thus if a man injures his friend by a convulsive motion of his arm, he feels no guilt, because the action was involuntary and unavoidable; but if he injure

him voluntarily, he feels condemnation and guilt. And why this, if his actions are all necessary and unavoidable? Why have we a consciousness of freedom in performing our actions, if they are *necessary* and unavoidable? Does conscience tell lies in this case? Has God subjected us to this deception? Impossible.

“Whom conscience sent, her sentence will support,
And God above assert *that* God in man.”

3. However plausible the doctrine of necessity may appear in theory, nobody was ever yet found willing to admit it in practice. Those who are the loudest in asserting it, complain as soon as others of an injury done them. Let them be calumniated or defrauded, and you hear no more of the necessity of these actions. No regard is had to its being the “*choice*” of God, or to its being in “*accordance* with his will.” Is there not great inconsistency here? And upon the supposition that the doctrine of necessity is true, and that these actions are in “*accordance* with the will of God,” is there not impiety too? For what is piety but resignation to the will of God, and to those events and actions which are in “*accordance*” with his will? Why should we not regard the will of God in the same light in an instance of calumny or fraud, as we do in an act of justice or mercy, if both are equally in “*accordance* with his will?” The truth is, the sentiment of all mankind is the same in practice on this subject,

and is opposed to the necessity of wrong actions; and were it otherwise it would subvert the order of society, overthrow government, and introduce universal anarchy and ruin. For then no sinner would refrain from what he had an inclination to do, and no crime would be punished, seeing we never punish an action that is necessary and unavoidable, and that is in "*accordance* with the will of God."

4. The doctrine of necessity implies *blasphemy*, or *no sin at all*, according as we consider the evil actions of men with reference to the will of God. If we first say that there is such a thing as sin or moral evil in the world;—if we say that it is a great evil, essentially and diametrically opposed to piety, to justice, mercy, and truth; then it would be horrid *blasphemy* to say that it proceeded from, or was in "*accordance*" with the will of God. Because this would not only make him the author of all the sin in the world, but it would also be saying that he has fellowship and agreement with it, which would be blasphemy if there be any such thing in the world. And it would perplex my opponent as much to be required to tell what is blasphemy, if this be not, as to be required to tell how our sins are forgiven, while we suffer the whole punishment due to them.

But if we first say that God is holy, and his will holy, and just, and good; then it will follow that whatever is produced or brought about by his "*choice*," and "*will*," must be

like himself, holy, just, and good; because it is absolutely impossible that the same fountain should send forth both *sweet water and bitter*, or in other words, it is impossible that a holy principle should produce sin, or be in "*accordance*" with it. Thus, viewing the doctrine of necessity in whatever light you please, it is incumbered with insuperable difficulties. It blasphemes the holiness of God, and exculpates the sinner from all blame. Whatever the will of God may be concerning us, as he is our Sovereign, and we are dependent on him, and accountable to him, we *ought*, undoubtedly, to do his will.

5. This doctrine of necessity, and the evil actions of men being in "*accordance* with the will of God," is utterly subversive of the doctrine of repentance. Repentance is a commanded duty; but does God command his creatures to repent for having done his will? And is not God herein represented as at variance with himself? First, he "*chooses*" our actions, and they are in "*accordance* with his will;" and then he commands us to repent for having done that which was *agreeable* to him. Nay, more: he produces *sorrow* in our hearts for having done actions that were in "*accordance* with his will." But if our actions are all in "*accordance* with his will," how is it that in repentance, under the influence of his word and Spirit, we always have a conviction that our actions have not been in "*accordance* with his will," but in *opposi-*

tion to it? Are we deceived in this conviction? Do we err then when we are the most humbled under a sense of our sins as being *opposed* to the will of God? Does God thus deceive his creatures, making them believe their actions are *opposed* to his will while they are in "*accordance*" with it? This view of our actions as opposed to the will of God is, however, essential to repentance, and we cannot see that it is possible for a person to repent under the belief that his conduct has been in "*accordance with the will of God.*" He is most fatally deceived who thinks thus; and if he would reflect seriously on the nature of repentance, it would be the means of convincing him that his actions are not in "*accordance with the will of God,*" but in *opposition* to it.

6. This doctrine is equally at variance with the doctrine of forgiveness; for what need has he of being forgiven who has always done the will of God,—all of whose actions have been in "*accordance*" with his will? And suppose a man should make a mistake, and think his actions had been *opposed* to the will of God, when in fact they had been in "*accordance*" with his will; yet God, who always judges according to truth, could not but know his error, and pity his weakness, and would doubtless undeceive him, by letting him see that there is nothing to be forgiven where he had done "*precisely*" what he "*chose,*" and what was in "*accordance*" with his will. For how

can God be displeased with a man for doing his will, or hold him under condemnation for "doing precisely what he *chose* he should do?" On this ground the whole doctrine of condemnation and forgiveness is a mere farce, or at most, a solemn mockery of truth, and justice, and mercy. But if, as we know, the doctrine of forgiveness is a doctrine of the Gospel, and a Divine reality, then it follows that this doctrine of necessity and sinful actions being in "*accordance* with the will of God," is a gross delusion of the devil, and a snare to catch unwary souls.

7. If this doctrine of necessity be true, there is no need of regeneration, or any change in the dispositions of men; for on this ground, these, however sinful, are in "*accordance*" with the will of God, as well as their actions. And why should God require an alteration in that which is in "*accordance*" with his will? If a present disposition of the heart of man be in "*accordance*" with the will of God, can he require a change in that disposition while he himself remains the same? Must not that which is in "*accordance*" with his will at one time, always be so, unless he should change? And if God always remains the same, and still requires a change in that which is in "*accordance*" with his will, it will follow that he requires that the dispositions of his creatures should be in *opposition* to his will, and that a disposition which is at present *agreeable* to his will, should be changed for the express

purpose that it might be in *opposition* to his will.

Here again we might urge the blasphemy of this doctrine;—for it is full of blasphemy, view it as you will. If you say that a sinful disposition in the heart of man is in “*accordance* with the will of God,” it is *blasphemy*. If you say that God changes, and that what pleases him at one time will not always please him, it is *blasphemy*. If you say that he requires a change in that which is in “*accordance*” with his will, that it may be in *opposition* to his will, it is *blasphemy*. *Blasphemy* is written on all the features of this doctrine of necessity, which teaches that the sinful actions and dispositions of men are in “*accordance*” with the will of God.

The doctrine of *necessity* is the foundation and corner stone of Universalism. If it be true, there are no conditions in salvation, and sin, repentance, forgiveness, and regeneration, are words without importance, and without meaning. On this ground the doctrine of the atonement is rejected, and that of personal suffering to the whole extent of “sin’s desert,” is substituted in its place. And indeed what necessity is there of the one, or what cause to dread the other, if all the actions and dispositions of men are *necessary*, and are in “*accordance*” with the will of God? On this ground God, even in his character of Lord and Judge, needs no propitiating, and man has no cause to dread the displeasure of a

being with whose will his own actions and dispositions are in "accordance."

And can the influence of such a doctrine be salutary on society? Is it calculated to restrain the vicious, to excite to repentance, and to reform the world? We will not trust to any conclusions drawn from theory merely, but we appeal to matter of fact.

The Universalists cannot be offended at us for representing their doctrine, as having an unfavourable effect upon experimental religion; since they themselves are not backward to express their views on this subject; from which, in part, we draw our inference. We know their views of experimental religion, because we know how they express themselves upon a subject of a change of heart, and because we know their views of sin, of the atonement, of conditions, of repentance, and of forgiveness of sin; and because the necessity of a new and heavenly birth is never urged, but ridiculed, by their preachers both from the pulpit and the press. Who is there among them that is in the practice of urging the nature and importance of repentance, regeneration, and holy living, in a close and practical application to the heart? And is this unnecessary? Ought we not to preach as did Christ and his apostles, saying to all, "Except a man be born again he cannot see the kingdom of God?" And ought we not to "reprove and rebuke with all long suffering and doctrine?"—"To warn every man, and teach

every man, in all wisdom, that we may present every man perfect in Christ Jesus?" And should we not be "instant in season and out of season" in this "labour of love" to our fellow creatures? But our opponents have found out a way to make all these things of little or no importance, by denying the conditions of salvation, and by asserting that, let men live as they please in this world, they shall all pass into glory as soon as they die. And to smooth the passage of sinners through this world, and as though they would lull their consciences into a more fatal stupidity than that which is natural, they teach that all their actions are "*necessary*," that they are "*precisely what God chooses they should be*," and that they are in "*accordance with his will*." And where is the need of regeneration in this life, if these things are true?

If we have succeeded in showing that this doctrine is without foundation in truth and in the word of God, then it follows that man is a free agent, that there are conditions in salvation, and that these conditions must be performed in this world, or he who neglects them is lost for ever. May God, for Christ's sake, give us all understanding in these things. And now we commend you to God, and to the word of his grace, which is able to enlighten and renew your souls, to build you up, and to give you an inheritance among all them which are sanctified; which we wish

you, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Amen.

Dec. 30, 1827.

APPENDIX TO ANSWER IV.

IN my opponent's reply of November 23, 1827, were a few things worthy of notice, which on account of the length of my answer, were omitted. These I shall notice in this place. The *first* of the following articles I appended to my discourse on "necessity," and delivered it with that; but now assign it a more proper place in this appendix.

My opponent contends that we suffer in our own persons the whole punishment of sin, while sin itself is pardoned. I maintain that this is absurd, false, and impossible;—that if our sins are pardoned, we are released from punishment. If I succeed in maintaining my position, one of the main pillars of Universalism is removed, and the whole building must fall to the ground.

In my last answer on this subject, I said, "A sinner is pardoned just so far as his punishment is remitted, and no farther." My opponent overlooking this, goes on to represent me as holding that a sinner is *fully* pardoned by God, and yet is held to suffer a *part* of the penalty of the law, in that disciplinary punishment which he inflicts upon his own children in this life, and under cover of this mistake,

endeavours to bring off his own absurd doctrine of suffering the whole punishment due to sin, while the sinner is fully pardoned. In reply to this I remark,—

1. That *discipline* and *punishment, properly so called*, are essentially different in their character, the one being a blessing, the other a curse. Discipline, as far as it is painful, may be referred to the sentence of the law; but being less than the desert of sin, and being administered on principles of mercy, and with a view to the reformation and salvation of the sinner, is changed into a blessing. My opponent gives us the same view of the difference between disciplinary and full punishment, when in his last reply, speaking of the latter, he repeatedly asks, "Is this a blessing, or is it a curse?" We agree with him that it is a "curse;" and herein it is distinguished from disciplinary punishment, which is a blessing. The Christian, therefore, does not suffer any proper punishment at all.

2. The sinner is not *absolutely* and *fully*, but *conditionally* pardoned in this life. "We are made partakers of Christ," says the apostle, "if we hold fast the beginning of our confidence firm unto the end." And our Saviour has given us an illustration of this subject in the 18th chapter of Matthew. Here we read of one who had a debt of ten thousand talents forgiven by God, who, nevertheless, because he would not forgive a fellow servant, forfeited his own pardon, and was cast into prison till he

should pay all that he owed. On this ground I say the sinner is pardoned, so far, and no farther than his punishment is remitted. If his pardon were absolute and full, his release from punishment would be so too.

But this is not the case with my opponent. He holds that the sinner is *absolutely* and *fully* pardoned, and yet that he is held to suffer the whole punishment of his sins. This we pronounce absurd in the highest degree. The remission of punishment enters into the very idea of pardon. I can have no other idea of pardon. You, my respected hearers, can have no other idea of pardon. My opponent himself, after all that he has said, can have no other idea of pardon than that which implies remission of punishment. If he has, let him now bring it forth and tell us how a sinner can be *fully pardoned*, and yet be held to suffer the *whole punishment* of his sins. But I tell you beforehand that he will not attempt this. He may "submit" this point also "to the audience," or he may attempt to point out some defect in my arguments, or he may attempt something else. But he will never attempt to show, by explanation, or illustration, *how* a sinner can be fully pardoned, and yet fully punished for all his sins. If he could do this, he might, for aught I know, make a hundred Universalists this evening; but if he cannot do this he ought to be deserted by every one who has joined his standard.*

* This was said, if possible, to "provoke" my oppo-

But do not the Scriptures promise pardon, and threaten punishment to the same person at the same time? To this I say no, not in this order; but they first threaten punishment, and then offer pardon, or remission of punishment, upon condition of repentance and faith in Christ. My opponent has often quoted this phrase from Ezek. xviii, 20, "The soul that sinneth it shall die," with others of like character, to show, that though we be pardoned, yet we must suffer the punishment of our sins. To "die" in this place he takes, as I do, to be the punishment of sin. But then I say that this text, with the context, clearly proves that when sin is pardoned, punishment is remitted.—"The soul that sinneth, it shall die;" but if he turn from his sins he shall live, "he shall be pardoned, he shall not die,"—that is, he shall not be punished. And in the same manner we are to understand all the passages he has brought forward to prove the certainty of punishment with pardon. We shall certainly be punished as our sins deserve, if we do not repent and believe in Christ; but we shall as certainly escape punishment if we do repent and believe: because Christ has made an atonement for our sins, and is, in this respect, the end of the law to every one that believeth in him. But

gent to give an illustration of this article of his faith, believing that nothing I could say would so effectually expose its absurdity. But he knew too well the weakness of his cause to attempt this. And yet he does not give it up.—"Lord, what is man!"

if the sinner must suffer the whole punishment of sin in his own person, then Christ has died in vain; and if he is ever saved, Christ will have as little glory in his salvation as he has had influence in removing his punishment.

And *must* the sinner suffer the whole punishment of his sins? *Must* he bear the whole weight of his transgressions? *Must* he answer in his own person for ten thousand transgressions of the Divine law?—for ten thousand insults offered the infinite Majesty of heaven and earth?—for ten thousand slights of the Saviour?—for neglecting his own salvation, and for abusing unnumbered blood-bought favours? Alas! alas! for him who bears his own sins. O, believe not this doctrine, but flee from it as you would flee from the face of a serpent. O, turn from your sins, turn to the slighted, long-neglected Saviour, and your soul shall live.

On the question whether repentance and faith, &c., are conditions, or constituent parts of salvation, or both, I have but a few words to say, and these would not have been deemed necessary, had not my opponent overlooked a material fact in my illustration of this subject, and thereby evinced that argument failed him. I have contended that repentance and faith, &c., are both conditions and constituent parts of salvation, and used the following illustrations: A man has lost his health by intemperance, and recovers it by a return to a temperate course of living; and

continuing temperate he continues in health. Temperance with him is a constituent part of health. Again; a man loses his character by a habit of lying, and regains it by reforming that habit and speaking the truth; and speaking the truth is now a constituent part of good character. My opponent cannot see the force of these illustrations, and thinks that temperance and speaking the truth are "causes producing these effects." Now I had as lief he would say that these are "causes," as conditions; for I use the word "condition" precisely in the sense of *moral cause* in these cases. But the point he overlooks is this: when these causes have produced their effects, they do not cease, but remain as constituent parts of health and good character, as truly as repentance and faith remain constituent parts of salvation. We may consider the point of conditions, therefore, as fully gained, my opponent himself being judge. And with these remarks I am willing to submit the question to the decision of the audience.

In speaking of the atonement, my opponent represents that important doctrine as "God's making satisfaction to himself, to render him placable, and to enable him to show mercy to the transgressors of his law." I cannot thank him for *thus* stating *my* sentiments; and if they form an insuperable difficulty in his way, he surely ought not to misrepresent them in order to refute them. And I have the stronger ground of complaint

because this representation has often been made by his friends, and always denied by the advocates for atonement, as he cannot but know if he is a man of reading. I might here dismiss this article, and leave my opponent to extricate himself from a difficulty of his own creating; but as the edification of others is concerned, I submit the following remarks:—

1. The advocates for the doctrine of atonement never held that one and the same person made and received satisfaction; but that one person made satisfaction to another, or that Christ made satisfaction to God as law-giver and judge of mankind. Should it be objected "that the distinction of persons in the Godhead does not remove the difficulty, because there is but *one* God," we answer: The unity of the Godhead does not destroy the distinction of persons, but leaves that distinction as real, as the distinction between Peter and John, though not in the same sense. Nor is there any absurdity in saying there are three persons in the Godhead, while we admit there is but one God. This is not saying, as the enemies of the doctrine represent, that *three* are *one*, and *one* *three*; but it is simply saying that *three persons* are *one God*. And though there is nothing among men that will explain this Divine mystery, yet we can see no more absurdity or contradiction in it, than in saying that *two, three, or more persons* form *one* associate body. And while we hold the doctrine of the trinity Scripturally, we

shall have no great difficulty in maintaining the doctrine of atonement on the same ground.

2. It was never supposed by the friends of this doctrine, that the atonement rendered God placable, or merciful toward sinners; but, on the contrary, that the atonement was the strongest expression of the mercy of God that he could have given to a sinful world. "God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son," &c. But though the atonement was not made to render God merciful, yet it was made that he might exercise mercy consistently with justice, "That he might be just, and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus," says the apostle. If, therefore, the enemies of this doctrine wish to oppose it, let them oppose it, and not fight a *man of straw*; which will benefit their own cause as little as it will injure ours.

To relieve the cases of those who continue in sin to their last moment in this world, and then die in a fit of intoxication, or by their own hands, my opponent labours to make it appear that there is little difference between these and the very best of men. For this purpose he quotes the words of St. Paul, in Rom. iii, 10-12, and applies them to the Christian, to show that none are perfectly holy in this life: and then infers that if God saves such in the article of death, he will also save the self murderer, and him who dies while intoxicated. Surely he must have had a hard task

when reduced to the necessity of contradicting both himself and the word of God.

First, He contradicts himself most explicitly. When contending against conditions he instituted the inquiry, "What is salvation,"—that salvation which is by repentance and faith? And he tells us it is salvation from sin, yea, not only from sins committed, but "from *evil propensities*, and from *sinning in future*." Here he advances the doctrine of holiness quite up to the point of *perfection*. But when he undertakes the task, and a hard task it is, of getting him who dies while he is drunk into heaven, he finds it expedient to do away the difference of character between the drunkard and the best Christian, and to place their salvation on the same footing. And this can be done only by denying that the latter is saved from sin in this life. But,

Secondly, If the absurdities of Universalism had not become familiar to us, I might say it is surprising that my opponent should use the words of the apostle to help himself out of a self-created difficulty. St. Paul, in Rom. iii, 10-12, as the context most clearly shows, is proving that the natural state of both Jews and Gentiles is sinful, and that all mankind equally need a Saviour. But will the argument that proves we all need a Saviour to deliver us from sin, prove, at the same time, that none are delivered from sin by the Saviour? If not, my opponent's argument is a mere sophism, and there is no evidence that

the drunkard shall inherit the kingdom of God, but the direct contrary.

And whatever imperfection may attach to the best of men in this world, there is surely a vast difference between him who feareth God, and him who feareth him not;—between him who repenteth, and him who repenteth not;—between him who believeth in Christ, and him who doth not believe:—in a word, there is a great difference between him who performs the conditions of salvation, and enters into covenant with God, and him who does not. The one is a child of God and an heir of heaven; the other a child of wrath and an heir of hell.

LECTURE III.—*Future Punishment.*

“Who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power,” 2 Thess. i, 9.

HAVING laid before you in the two former lectures the evidence of a future judgment, and the conditionality of salvation, from both which we infer, with the utmost certainty, the doctrine of future punishment; I come in this *third* lecture to submit some of the more direct evidences of that doctrine; after which I will answer an objection.

1. That we have ample evidence from the Scriptures of future punishment, may be seen from the proofs which follow. I begin with

those passages of Scripture which teach that the "hypocrite's hope shall perish," that his "hope shall be cut off," and that his "trust shall be a spider's web," Job viii, 13, 14. It will be said that the hope here spoken of relates to prosperity in this life. If I should grant this it would make nothing against my argument; for then it would be a general rule applied to a particular case, which is often done. But it will not apply generally to the hopes of hypocrites and wicked people in this life; because they as often prosper, as they have their hopes cut off in this world. But in its proper and universal application it relates to future happiness. All men, however wicked, hope to be happy after death. But we are told their "hope shall be cut off, and their trust shall be a spider's web." And we are just as sure that this is the true application of the passage, as we are that the threatenings of God's word are true. For if the wicked and the hypocrite hope for heaven when they come to die, and the word of God says, "Except ye repent ye shall perish,"—"He that believeth not shall be damned," it is undeniably true that their "hope shall be cut off." Of this number I fear are many of those who, while living without repentance, trust in the doctrine of universal salvation, and on that doctrine build their hope of heaven. I fear the same for many of my own, and every other denomination, that they are trusting in something beside Christ, and therefore I urge

repentance and holiness upon all, because, without holiness no man shall see the Lord. Many will say unto Christ, even in "*that day*," — "Lord, Lord, have we not prophesied in thy name," &c., but he will say unto them, though their *hope* be strong, "I never knew you," I never approved of you; "depart from me, ye that work iniquity," Matt. vii, 22, 23. To the same purpose is the application of our Lord's sermon on the mount, recorded verses, 24-27 of this chapter: "And every one that heareth these sayings of mine, and doeth them not, shall be likened unto a foolish man that built his house, (his hope,) upon the sand: and the rain descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew, and beat upon that house, (that hope,) and it fell, (it was cut off,) and great was the fall of it." From which we infer the future punishment of these foolish builders.

2. God allows sinners a space to repent, and affords them a system of means and helps to enable them to work out their salvation; he admonishes them that their opportunities and privileges will not always last, and that when they end, their condition becomes hapless. "The night cometh when *no man can work*," John ix, 4. "Seek ye the Lord *while he may be found*, call ye upon him *while he is near*. Let the wicked forsake his way, and the unrighteous man his thoughts: let him return unto the Lord, and he will have mercy upon him; and to our God, for he will

abundantly pardon," Isa. lv, 6, 7. Here it is intimated that God will not always wait to be gracious, that he will not always be found. And agreeably to this he says, "Because I have called, and ye refused; I have stretched out my hand, and no man regarded; but ye have set at nought all my counsel, and would none of my reproof; I also will laugh at your calamity; I will mock when your fear cometh, &c. Then shall they call upon me, but I will not answer: they shall seek me early, but they shall not find me," Prov. i, 24-28. "Turn ye, turn ye, for why will ye die, O house of Israel?" Ezek. xxxiii, 11. Once more: "Exhort one another daily, while it is called *to-day*: lest any of you be hardened through the deceitfulness of sin," like the Israelites in the wilderness; to whom God "sware that they should not enter into his rest," the land of Canaan. "Let us therefore fear," says the apostle, "lest a promise being left us of entering into his rest," the heavenly Canaan, "any of you should seem to come short of it," Heb. iii, 13, and iv, 1. Those who wilfully go on, hardening themselves in sin, are in danger of being "given over" by God "to a reprobate mind," Rom. i, 28, and then he will "send them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie, that they all might be damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness," 2 Thess. ii, 11, 12. From these passages we learn, 1. That God will finally "give over," *leave to them-*

setees, abandon, the incorrigible sinner ; and
2. That then their case becomes hopeless, and
their damnation sure.

3. The future punishment of the wicked is clearly inferred from our Saviour's words to the Jews,—“Ye shall die in your sins.” Again:—“I said, therefore, unto you, that ye shall die in your sins ; for if ye believe not that I am he, ye shall die in your sins,” John viii, 21, 24. The nation of the Jews did not believe that he was the Messiah, and shortly after these words were spoken to them, more than a million of them were cut off in their unbelief. The same may be said of thousands, and tens of thousands, in every land where the Gospel has been preached—they have died in unbelief, and of course have died in their sins, according to our Saviour's words. But the case of the Jews is sufficient for my purpose, and concerning these there can be no dispute—they did not believe in Christ—they “died in their sins.” Let it not be said that they were saved from their sins in the article of death. To *die in sin*, and to be *saved from sin*, are phrases of different import ; and he who says they were saved from their sins in the article of death, contradicts our Lord, who says that the unbeliever shall die in his sins. Beside, our Lord evidently intended these words, “If ye believe not that I am he, ye shall die in your sins,” as an admonition to the Jews. But if you say they were saved from their sins *in death*, you do

away all the admonition, and give to his words the character and the effect of a promise,—“If ye believe not that I am he, ye shall be saved from your sins *in death.*” Thus says Universalism. We however choose to believe our Lord, and that the words, “Ye shall die in your sins,” exclude the possibility of repentance, of faith, of pardon, of regeneration in death; and of course they pass out of this world into the next, without any change, and with all their sins upon them. If this does not imply future punishment, I know not what does.

4. The Scriptures inform us of the enemies of the cross of Christ, that their “end is destruction,” that they “bring upon themselves swift destruction,” and that “they shall utterly perish in their own corruption,” Phil. iii. 19; 2 Pet. ii, 1–12. I cannot see how it is possible to reconcile Universalism with these testimonies. That doctrine teaches that whatever may be the condition of the ungodly in this world, they shall in the *end* be saved. But the word of inspiration tells us that their “*end is destruction;*” that they “*shall utterly perish in their own corruption.*” If this testimony be true, that doctrine is false; because nothing can come after the *end*, and those who *utterly*, i. e. *wholly* perish, cannot be saved. Let it be observed, however, that to be destroyed, and to perish, is not to be annihilated, but to be punished.

5. St. Jude leaves an explicit testimony to

the doctrine of future punishment. Speaking of Sodom and Gomorrah and the cities about them, he says, "They are set forth for an example, suffering the vengeance of eternal fire," verse 7. On this passage we may remark, 1. That it does not speak of the punishment of those ancient sinners as being passed, but as still continuing, they are "*suffering*;" and he assigns a reason for it, viz., 2. "They are set forth for an *example*." 3. This example could not be in the literal destruction of those cities, for we know not that they have been an example in this sense. It must therefore be in their "*suffering the vengeance of eternal fire*." 4. He that denies this, makes that no example, which God "*hath set forth for an example*" unto all that should after live ungodly.

6. The argument for future punishment is equally conclusive, if not as explicit, from all those individuals, cities, and nations, which have been destroyed by the judgments of God. What is there in these cases to induce the belief that the progress of these was toward a state of consummate felicity? Does not every thing induce the contrary belief? They advanced in wickedness till their iniquity was full. So far from diminishing their liability to punishment, they were constantly increasing it. The anger of Heaven was revealed against them, and the tokens of his wrath were more and more visible. At length they were taken away by his judgments; and

is it now a natural inference that their punishment ceased, and they were made holy and happy the moment they left this world? But what says the word of God in these cases? It says they were destroyed, that they were taken away in his wrath, that his fury was poured out upon them. And are we notwithstanding to suppose that his wrath has accomplished the work of mercy, because these sinners were too wicked to live upon earth, and made them holy and taken them to heaven as the reward of their iniquity?

7. The Scriptures assert everlasting punishment—“*eternal damnation*,”—“*eternal judgment*,”—“*the vengeance of eternal fire*,” where “*the smoke of their torment ascendeth up for ever and ever*.” See Matt. xxv, 46; Mark iii, 29, compared with Matt. xii, 31, 32; Heb. vi, 2; Jude, verse 7; Rev. xiv, 11, and xx, 10. Although the present discussion more properly relates to the simple existence of future punishment, than to the duration of it, yet those passages which assert it to be eternal, everlasting, &c., are undeniable proofs of my doctrine. I shall not now urge, as I might do, that the same words, which in the above passages are applied to the punishment of the wicked, are the strongest we have to express the eternal existence of God, and the endless felicity of the saints, and therefore ought to be taken in their most literal and obvious meaning; but for the sake of the argument, I will allow what the Universalists have always contended for.

namely, that these words signify an age, or period of duration. And then it will be impossible to *save* the doctrine of universal salvation; for according to this interpretation of the words, the wicked shall suffer an *age of punishment*. Now this *age* of punishment must be either in this world, or in the future state. If the question related to the first sin, or sins, committed by man, it would probably be said that he has an *age* before him in this world, in which to suffer the punishment of his sins. But what can be said when the question relates to the last sin committed by man, and that the sin by which he passes beyond the boundaries of time into eternity? Those who commit suicide shall again instruct us in those great concerns of our souls. Here is a class of human beings who commit one of the greatest crimes, and yet do not remain a moment in the world to suffer for it. Now, says Universalism, every man shall suffer according to his sins. Surely then, those who destroy their own lives must suffer in the future state, seeing they do not remain a moment after their crime to suffer in this. And this is according to the Bible.

8. The Scriptures abundantly express the same sentiment negatively: "He that blasphemeth against the Holy Ghost hath *never* forgiveness," and of course hath never salvation, seeing there can be no salvation without forgiveness, Mark iii, 29. When our Saviour represents the blessings of the Gospel by a

marriage feast, he says of those who refused to come when they were bidden, "I say unto you, that *none* of those men which were bidden *shall taste of my supper*," Luke xiv, 24. How then can they be saved? — Once more: "He that believeth not the Son, *shall not see life*; but the wrath of God abideth on him," John iii, 36. Here one verb is in the present time, *believeth* not; and the other is in the future, *shall not see life*; and the plain meaning of the passage is, he that believeth not now, while he lives, and has the means of grace, shall not, after that period, see life.

But what need is there of multiplying particular proofs, when the same thing may be abundantly proved another way. The genius of religion, the scope of the Scriptures, and the economy of Providence, all point to the future state as the proper time and place for rewards and punishments. Religion is the first duty, and should be the great business of the life of man. The righteous man walks by faith in things *unseen*, and supports himself on a hope of *future* happiness while passing through the afflictions of this life. God is holy, and requires holiness of his rational creatures. Sin has done infinite mischief in the world, and is infinitely hateful to the holy God. He has every where in his word set his face against it, and denounced the heaviest woes against transgressors. He does not, however, execute sentence against them speedily; but because he is merciful as well as holy, he gives them

a space to repent, and even waits long to be gracious. He threatens, he admonishes, he entreats: he uses with them a course of mercies and correction;—mercies, that they may have a motive to seek his face;—corrections, that they may fear the heavier penalties of his law. While dealing thus with his creatures, he does not make all that distinction between him that feareth him, and him that feareth him not, which he designs ultimately to make, and which the promises and threatenings of his word require. The dispensations of his providence are generally the same with respect to both the righteous and the wicked. Neither the happiness of the one, nor the punishment of the other, is what we might expect from the hand of the infinite Ruler of the universe. Neither the promises to the one, nor the threatenings to the other, appear to be fully accomplished in this life. The result of the whole is, that there will be another state, a state of exact retribution, where he will render to all according to their deeds. These great principles are every where spread before our eyes, and proposed to the understanding of all men. They have been the support and comfort of the afflicted righteous in every age, and have been urged, and that with the greatest success, against those who have denied revelation and the providence of God. While infidels have contended that the world is governed by *chance*, and have urged that all “things come alike to all men”

in this world, the fathers and doctors of the Church have admitted the conclusion as a general thing, but denied the premises, and have maintained the cause of God, by contending that the appearances of chance in the dispensations of Providence to men in this world were sure indications of a future retribution. But now we have a new species of infidelity sprung up in the Church, a species of infidelity more absurd than the old, since it affirms that there is an exact retribution both of rewards and punishments in this life; and that with the evidence of Divine revelation, the observation of all mankind, and the testimony of our senses against it. But since it is so, we will hear the objection to this doctrine, and by the grace of God we will answer it.

Obj. "The manifest tendency of virtue is to make mankind happy in this world, while the tendency of vice is to make them miserable. To this agree the Scriptures, which testify that 'The way of the transgressor is hard,' while 'wisdom's ways are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace.' It is, therefore, both reasonable and Scriptural to conclude that rewards and punishments have respect to this life only."

To this we answer: It was never denied by any who hold future punishment, that the tendency of vice is to make mankind miserable, or the tendency of virtue to make them happy; much less was it ever denied that "the way of the transgressor is hard." These are general

sentiments, admitted on all hands, and which will be better understood in the progress of this discussion.

That we may arrive at the greatest certainty on the main question, it may be proper to make a few preliminary remarks:—

1. We must distinguish between sin, and the punishment of sin. We are sometimes told that "sin is its own punishment." This sentiment is not correct. God and mankind universally reject it. Every parent who punishes his child for committing a fault, rejects it. Every master who punishes his servant for any sin, rejects it. Every magistrate who awards the sentence of the law to a transgressor, rejects it. And God himself, as often as he punishes the transgressors of his law, rejects it; because he thereby makes a distinction between transgression and the punishment of transgression. But if the sentiment be correct, all punishment, human and Divine, must be wrong.

2. We must distinguish between the mere natural *effect* of sin, and its *punishment*. Poverty and want may be the effects of idleness and intemperance, but they are not the punishments of those vices. Punishment is the result of legal process,—follows upon conviction by evidence,—is awarded by the sentence of the law, and executed by legal authority. This reasoning applies to punishments under the Divine government, as well as to those under human governments. Thus in the case of Pha-

raah, the effect of his refusing to obey the voice of the Lord was the increased obduracy of his heart ; but this was not his punishment. The same may be said of the Jews ; they rejected Christ the light, and greater darkness came upon them. This was the *effect* but not the *punishment* of their sins.

3. We must distinguish between disciplinary punishment, and capital punishment. This distinction exists as well under the Divine government, as under human governments. Disciplinary punishment in all cases differs from capital punishment, in that it is less than the transgressor's deserts, is inflicted with mercy on the part of the government, and with a view to the reformation of the offender : but capital punishment is the whole sentence of the law, according to the desert of the transgressor, and is inflicted on the part of the government with a view to maintain just authority, and to protect the rights and liberties of the community. When, for *petty larceny*, a person is whipped, or sent to the house of correction, it is disciplinary punishment, and may reform the offender ; but when for treason, or murder, a person is hung, it is capital punishment, because the life of the transgressor is taken. In this case the reformation of the offender is not the object, as it would be most absurd to say a man is *hung* for his *good*.

The same may be observed of the Divine government in this world. Here a great variety of disciplinary punishments are used

both with the righteous and the wicked: these are designed to bring the latter to repentance and to God; and with respect to the former, to preserve them in the way of duty, and make them more fruitful in righteousness. While administering this discipline, God appears as a father correcting his children for their good, mingling the assurances of his love with every stroke, and showing himself ready to forgive their iniquities whenever they submit; but threatening heavier punishments if these prove ineffectual. That these chastisements are also called punishments in the Scriptures, we do not deny; but that they are different, both in the degree and design of them from capital punishments, or punishments, properly so called, we affirm. Even in this world, when his creatures have proved incorrigible, God has made this difference in the character of his punishments. When he destroyed the antediluvians, Pharaoh and his host, the inhabitants of Sodom, &c., he did not inflict a disciplinary punishment, that is, a punishment designed for their good; for he took them away in his wrath from the place of repentance, and from the means of reformation. It would be the most palpable absurdity imaginable, to say that the greatest punishments under the Divine law are disciplinary, and inflicted for the good of those who suffer them. But according to Universalism, the wicked are damned for their good! —sentenced to the punishment prepared for

the devil and his angels to reform them!—banished from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power, to prepare them to enjoy his favour, and to dwell in his kingdom for ever!—cast into *outer darkness* to illuminate them!—have their *hope cut off*,—are sentenced to dwell in despair, *where there is weeping, wailing, and gnashing of teeth*, to recover faith, hope, and charity!—suffer a *punishment much sorer than that of death without mercy*, in a state of *wrath without mixture*, in order to their sanctification and glorification:—and all this, it would seem, on the principles of Universalism, after Gospel means, the mercy and the grace of God, have been exerted upon them in vain! And let it not be said that I herein misrepresent that doctrine: for the word of God informs us that the incorrigible sinner is doomed to such a state, and to suffer such things; while the Universalists tell us that all punishment is designed to promote reformation.

4. We must distinguish between sins that are pardoned, and sins that are not pardoned. It is the latter only that shall be punished as they deserve. The children of God, though pardoned, are the subjects of disciplinary punishment still in this world. It is necessary for them, and therefore provided for in the covenant of promise. But this is not punishing them *according to their sins*. Sins not pardoned shall be punished according to their desert; but this is never done in the present life.

5. We must distinguish between human law and Divine law. Human law is always imperfect and weak; and while it takes no cognizance of the greater number of sins, it never looks to the whole desert of those of which it takes cognizance. Human law takes no cognizance of motives and designs farther than they are developed in the actions of man; and even here it has not the power to inflict the whole deserved punishment. He that kills a man must die for it. And though he kill a thousand men, he can die but once. Here is then, in this case, no proportion between his guilt and his punishment. This shows that the Divine law takes cognizance of the same actions which have been punished by human law, and carries the degree of punishment to the degree of guilt. And no doubt this is the fact in all cases. Human law never awards the whole punishment due to sin. It cannot. But the Divine law will do this. The Divine law is a discerner of the thoughts, intents, and dispositions of the heart, which involve the principles of action, and is the rule by which the *secrets* of men shall be *judged in that day*. And who can determine the degree of turpitude and criminality here? None but the Divine Lawgiver and Judge. Man's thoughts and secret designs will be found unspeakably more criminal when judged by the Divine law, than his worst actions are when judged by the most rigid human law. Human law extends not to our piety or impiety; but the Divine

law requires the entire devotion of our hearts, and that we "love the Lord our God with all the heart, soul, mind, and strength." And to see the importance of love to God, and the criminality of withholding it, we may observe that it is this which gives character and acceptability to all our moral and social virtues. Without this they are all chaff. Who then can determine the criminality of those dispositions expressed by the terms *unbelief*, and *hardness of heart*! I confess that I am lost in the contemplation of this subject, and am no more able to comprehend it than I am able to comprehend the immensity of the Divine being. And shall man; *weak, guilty* man, whose depravity is evinced by a criminal partiality to himself; whose carnal mind is enmity against God; whose understanding is darkened, and who errs continually in the most common concerns of life—shall this man invade the judgment seat of Christ, and decide on the degree of his own criminality, and the extent of his own deserved punishment? What would you say of a traitor to his country who should attempt to do this? Would you say that he is a suitable person to decide on the degree of his own criminality, and the extent of his own punishment?—Yet the absurdity in this case bears no proportion to the absurdity and danger of attempting it in the other:

I now come to the objection, and will endeavour to show, by Scriptural and rational

arguments that sin is not punished in this life to the extent of its desert. If I prove this, Universalism falls to the ground. And here it may be observed that if sin is punished to the extent of its desert in this life, it must be either in the outward trials and afflictions of the sinner, in pain and distress of body, or in anguish and remorse of conscience, or in all these. I begin with the first of these and ask,

1. Does the punishment of the wicked in this life consist of the outward trials and afflictions they suffer?

That the wicked have a portion of the trials and afflictions of this life will not be denied; but if the whole punishment of sin consist in these, we may expect to see an exact proportion, as far as we can judge, between the degree of criminality, and the trials and afflictions suffered: that is, the more guilty will have more trials and afflictions; the less guilty will have fewer, and the holy will have scarcely any at all. But is this the fact? Will either the word of God or our own observation allow us to say this? So far from it, that many of the wicked have fewer trials and afflictions than many of the righteous. Job says, "Wherefore do the wicked live, become old, yea are mighty in power? Their seed is established in their sight with them, and their offspring before their eyes. Their houses are safe from fear, neither is the rod of God upon them," Job xxi, 7, 8, 9. Our objectors have placed themselves in the situa-

tion of Job's friends, who thought that God deals with men in this life according to their moral characters, and therefore inferred that Job was a wicked man because he suffered so much; but Job had other views of this subject, as we have seen above; and tells them that the "rod of God is not on the wicked," while it rests heavily upon the righteous. Jeremiah says, "Wherefore doth the way of the wicked prosper? wherefore are all they happy that deal very treacherously?" Jer. xii, 1.

Solomon's observation is, that God deals in the same manner with the righteous and the wicked in this life. "There be just men," says he, "to whom it happeneth according to the work of the wicked: again, there be wicked men to whom it happeneth according to the work of the righteous," Eccles. viii, 14. "All things come alike to all: there is one event to the righteous, and to the wicked; to the good, and to the clean, and to the unclean," &c., Eccles. ix, 2. This cannot mean that God rewards the righteous and the wicked in this life according to their works.

The psalmist is very explicit on this subject, and says, "I was envious at the foolish when I saw the prosperity of the wicked. For there are no bands in their death, but their strength is firm. They are not in trouble as other men (the righteous;) neither are they plagued like other men, &c. Behold, these are the ungodly who prosper in the world; they increase in

riches. Verily I have cleansed my heart in vain, and washed my hands in innocency. For all the day long have I been plagued, and chastened every morning, &c. When I thought to know this it was too painful for me; until I went into the sanctuary of God: then understood I their *end*. Surely thou didst set them in slippery places; thou castedst them down into destruction as in a moment," &c., Psa. lxxiii.

On these words of the psalmist we may observe, 1. That there was a time when he was not clear in the doctrine of Divine Providence, and favoured too much the views of our opponents; for when he saw the "prosperity of the wicked," in which he was not deceived, he was ready to say, "Verily I have cleansed my heart in vain," as it respects any advantage to be enjoyed above them in this life. At that time "his steps, his faith in the providence of God, had well nigh slipped." 2. By going to the "sanctuary," where the reading of the law instructed him in the character of the providence of God toward men in this life, he saw that the prosperity of the wicked in this world was not to be envied,—that it was only a "slipping place," from which, at the "*end*" of life, they should be precipitated into "destruction and desolation as in a moment." 3. That upon receiving this accession of light, he became perfectly satisfied with the inequality between the righteous and the wicked in this world, and made this reflection upon himself in reference

to his former views,—“So foolish was I, and ignorant, I was as a beast before thee!”

The case of the rich man in the Gospel will fully illustrate the subject of the above psalm. He “prospered in the world.” He “clothed himself in purple and fine linen, and fared sumptuously every day.” He “was not in trouble” like *Lazarus*, nor was he “plagued” like many of the righteous, neither had he “any bands in his death.” But how was he “brought into destruction and desolation as in a moment!”—“He died, and in hell he lifted up his eyes, being in torment.” The words of Abraham to this rich man will confirm this article,—“Son, remember that thou, in thy life time, receivedst thy good things, and likewise *Lazarus* evil things: but,” &c.

We read of another prosperous sinner, who, in the midst of his increasing abundance, said,—“I will pull down my barns and build greater; and then will I say unto my soul, Soul, take thine ease, eat, drink, and be merry: but God said unto him, ‘Thou fool! this night thy soul shall be required of thee!’”

These testimonies are abundantly sufficient to show, what indeed our own observation teaches us, that the wicked do not receive their whole deserved punishment in the afflictions of this life, seeing that in many instances the righteous suffer more than they. Let us inquire,

2. Whether the wicked receive their whole punishment in the pains and afflictions of body

they suffer in this world? And here it may be admitted that they suffer great afflictions of body, and that they die; but as I have not yet heard it said, even by the Universalists themselves, that the wicked suffer more in these respects than the righteous do, I will not dwell upon this article. It is nothing to the point if it be said that some wicked people suffer more than some righteous; because it may be said on the other hand that some righteous people suffer more than some wicked. To prove this point the Universalists must make it appear that the wicked suffer as much more than the righteous, as they are more guilty, and that every man suffers in exact proportion to his guilt. Till this is done nothing is done.

3. But may not the wicked receive their full desert of punishment in the anguish and remorse of conscience they suffer in this life? So Universalism teaches; and when driven from every other refuge it flies to this as its last resort. Let us then proceed carefully, and examine this ground inch by inch.

First, then, we acknowledge that some wicked men suffer much remorse of conscience; but this is an effect of their guilt, and in no instance does it amount to their whole deserved punishment. If men received the punishment of their sins in remorse of conscience, we should expect to see continuance and progress in sin every where marked with continued and increased anguish and remorse; whereas the reverse of this is found to be the

fact. The observation of every person who is acquainted with the drunkard and the debauchee; who has visited our work houses, jails, and penitentiaries, must convince him that the lashes and stings of conscience are not increased, but diminished by progress in vice, till finally they amount to nothing. And here comes in the testimony of the Holy Scriptures to confirm this awful truth: "Now the Spirit speaketh expressly, that in the latter times some shall depart from the faith, giving heed to seducing spirits and doctrines of devils: speaking lies in hypocrisy; having their conscience *seared* with a hot iron," 1 Tim. iv, 2. Again: "Having the understanding darkened, being alienated from the life of God through the ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness of their heart: who, *being past feeling*, have given themselves over unto lasciviousness, to work all uncleanness with greediness," Eph. vi, 18, 19. That progress in sin is marked with an increase of *darkness* and obduracy of mind, may be seen from Rom. chap. i, particularly from the 28th verse: "And even, as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a *reprobate mind*, to do those things which are not convenient." Again, in 2 Thess. ii, 10-12, the same apostle, speaking of them that "received not the love of the truth, that they might be saved," says, "For this cause God shall send them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie; that they all might be

damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness."

Here you may observe is a state of depravity and wickedness in which men suffer nothing from remorse of conscience; because their consciences, through an excess of wickedness, have become like cauterized flesh, *seared with a hot iron, and past feeling*. In the progress of vice the remonstrances and remorse of conscience do not become more and more powerful, as the objection requires, but on the contrary, weaker, and less efficient. This shows, not that this kind of punishment is proportioned to the degree of guilt contracted, but the contrary, and that at the point where vice reaches its greatest obduracy, conscience ceases its functions. The tendency of vice to this end has been seen and lamented by the pious in every age, and it is confidently believed, would have been seen and acknowledged by all, had it not been that the love of system had obscured the "visual ray."

You may observe farther that these unhappy creatures are "given over" by God, that is, *abandoned, left to themselves*, to work all uncleanness with greediness. In this sense God is said to harden the incorrigible sinner, not efficiently, but judicially. In this sense Pharaoh's heart was hardened, and he devoted to inevitable destruction. In this sense too the Jews were blinded, and given up to the sword, and what is still more awful, to *die in their sins*. "Blame not the bowels of the Deity"

in this case. The Saviour would have gathered the Jews as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, but they would not be gathered by him—he pointed out their danger, but they refused to see it—he admonished them, but they would not believe there was any danger—he wept over them, but they regarded it not. And here you have an example of all those whose consciences are *past feeling*; and who are given over to a *reprobate mind*. They will neither see nor believe there is any danger. They cannot see the evidence of truth, nor feel the force of argument, nor the guilt of sin.—They mock at sin, laugh at godliness, and trifle with the awful realities of eternity.

I have now gone through with the objection, and proved, if I mistake not, that the wicked do not receive their punishment in this world.—We have examined every possible way in which they may be supposed to suffer it. First, The trials and afflictions of this life. But here we find that, in many instances, they are not “plagued and troubled like other men,”—the “rod of God is not upon them,” but “they prosper in the world.” We have, secondly, inquired whether they suffer the whole punishment of their sins in pain and distress of body? But here we find they suffer no more than the righteous. And lastly, we have inquired whether they suffer the whole desert of punishment in remorse of conscience? And here we find a class of wicked people, of people the most wicked, who suffer no remorse at all, because

their consciences are seared with a hot iron, and past feeling. The result of the whole is, that the wicked do not receive their whole deserved punishment in this life, but that it awaits them in the life to come.

The dispute about future punishment is now reduced to a narrow compass. If my opponent replies to my arguments, he has got to prove, not that wicked men sometimes suffer much in this world,—for this we admit—but that all wicked people suffer the whole punishment due to their transgressions in this life: because, if there are any who do not thus suffer, his system falls to the ground, and Universalism is found to be a fearful delusion. And I would press this point upon him, because it is all-important to the cause of truth. Should he attempt to satisfy himself, or this audience, with barely proving that “wicked men *suffer and are punished* in this life,” he will only show the weakness of his cause; because my argument requires this, and teaches that God uses a disciplinary punishment with them to bring them to repentance, and to fit them for heaven. If he would support his own cause, he must do more than this—he must show wherein my arguments are weak, and wherein I misapply the Scriptures; and he must show, not only that wicked people suffer and are punished in this life, but that all the wicked suffer all that their sins deserve; because, if only one does not so

suffer, his doctrine is false, and universal salvation is a lie.

Let us suppose, then, as a suitable case for him to try the strength of his arguments upon—let us suppose that one of the despots of our earth, to gratify his pride and ambition, should place himself at the head of half a million of men prepared for the work of destruction and death. He goes forth trampling upon all laws human and Divine; he violates treaties, disregards justice, burns cities, ravages kingdoms, while destruction and misery every where mark his way;—he makes indiscriminate slaughter of men, women, and children;—wants in the miseries of his fellow creatures; sacrifices many ten thousands of his own subjects, and makes widows and fatherless children without number. Finally, he returns victorious, and leaves the kingdoms he has subdued to his heirs. It cannot be said that history furnishes no example of this kind. Now I care not whether it be said that this tyrant, after all these crimes, passed the remainder of his days in prosperity, and died in obdurate tranquillity, which is by far the most probable, or that he suffered in every possible way to the end of his life;—I ask whether it be possible for him to suffer in this life all that his crimes deserve?

The truth will appear in a still stronger light by contrasting to the condition of the prosperous wicked, the afflictions of many, very many of the holiest men that ever lived.

How many of these have been poor, despised, oppressed, falsely accused, and treated as the filth and offscouring of the world,—chastened with strong pain, and plagued in various ways through their whole lives! The Divine testimony is, that they had “trial of cruel mockings and scourgings, of bonds and imprisonments;” that “they were stoned, were sawn asunder, were tempted, were slain with the sword;” that “they wandered about in sheep skins, and goat skins, being destitute, afflicted, tormented;” yea, they have suffered the spoiling of their goods,—been torn from their families, immured in dark and loathsome prisons, loaded with chains, fed on bread and water, suffered anxiety and fear, and finally, perhaps after many years of constant suffering and pain, have been tortured to death by the most cruel methods the malice and ingenuity of their enemies could invent. Now, one of two things must be true, either that these holy persons suffered more than they deserved in justice,—which it would be impious to say—or that the prosperous wicked receive less than their crimes deserve in this life. My opponent may take his choice of these consequences and either will ruin his scheme.

Nov. 28, 1827.

ANSWER V.

Remarks on Mr. Paige's Reply to Lecture III.

"These shall go away into everlasting punishment,"
Matt. xxv, 46.

It is with some regret I find myself compelled to remark on the productions of a new and *absent* antagonist this evening; but the course which my opponent has taken, has made it indispensable. Had he borrowed the sentiments of his brother Whittemore, and brought them here as his own, no exceptions could have been taken, especially if he had "given him due credit;" and this he certainly might have done. In this case his reply *might* have been in point; whereas now he has replied to some things not in my lecture, and has passed over more that are in it. His motive in introducing a third disputant I leave for others to decide;—one thing all must agree in, that he could not have brought in Mr. Whittemore's *misnamed* reply to Mr. Scott, for the purpose of a *pertinent* reply to my lecture.

About two years since, the Rev. T. Whittemore, of Cambridge Port, challenged the Rev. O. Scott, of Charlestown, to a discussion upon doctrinal points, and offered him *one* page, once in a month, in the Universalist Magazine, for each of six pieces he should write, and the choice of subjects was left wholly to Mr. Scott.

Mr. S. required some conditions, among which one was, that he should be allowed *two pages* in the Magazine for each of the six pieces. About ten months afterward Mr. W. complied with Mr. Scott's conditions; but when he found that Mr. S. did not reply to him, but pursued a forward course, he manifested a great degree of disappointment, and some irritation of feeling, which thenceforward changed the spirit and character of the discussion. Mr. Scott answered that he had fixed on five or six subjects for so many communications, and designed to reply in his last, if he found it necessary to reply;—that he was willing the arguments on both sides should go to the public without rejoinders;—that he could not go on with his original design and reply in only two pages, and to require it was like requiring a man to run a race with his legs tied, especially as he, Mr. W., had adopted the style and mode of declamation, and every where abounded in evasion, assumption, and illogical deduction; but if he would allow him an equal privilege in the Magazine with himself, he would reply, and make good all his assertions. This privilege, however, was never granted; but Mr. W. continued his complaints with increasing emphasis, till Mr. S. in his fifth communication said to him, that if he would continue to allow him two pages in the Magazine per month, he would review him at length, otherwise he should go no farther. This proposal not being complied with,

the correspondence ended, rather unpleasantly on Mr. W.'s part. And this is another reason why I was unwilling his spirit, and style, and mode of treating his subject and his opponent should be brought into this discussion; where our own way of managing is a sufficient trial of our humility, meekness, and patience. I have reluctantly said thus much on a disagreeable and delicate subject, because I thought it my duty to myself and to the audience, to assign the reasons for my objection to my opponent's bringing in Mr. W. as he did.

As my opponent, contrary to our mutual understanding, has furnished me with nothing in writing, and I have no guide but my own memory and Mr. W.'s irrelevant remarks, to be picked out here and there, I am apprehensive that I may bring in, or leave out of my answer, things that I should not, had I the assistance of a manuscript. I will do the best I can, and leave the event to the candour of the audience. I would only observe farther, that as my opponent has adopted the sentiments of Mr. W., I shall consider them as his own, and hold him alone answerable for them.

That I may not trespass too far on the patience of the audience, I will be as brief as possible, and confine myself to the principal topics in the reply.

I will first notice his remarks on those passages which assert the future punishment to

be *everlasting, eternal, &c.* I produced these passages in my lecture, not for the purpose of proving endless punishment, (though I take them in the endless sense,) but to show what the Universalists have always contended for, that the words *everlasting, eternal, &c.*, mean an "age," or "ages of ages." I apply these words as the Scriptures do, to express the duration of punishments under the Divine law, and to show the conclusiveness of the argument: I apply them to the case of deliberate suicide. What does my opponent do here? Why, first, he goes to work to show, what my argument does not require, viz., that these words do not mean endless punishment, and he occupies between four and five squares of a column to make this out. In the next place he states the case of an insane person, who, "by despair and excessive sorrow is driven to the dreadful alternative of taking his own life," to show that he receives his whole punishment in this world. In the third place he tells us that, "In cases of suicide, *the sin is in the intention to do the deed*, the execution of it *may* be the punishment." And here his argument closes. Now I desire to ask my opponents a few questions for information. And, *first*, where, in what books, in what language, and in what nation, they learned that the sin of suicide is *wholly* "in the intention to do the deed," that is, that there is no sin in the *act* of taking one's own life, but that the act is the "*punishment*" of the in-

tention? * And *secondly*, I would ask whether they are quite *certain* that the *act* of taking life is the "*punishment* of the intention" in a case of suicide, when they say it "*may* be the punishment;" and where, and what the punishment shall be, if it should not happen to be, as they say it *may* be? And, *thirdly*, I would ask, for it appears to have escaped their thoughts entirely, whether the time occupied in "*executing*" the "*intention*," when one shoots himself through the head or the heart, is the whole time expressed by the words, *for ever, everlasting, eternal, &c.* Is not this one of the finest defences of Universalism ever set up by two learned men!

As my opponent has several times asserted his ability to make it appear that the words *everlasting, eternal, &c.*, do not mean endless duration, I may be thought wanting in attention to this subject if I pass it over in silence; and yet I can make but a few brief remarks upon it in this place. I take these words in

* As my opponent has given us the novel and very queer sentiment that "the sin," in a case of suicide, "is in the intention to do the deed," and that the "*act* of taking life is the punishment of that sin;" and as in his defence he quoted Matt. v, 28, "Whoever looketh on a woman," &c., in proof of that sentiment; he is desired, as there has been no small inquiry on that head since the evening of his defence, to inform the public whether the same distinction between the "*intention*" and the "*act*" is to be made in a case of adultery, as in suicide; and if not he would do well to be very particular in assigning his reasons for confining it to the latter

the endless sense, for the following reasons among others:—

Because this is the true sense of the Greek word *aion*, from which they are derived. All able critics, ancient and modern, give the word this meaning according to its etymology, *ai*, always, and *on*, existing, *always existing*; and thus the idea conveyed by it is *endless existence*. The same is to be observed of its derivatives. The word *aionios* is applied to God, *Theos aionios*, "the everlasting God." And this word Dr. Chauncey tells us, "is applied to the future state of the righteous more than forty times in the New Testament." In all these places he admits that it means endless duration, Universalist as he was. Why then should these words be taken in a different sense when applied to the punishment of the wicked?

In this application of these words we are sustained by an unerring rule of revelation,— "The things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal," 2 Cor. iv, 18. Here the word "eternal" must have the endless sense, as it stands opposed to the word "temporal." And then the things which are not seen, the things of the invisible, spiritual world, as God, angels, saints, and sinners when they enter that world, with the happiness of the one class, and the misery of the other, must be endless, because "the things which are not seen are eternal."

And here let me add the testimony of Dr.

Huntingdon; of which I might say as David did of the sword of Goliath, "There is none like it;" for he was not only a man of learning, but a Universalist, and wrote his book entitled "Calvinism Improved," to prove that doctrine. His words are, "Does the Bible plainly say that sinners shall be damned to interminable punishment? It certainly does; as plainly as language can express, or any man, or even God himself can speak. It is quite strange to me that some who believe that all mankind shall in the end be saved, will trifle as they do with a few words, and most of all with the original word, and its derivatives, translated, for ever," &c. We never denied that these words are sometimes applied by way of accommodation, to temporal things; but to us, as well as to Dr. H., it appears "trifling," when men have nothing to urge against the proper application of these words to the future state but their accommodated application to the things of this world.

I quoted Jude, verse 7, in my lecture, and offered four reasons to show that the phrase, "suffering the vengeance of eternal fire," in relation to Sodom and Gomorrah, &c., should be taken as implying that they are still suffering. The reply touches only *one* of these reasons, but accuses me of *misquoting* a passage in one of St. Peter's epistles which I do not quote at all; and then to show that the phrase, "suffering the vengeance of eternal fire," is limited to this world, tells us "the

fire which St. Jude speaks of he *supposes* to be the fire by which Sodom and Gomorrah were destroyed, called eternal, *aiônios*, on account of the great length of time it lasted ;” and to support *his supposition*, gives another *supposition* mentioned by “Whitby,” that “this fire lasted from Abraham’s time to the beginning of the second century,” a period of about two thousand years. This was a long time for a literal fire to last ; and really I “*suppose*” there is no more foundation for this report than there is for that of the “apples of Sodom,” or “the pillar of salt,” into which Lot’s wife was changed, as still remaining, but which nobody can find : but there is another *report* as credible as that mentioned by Whitby, viz., that the land where those cities stood was sunk, and that the Dead Sea occupies the same spot. And I should think, after all the assurance manifested by my opponents, it would not be a little mortifying to be obliged to resort to *supposition* and such *legendary tales* to support the doctrine of universal salvation.

My opponent’s remarks, if such they may be called, upon the passages which speak of the unbeliever *dying in his sins* and the *hypocrite’s hope being cut off*, having little in them beside words, and nothing like argument, I pass over ; but I stop a moment to notice those on the texts produced to show that the “end” of the impenitent “is destruction,” that they “bring upon themselves swift destruc-

tion," &c. He says, "I will now point out the deficiency of your argument here: the word *end* is used in the Scriptures with a great variety of significations. *Telos*, rendered *end*, is used to signify an *event*, *consequence*, *fruit*, *recompense*, *a short sum*, *an impost or tax*," &c. He adds, "Your sole dependence is placed on the word *end*, as though it invariably signified *final destination*, which is not true. How quickly your proof melts away when brought to the blaze of truth!" Let us look at this "blaze of truth." Let it be observed that I contend that *end* here means *final destination*, while my opponent denies it, and gives us, according to the Greek, six other significations of the word. Let us see how they will apply to our subject: Take Phil. iii, 19, and read, not whose *end*, i. e. final destruction, but whose "*event*" is destruction—whose "*consequence*" is destruction—whose "*fruit*" is destruction—whose "*recompense*" is destruction—whose "*short sum*" is destruction—whose "*impost or tax*" is destruction. Now you have all the significations my opponent has given of this word, and you have ours, and you may take your choice, with the assistance of his "blaze of truth."

The new recruit my opponent has brought in from Cambridge Port is a man full of words, and has access to a college library, as large and rich as any in the country. Let us hear him a little farther on this subject. He says, "Mr. Scott, do you love to read the

Bible? if you do, see Ezek. vi, a chapter selected out of many to which I might refer you, in which you will find an *end*, the day of trouble, fury, anger, destruction, all come upon men in this life." Here I would ask, because the point was overlooked by my opponent in my lecture, if "trouble, fury, anger, and destruction" come upon incorrigible sinners in this life, and the Scriptures tell us that this is their *end*, whether there is another *end*,—an end of *joy, mercy, and salvation*, after their *end*, and if so, where it is to be found in the Bible?

In my lecture I quoted several passages of Scripture to show that "God allows sinners a space to repent,—affords them all necessary means and helps, and admonishes them that these opportunities and privileges will not always last, and that when they end, their condition becomes hopeless." In the reply my opponent brings in, as though contained in my lecture, a passage which was not in it, and makes it the only one on which he comments, and leaves out an important passage that was in it, Prov. i, 24–28, where God says to the wicked, "Because I have called and ye refused, &c., I also will laugh at your calamity, &c. Then shall they call upon me, but I will not answer, they shall seek me early, but they shall not find me."—I say this passage was unnoticed in the reply, and the argument on all the other passages *totally* evaded, for which, as well as for many other observations,

he must thank his brother W. And here is a good opportunity to give a specimen of his general mode of reasoning. He says, "You quote thirdly Isa. lv, 6, 'Seek ye the Lord *while* he may be found, call ye upon him *while* he is near.' What does Isaiah say here about God's accepted time, or the day of salvation? Nothing. What does he say about the future state? Nothing. Can we even prove from the passage that he believed in any future existence? Certainly not. Reader, this is Mr. Scott's," *alias*, Merritt's, "direct proof of future punishment. I should think a man a *wizzard* who could prove future punishment by that which does not prove future existence. Let us drag on to the next passage," &c. Now these are the words, and this the method of the man who was brought here to reply to my lecture; and you may observe how dexterously he has shifted to keep my argument out of sight. My argument is built upon the word *while*, twice used in this text,—“Seek ye the Lord *while* he may be found, call ye upon him *while* he is near,” and is expressed in these words: “Here it is intimated that God will not always wait to be gracious, that he will not always be found.” By keeping my argument out of sight, by a palpable misrepresentation of it, he has left it whole and entire; but has he done me justice in misrepresenting my argument? Has he done himself justice as a public teacher of religion? Has he done justice to the audience, who have

a claim to the undisguised arguments of both disputants? Above all, has he done justice to the text, and to the cause of truth? The remarks on some other passages quoted in the first part of my lecture I pass, as there is nothing in them to invalidate my reasoning and arguments. But an argument for future punishment which occurs in this part of the lecture, founded on the genius of religion, the scope of the Scriptures, and the providence of God; and which, it is believed, was entitled to serious consideration, my opponent has passed without noticing. It will avail him nothing to say that this, and other matter which he has passed in the same way, was not in Scott's Letters, and therefore the reply did not reach it. Why then did he bring in that reply as an answer to my lecture? He had my lecture before he made his reply; and surely he was not bound to confine himself to the matter I had borrowed from Scott, but might have replied to my new matter. But I see his difficulty: had he acknowledged new matter in my lecture, the audience would have seen that Whittemore's reply to Scott could not be a reply to me.

In coming to the second part of my lecture, the first thing I shall notice is the charge that I take away the doctrine of future punishment "entirely from Scriptural ground." This was Mr. W.'s remark upon the *first* part of Mr. S.'s letter, before he came to his direct Scripture proofs; but in my lecture I have changed

the order, and placed the Scripture proofs first: this renders the remark perfectly nugatory, and is another instance of the *pertinence* of the reply. In the second part of my lecture I answer an objection at length, and my arguments are of a different character, though still I trust Scriptural.

In coming to the question whether the whole punishment of sin is inflicted in this world or the future, I bring five preliminary arguments, intended to define and support my main proposition. Of these only two are noticed in the reply. In the second of these I say:—

“We must distinguish between the mere natural effect of sin, and its punishment. Poverty and want may be the effects of idleness and intemperance; but they are not the punishment of those vices. Punishment is the result of legal process,” &c. This is called “assumption.”—“Do you not see,” say my opponents, “that all and every thing you here offer for argument is your own assumption?” To this I answer:—

If the distinction here made between the mere natural effects, and the punishment of sin, be assumption, it is assumption resting on matter of fact, the subject of daily observation.

Again: I distinguish between “disciplinary punishment and capital punishment;” and admit that the former is designed to promote reformation, but not the latter. This distinction in punishments, if supported, will over-

throw the doctrine advocated by my opponent; to prevent which he makes vigorous resistance. And here I cannot but remark, that his having placed reliance on Mr. W. will prove to him only as the broken staff, which, when a man leaneth on it, entereth into his hand and pierceth it.

The first attempt to reply to this distinction is by *misrepresentation*. He says—"Look at this, reader. If it be true, justice is not satisfied with the promotion of reformation. Do you think God has any such justice? The authority of the law is not supported by the promotion of reformation. Do you think God has any such law? Government does not obtain stability and security from the promotion of reformation. Wonderful statement! Well then suppose punishment does not promote reformation; suppose that instead of reforming men, it makes them worse, then *justice* will be satisfied," &c. I have neither said this, nor can it be deduced from any thing I have said. I have expressly admitted that disciplinary punishment is designed to promote reformation; and of course the authority of the law, and the stability of government, *are* secured by reformation; and capital punishments are inflicted, not because reformation would not render government secure, but because, to grant a general amnesty to all thieves, murderers, traitors, and other transgressors, would be to prostrate the authority of law, prevent reformation, and jeopard the property, the

lives, and the liberties of the community. To do away capital punishments would not promote reformation, but it would invite transgression, and introduce wide-spread anarchy and universal desolation. Who would feel secure in his property, his life, or his liberty, if our penal laws, and especially those which inflict capital punishment, were all repealed? Capital punishments are inflicted, not out of revenge to the offender, as my opponent unwarrantably represents, but for the security of government: and I fully agree with him that "capital punishments are inflicted by necessity; and that society would be very glad to get rid of them, if it could consistently with the *security of its government*." I only blame him for misrepresenting and condemning my sentiment, when he advances the very same,—the necessity of "capital punishments to the security of government." And here you see his rashness in saying that "the commonwealth has no justice but what would be satisfied with the reformation of the offender." He not only contradicts his own sentiment, that "capital punishments are necessary to the security of government," but he contradicts matter of fact. It is sometimes the case that persons under sentence of death for murder and other crimes, are brought to repentance before their execution. But is the justice of the commonwealth satisfied with their reformation—without their execution? Let matter of fact decide. If in a few instances,

where special reasons joined with reformation exist, the sentence of the law is remitted, yet the law has made no general provision of this sort, but deals with the penitent and the impenitent murderer in the same manner. And this is not an act of wantonness and cruelty, as is represented, but of wisdom and benevolence. The disposition of the murderer, whether he be penitent or impenitent, is not the object of the law; but "the security of government," and the protection of society. My opponent proceeds, "But if it is thus under human governments, it is because they cannot change the moral dispositions of men or reform the criminal;" but "has not God the power which human governments want to reform his creatures, create them anew, and make them holy?—Who will doubt it?—Then do you not attribute to the Father of our spirits an action beyond all description hateful and wicked in man?"—"The character of Nero is not blacker than this which men ascribe to God."

If this objection were well founded, we should all do well to become Universalists; but happily it has not the shadow of truth in it. The objection rests on two assumptions: 1. That in administering the capital penalties of his law, God makes the reformation of the offender his paramount object; whereas under the Divine, as well as under human governments, the objects of punishments are "the security of government," and the protection

of society. Thus in destroying "Sodom, Gomorrah, and the cities about them," the object was not the reformation of those offenders, but we are expressly told, that in their punishment, "they were set forth for an example to them that should after live ungodly." The same may be said of the antediluvians, of Pharaoh and his army, of the troop of Korah, Dathan, Abiram, &c. There is no reasoning against matter of fact. These, and thousands of others, were taken away by the judgments of God—taken out of the world,—taken from the place of repentance and from the means of reformation. If my opponent denies this, it is for him to prove the contrary. He has the affirmative side of this question. He tells you that those who are taken out of this world by the judgments of God have another place, and other means of repentance and reformation. Let him show this and we will believe his doctrine; but till he does this we cannot, we dare not, we ought not to believe a syllable of it.

2. His second assumption is, that God governs the moral world as he governs the natural world, by mere power; and therefore he says, "Has not God the power which human governments want, to reform his creatures, create them anew, and make them holy?" He adds, "None will doubt it." On his principles it is not only "doubted," but *denied*, that God can "reform, create anew, and make his creatures holy." God does

not govern the moral world as he governs the natural world, by mere power; but having made mankind free agents, he governs them as such, by laws and motives. To talk, therefore, of his "reforming his creatures, creating them anew, and making them holy," without their own agency in the use of his appointed means, is worse than idle and vain; it is to *deceive* and to *destroy* souls. If to "reform mankind, to create them anew, and make them holy," depend on the sole will and power of God, why is not this change wrought in all mankind *immediately*? Is it not his will that they should be holy *now*? If it be not his will, then why does he command them to be holy *now*? Why does he command them to repent, believe, and obey the Gospel, and denounce the heaviest woes, and threaten the severest penalties, even damnation, upon them if they do not? What sincerity or truth is there in these things upon the supposition that it is not his will that they should repent, believe, and obey *now*? And if it be his will, then what reason can be assigned why they are not holy *now*, except that they are free agents and refuse obedience to his commands? This is the only ground on which we can account for the present sinful state of mankind. God wills that they should be holy; but they, as free agents, will not be holy, and therefore he will punish them as their disobedience deserves. And if it were wise, and holy, and good in God to make

mankind free agents, and to govern them as such, then who shall have the temerity to arraign his wisdom and goodness, and accuse him of acting in a manner "beyond all description hateful and wicked, and ascribe to him a character as black as that of Nero." My opponent is chargeable with this temerity.

Before I notice again the Scriptures quoted in my lecture to show that the wicked do not receive their whole punishment in the outward trials and afflictions of this life, I would notice my opponent's method of treating this part of the controversy. I say in my lecture,—"That the wicked have a portion of the trials and afflictions of life, will not be denied; but if the whole punishment of sin consist in these, we may expect to see an exact proportion, as far as we can judge, between their criminality and the trials and afflictions suffered. But is this the fact? Will either the word of God or our own observation allow us to say this? So far from it, that *many* of the wicked have fewer trials and afflictions than *many* of the righteous." In replying to this my opponent represents me as "labouring to prove" that the "wicked" *generally* "prosper, that they are happy, and that they enjoy themselves more than others." And this he does, I believe in every instance where he mentions this subject. But the difference between saying that "*many* of the wicked have fewer trials and afflictions than *many* of the righteous," and saying that "the wicked prosper,"

“that they are happy,” and that “they enjoy themselves more than others,” is such, that it leaves my argument in full force, while it does nothing to support his own. I quoted Job xxi, 7, 8, 9, to prove that the wicked sometimes prosper in this world,—that the “rod of God is not upon them.” The reply, entirely overlooking the point, says, The “Scriptures do not teach the doctrine of a future retribution,” but that “wrath bringeth the punishment of the sword, that ye may know there is *a judgment* in this life.” But will this prove that Job spoke an untruth when he said of *some* wicked people that “the rod of God is not upon them?”

I also quoted Jer. xii, 1, where the prophet asks, “Wherefore doth the way of the wicked prosper?” &c. Here my opponent as good as contradicts the prophet. He says, “I believe it is a good rule not to infer from a man’s words what he himself does not believe;” and then goes on to show that the wicked are punished in this world,—“The spoilers are come upon all high places,” &c., and thus he leaves the subject. But is there not a better way than to set one passage of Scripture *against* another? There certainly is, and it is very easy to reconcile these passages by observing, what indeed we see daily before our eyes, that some wicked people prosper while others are afflicted—that they prosper at one time. and at another time are involved in divers afflictions, war, famine, pestilence, &c. And

it may be observed also that the righteous are as often involved in these afflictions as the wicked.

I quoted a part of Eccles. viii, 14, and ix, 2, to show that the dispensations of Providence are generally the same toward the righteous and the wicked in this world—that in this sense “all things come alike to all,” and that this is not to reward the righteous and the wicked according to their works in this world. Here the reply brings in, as quoted by me, a passage which is not found in my lecture, and which I have not quoted during this discussion,—“and after that they go to the dead,” and occupies a full square and a half in confuting what I have not said. But no matter for this, if I did not quote it in my lecture, Mr. S. did in his letter to Mr. W.; and therefore it is a reply to me! And many similar replies I meet with in that singular production.

I quoted the 73d Psalm for the same purpose, viz., to show that the wicked sometimes prosper in the world, and to show the views which the psalmist had on this subject at different times. The case of the psalmist stands thus in this psalm: 1. There was a time when he was not clear in the doctrine of Divine providence, and thought the righteous should be prospered, and the wicked visited with adversity in this world. 2. This proved a sore temptation to him afterward when he came to observe that the wicked “prosper in the world,”—that “they are not in trouble as

other men," &c., while he had been "plagued all the day long, and chastened every morning;" for he was moved to *envy them*, and to believe that he had "cleansed his heart in vain, and washed his hands in innocency." And so powerful was this temptation, that he says his "feet were almost gone, his steps had well nigh slipped." 3. By going to the sanctuary he received instruction upon this subject, and saw, that though the wicked prosper in this world, even to their last moment, and have "no bands in their death," yet their "*end*" was not to be envied; for their prosperity was as a slippery place from which they should be brought down "into destruction and desolation as in a moment." 4. That on receiving this instruction, and with reference to his former views of providence, his envying the prosperity of the wicked, and thinking it in "vain that he had washed his hands in innocency," he made this reflection upon himself, "So foolish was I, and ignorant, I was as a beast before thee." I then confirm this construction of the psalm by the cases of two prosperous wicked men in the Gospel. Without noticing these cases, the reply labours to make it appear that the error of the psalmist consisted in thinking that the wicked were in prosperity, or in other words, that they "were not punished in this world." Being perfectly confident that this sentiment is untenable, and that every person must perceive its fallacy on reading the psalm, I shall spend

no more time upon it, but leave it with the audience as it now stands. I cannot close my remarks without noticing some things in the author of the reply which I think of very dangerous tendency. We have seen how he has set a passage in the Prophet Jeremiah, where he speaks of the "prosperity" of the wicked, against other passages in the same prophet, without the least effort to reconcile them. On the passage quoted from Ecclesiastes he gives us a novel sentiment, expressed in very exceptionable language. His words are, "Those you took from Ecclesiastes, if we can judge from the character of the book, were written by Solomon, at a time, when, by too free an indulgence in mirth and pleasure, his mind had become enervated, and he had imbibed a disgust at every thing. He even despised what is generally considered the source of true happiness. This whole book, and *particularly the passages you quote*, are a proof of the situation to which he had debased himself by his sins." He quotes the words of Job, uttered under an overwhelming manifestation of the Divine perfections, and expressive of his short comings and deep humility, and accompanies them with this general reflection, "Job did not always say what was right." He then adds, "I wonder that you did not observe these circumstances in quoting these passages, and if you did see them, I wonder still more that you ever brought *such testimony* forward." This shows

that he intended the foregoing remarks should have a general application to the books from which quotations had been made to prove that the wicked sometimes prosper in this world. And is there no way to prove Universalism but by denying the inspiration of the Scriptures? What could Voltaire, or Thomas Paine, or any other infidel, have said more in so few words to overthrow the inspiration of those books, and make them of no authority in matters of faith? If Solomon wrote the book of Ecclesiastes in the midst of his voluptuous course, it is entitled to no more respect than the "song of the drunkard." And this is the sentiment of the reply. But what effect are these sentiments, thrown out by professed ministers of the Gospel, likely to have upon that part of the community who have not made the evidences of revealed religion their study, and who love pleasure and sin more than God and religion? The effect will be what we have seen and heard; the youth who have not yet learned their religious alphabet, as soon as they begin to relish this new doctrine, Universalism, will begin to imagine that "the Bible is full of contradictions;" while those who worship at the shrine of Bacchus, as oft as their senses are well steeped in new rum, will talk largely of "the tough stories of the Bible;" and others from the example of their teachers in excepting to a part, will object to the whole inspired volume. I would hope that my opponent is not

yet prepared to go all this length; but this is the direct tendency of the sentiments of his brother W., whom he has brought in to answer the arguments of my third lecture. The best apology that can be made for him will be found in his scarcity of argument, and in the urgency of the case, which has driven him upon the very shoals of Deism.

Thus far we have found nothing in the reply to show that the wicked do not sometimes prosper in this world, and of course nothing to show that they receive their whole punishment here; and as it has not yet been said that they suffer more pain and distress of body than the righteous, we have nothing to add on that point, but shall pass to notice a few things in connection with those passages of Scripture which teach that the consciences of some become "seared with a hot iron," and "past feeling."

The first thing I shall notice here is an attempt to make Dr. A. Clarke countenance the sentiment of my opponent and his new recruit from *Cambridge Port*. Passing over two other passages to the same point in my lecture, he fixes on that in 1 Tim. iv, 1, 2, where the apostle speaks of the "conscience seared with a hot iron," and that in Eph. iv, 18, 19, where the same apostle speaks of the conscience that is "past feeling," and then says, "you cannot be ignorant, I trust, that the expression, *seared with a hot iron*, may be ex-

plained without favouring the idea of callousness of conscience." He then introduces Dr. A. Clarke ; and suppressing his comment on the passage in Ephesians, where he is clear and full to the point of "callousness of conscience," and withal saying that "he is authority which I will not refuse," goes on to say, "A. Clarke," on the phrase, *having their conscience seared with a hot iron*, "does not favour the idea of callousness of conscience," but says, "they bear the marks of their hypocrisy as evidently and as indelibly in their consciences in the sight of God, as those who have been cauterized for their crimes do in their bodies in the sight of men." Here I have but two remarks to make. 1. What Dr. Clarke says on this passage implies "callousness," or insensibility of conscience, as much as cauterized flesh, or flesh burnt with a hot iron, implies that that flesh is without feeling. 2. I believe this, not because Dr. Clarke says it, but because St. Paul says it; and I must inform my opponent that in matters of faith Dr. Clarke with me is no better authority than any other uninspired man, however I may respect him for his learning and piety.

Again : speaking of those whose consciences are so *seared* and *past feeling* that they have "no shame, no remorse," he says, "if their consciences did not accuse them of wickedness, if the functions of conscience all ceased, as you contend, they knew not that they did

wrong, and therefore were deserving of no punishment." Now this is a very precious confession of my opponent, as it goes far to disclose the features of Universalism in some important points, and to show what all may not have been sensible of before. We infer from it, 1. That mankind are under no law but that of their own conscience; for were they under any other law they might transgress it, and so deserve punishment after their consciences had become so depraved as to feel neither shame nor remorse. But the reply says, "If the functions of conscience have ceased, they deserve no punishment."

2. It is better for mankind to remain in ignorance, to neglect the word of God, and the ordinances of his worship, and all the means of instruction and grace, than to attend to them; for if they attend to them they will obtain knowledge, and have a conscience, and so will acquire the capacity of becoming sinners, and will undeniably become guilty; whereas if they only remain as ignorant as the cattle, they will have no more conscience than they, and of course no more sin:—"For if they are ignorant," says my opponent, "they *deserve* no punishment."

3. When a man's conscience, through an excess of depravity and wickedness, becomes *seared with a hot iron*, and *past feeling shame and remorse*, his actions thenceforward, be they what they may, become *innocent*. "For then,"

says my opponent, "they *deserve* no punishment."

4. That there are no fixed, immutable principles laid down by God for the government of mankind ;—none but such as are *acquired* and such as *cease to exist* upon being forgotten : "if they *knew not*," says my opponent, "they *deserve* no punishment."

5. Finally, God cannot be much displeased at the conduct of man at any time, and none at all when, through the abuse of his knowledge, and an excess of wickedness and depravity, his conscience becomes "seared with a hot iron, and past feeling;" "for then," says my opponent, "he *deserves no punishment*."* These are the legitimate inferences arising from one important article in the system of Universalism. They are more fully expressed in Mr. Ballou's Treatise upon Atonement; and who can wonder that upon this view of sin and the law, either he, or his

* To rid himself of these corollaries my opponent denied the sentiment whence they are drawn, and made a most flimsy attempt to show that he reasoned on *my* principles. I have indeed quoted the Scripture to prove that there is a state of depravity in which the conscience is "past feeling" shame and remorse for the most beastly actions; but it is the author of the *reply* who says that such "know not that they do wrong, and therefore deserve no punishment." And it is from this sentiment of *his* that the corollaries are drawn, as every one may see. If, therefore, he does not like the corollaries, let him renounce the sentiment which contains them, and no longer attempt to deceive the public by denying his own spurious offspring.

followers, should deny the necessity of atonement?

I now come to that part of the reply where the last grand effort is made to show that the greatest sinners receive their whole punishment in this world. Let it be recollected that in my lecture I gave the case of a tyrant, "who, in the pride of his heart, goes forth with mighty armies, trampling upon all law, human and Divine; violating treaties, disregarding justice, burning cities, ravaging kingdoms, spreading destruction and misery every where, wantoning in the miseries of his fellow creatures," &c. I suppose this tyrant to return from his conquest, and to spend the rest of his days in ease and worldly prosperity, and at last to die in obdurate tranquillity. This case is to be disposed of by my opponent, and what, think you, will he do with it? Why, after much "beating of the air," and filling about four squares of a column with words without meaning, he settles the case in few words, by including this tyrant in that class of whom it is said that "God gave them over to a reprobate mind, *as a punishment*, because they did not like to retain him in their knowledge,"—that is he gave them over to an "unthinking, unsearching, stupid mind," or in other words, their consciences became "seared with a hot iron, and past feeling,"—"God gave them over." This was certainly a hard case for *both* my opponents. We may remark here,

1. That this "unsearching, stupid mind,"—this "seared, unfeeling conscience," is a confirmed state of sin and guilt, in other words, the *ne plus ultra* of moral depravity.

2. According to my opponent's doctrine, a high degree of criminality is *fully* punished in this world by a greater degree of criminality. And this is what he contends for. He says that men are "punished *in* sin and *by* sin." And again, "*sin* itself is punishment." Once more: "All the cases of wickedness you can bring forward are met by this,"—that sin is punished "*by sin*;" and "the more deeply you plunge the sinner into the abyss of depravity, the more you do against your own cause,"—that is, against the doctrine that makes a distinction between sin and the punishment of sin.

3. As sinners love sin, and "roll it as a sweet morsel under their tongue," so they are *fully* punished for their greatest crimes, and for all their sins, by being *indulged* by God in that which they love, namely, to sin all their days without restraint, without remorse, and without, in the least, endangering their future happiness.

4. As searching after the knowledge of God and retaining that knowledge, is mental labour; and as an unfeeling conscience is a state of freedom from mental pain, so the greatest sinners in the world receive their *whole* desert of punishment by being abandoned to a state of mind where they are freed

from all labour after the knowledge of God, and from all pain on that account and their sins,—in a word, they are punished without any *suffering* or pain whatever.

5. But how will my opponent reconcile this view of the subject with what he has said elsewhere? Here he tells us that sin and punishment are the same thing, or in other words, that sin is its own punishment, sinners are punished "*by sin.*" Elsewhere, and generally through this discussion, he has made a distinction between sin and the punishment of sin: and no farther back than his last reply, has contended, as you all know who heard him, that the wicked are punished by the trials and afflictions they suffer in this life. And when he was last upon the case of suicide, he told you that "*the sin* was the intention to do the deed," and "taking life was the punishment of that intention." What a pity it did not occur to him at that time, that "*sin is punished by sin.*" I leave him to settle this controversy with himself in the best way he can.

We may now consider the point of the whole punishment of sin in this world as virtually given up by our opponents, and that of future punishment as established; for, in a case like that before us, when men resort to palpable absurdity and contradiction, it is evident that argument has failed them. It has always been contended by our opponents that sin is punished either in outward afflictions, in

pain and distress of body, in remorse of conscience, or in all these, in the present life. But here is a class of men, the very chief of sinners, who live in worldly prosperity, are as free from pain and distress of body as the best of men, and have no remorse or pain of conscience whatever, being given over by God to a *reprobate mind*, and to a conscience that is *past feeling*. This class of sinners do not receive their punishment in any of those ways which the Universalists have assigned for the punishment of sin in this world. My opponent's sophistical illustration of the payment of a debt by three one dollar bills taken together, when neither would pay the debt alone, will not help him here; for his bills are now all *blanks*. And should he ever again attempt to pay three dollars, or rather ten thousand talents, with three *blanks*, we shall suspect him of relationship to a class of men (I need not otherwise describe them) who live by defrauding the public. But when these modes of punishment have all failed, something else must be resorted to, or Universalism goes down. And, behold! here you have it—a mode of punishment without pain, and without suffering—a mode of punishment which the sinner himself prefers to no punishment at all—a mode of punishment which amounts to a *plenary indulgence* to follow sin the rest of his days, without restraint, without remorse, and without danger.

In closing my remarks on the reply, I can-

not but observe,—that while it deals principally in evasion and assumption, it brings a number of items as though contained in my lecture which were not in it, and passes over in silence, in the first part, an important argument for future punishment, or rather a three-fold argument founded on “the genius of religion, the scope of the Scriptures, and the economy of Providence,” and three out of five of my preliminary arguments, as well as much other matter; but it has in some measure compensated for these aberrations by the incautious manner in which it has, in several respects, exposed the nakedness and deformity of Universalism, particularly in respect to him who commits suicide, the law and sin, and the new mode of punishing the greatest crimes without suffering or pain. The cause I plead would have been safe without this defence, from the mere want of sentiment in the reply to which this is an answer; from which circumstance, and an inundation of words without meaning, less was probably carried away by the audience than from any other discussion since we first met.

Dec. 14, 1827.

THE
CURSE OF THE DIVINE LAW:
A DISCOURSE

DELIVERED IN THE METHODIST CHURCH IN SPRINGFIELD,
MASS., AFTER THE CLOSE OF THE PRECEDING
DISCUSSION.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

BEFORE the commencement of the discussion which gave rise to the preceding lectures of the Rev. T. Merritt, Mr. Paige, the Universalist advocate, was informed that probably I should take some part in the controversy; and when the discussion between him and my worthy brother was closed, Mr. Paige was informed that I was about to deliver one or two discourses on the subject in the Methodist church in Springfield, and if he desired it, he might have the privilege of replying: but if he did reply he might expect an immediate answer, and that the disputed point should be discussed, and, if possible, settled one way or the other on the spot. This offer Mr. Paige, for reasons best known to himself, declined. Some reasons it is true were offered by him,

but whether they were the leading ones in his mind, remains a question on which those acquainted with the circumstances will undoubtedly form their own opinion. The discourses, however, were delivered, and at the request of the Methodist Society in Springfield are now furnished for publication, together with the foregoing; and the public must judge whether they contain arguments of any weight in deciding the great question between Universalists and anti-Universalists. Some of the following arguments I have never before seen published; others have been urged before, and ought to be urged again and again, in all the various and possible forms that truth is capable of putting on; for they have never been answered, and it is believed never can be to the satisfaction of even their opposers themselves. For some of the arguments in the first discourse, and for the method of reasoning adopted in the second proposition, I acknowledge myself indebted to Dr. Edwards, in his reply to Dr. Chauncey; a work which ought to be more generally known and read. It is indeed true that many of his arguments are aimed against a modification of Universalism, materially different in its character from the form now more generally in vogue; still Universalism, in all its forms, depends upon certain fundamental principles, to destroy which is to destroy every form of the doctrine. This Edwards has done, and done too in his own masterly manner.

The second discourse, containing objections against Universalism, might be easily enlarged to a great extent. My collection of objections is small and imperfect; not because nothing more could be said, but because other important and pressing duties would not permit me to add more. There however are more, it is believed, than the advocates of this system can readily and fairly dispose of; and when they may think they have done this, they will but just have begun their work; for this system is so directly opposed to all that is rational and Scriptural, that objections may be raised against it, numerous and strong. Let the candid weigh them.

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W. FISK.

DISCOURSE I.

“Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us,” Gal. iii, 13.

THE text which we have selected, as it contains the foundation and essence of the whole Gospel system, lies, of course, in direct opposition to all erroneous systems; and especially will a correct illustration of it wholly destroy, it is believed, that confused and dangerous system of error, which, under various aspects, and in a variety of forms, bears the name of Universalism.

And in the following discourse it is proposed to examine this system of Universalism under the several forms and mutations which it has put on, within these few years past, in our country. In attempting to do this we may inquire what that law is from which Christ hath redeemed us—what is the curse of the law, and how the redemption of Christ affects that law and its curse.

I. What is the law from which Christ hath redeemed us?

This can be no other than the moral law of God, that universal rule of righteousness which is binding on all men, in all ages of the world: it cannot mean the ceremonial or any other law peculiar to the Jews, or to our first

parents; because the verse immediately following our text goes on to show the extent of the blessing procured by redemption from that law,—“that the blessing of Abraham might come on the Gentiles through Christ.” So that the law from which Christ redeemed us was a law that extended to the Gentiles also, otherwise a redemption from its curse would not profit them. But to decide this point at once it must be acknowledged that the law here spoken of is as extensive as the redemption itself. By whatever limitation, therefore, you restrict the law, by the same you limit the blessings and designs of the redemption. But the redemption relates to all mankind, to Jew and to Gentile, therefore the law, from the curse of which Christ hath redeemed man, extends to all men. But what law can this be but that code of righteous and unchangeable principles that is universally binding upon the human family? There is no other universal law, and therefore this is the law here spoken of.

II. We are to inquire what is the curse of this law. The curse of God's law must mean loss, punishment, or suffering, of some kind and in some degree. This the word imports, and so the Scriptures represent it. It therefore follows that this curse must imply either the loss of existence itself, that is, annihilation; or it must imply existence affected, more or less, longer or shorter, with some kind of positive suffering or loss. We will spend a

few moments in inquiring whether the idea of annihilation is a rational and Scriptural definition of the curse of God's law.

To this we object in the first place, because the Scriptures represent this curse as positive suffering. It is a pain that gnaws like a *worm that never dies*; that burns like a *fire that is never quenched*; it is *torment*; it is *wringing out*, and *drinking the dregs of the cup of trembling*; it is suffering *indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish*,—it is enduring an agony that begets *weeping, wailing, and gnashing of teeth*; it is *to dwell in everlasting burnings*, and to *suffer the vengeance of eternal fire*. But none of these expressions are applicable to the mere cessation of being or of consciousness. If it should be said that these expressions are applicable in case of annihilation, because in passing through this change from entity to non-existence, the objects of the Divine displeasure will suffer pain; we reply that this is to give up the argument; because it is saying that the curse of the Divine law, as described in the Scriptures, is not the loss of existence, but the suffering endured before existence is lost; and therefore the reasoning destroys the premises, and at the same time implies an act of injustice, in that it represents the sinner as enduring the curse of the law while in being, and after all, in addition to the curse, losing his existence. Again it may be objected to this idea of the curse, that it destroys all *degrees of punishment, which is*

contrary to Scripture and reason. Annihilation, then, is not the curse of the Divine law, and therefore this curse must imply an existence, affected more or less, longer or shorter, by some kind of suffering. To this point, therefore, we turn our attention.

What may be the nature or degree of this suffering will not now be inquired into; that it will be exceedingly grievous none can doubt who credit God's word. Our present inquiry will be this, What is the duration of suffering threatened in the curse of God's law? It must be *endless* or *limited*. If limited, it must come under one of the four following heads: it must be less than the damned actually suffer, or it must be more than the damned actually suffer, or it must be just what the damned actually suffer, or it must be an indefinite period of suffering, just enough to bring the sinner to repentance and salvation, be the same more or less. Upon all these points let us institute a serious and a cautious investigation: if any one of them is found consistent with the Scripture representation of the Divine government, and the Gospel economy, then we will give up the idea of an endless hell; if none of them is true, then it must be acknowledged that the damned must suffer the penalty of an *endless curse*.

1. On the first supposition, viz., that the curse of God's law is less in duration than the damned actually suffer, we need not dwell a moment; for none, it is presumed, would

charge upon God the injustice of inflicting suffering upon his creatures beyond what his law requires; and this he would do, if the damned were made to suffer more than the penalty threatened.

2. We pass then to inquire, secondly, whether this curse is a limited punishment, but more than the damned will actually suffer? If so, this greater curse is threatened in the law: if it is not revealed, it does not exist, for surely God's law is not so imperfect as to contain only a part of its penalty. But I ask, what words are made use of to express the penalty of God's law, which convey the idea of more suffering than the damned actually endure? It is said, the smoke of their torment ascendeth up *for ever and ever*; that they suffer the vengeance of *eternal fire*; that they shall actually go into *everlasting punishment*, &c. Now whether these words are used in a limited, or an unlimited sense, is not the question; but the question is, are any stronger words than these used to express the curse of God's law? I answer no; fearless of contradiction: for these, and similar words, are the very terms used to express the penalty of the law; therefore there is no greater curse revealed than the damned will actually suffer, whether that suffering be in this world or the world to come, and of course the supposition, that the curse of God's law is limited, but greater than the damned will actually suffer, is false.

The absurdity of this supposition may be

seen by another argument. If the curse of God's law implies a state of suffering more than any sinner will ever suffer, it follows that there is more in this curse than any sinner is ever exposed to. God then has threatened more than he ever meant to perform. Whether this threatening is the result of his injustice, or of his inconsistency, or whether the failure in the execution is to be attributed to his impotency, we are not informed; but to something of this kind it must be attributed, if the supposition be true. And when once this is supposed true, we may just as well suppose, that the sinner is exposed to no part of the curse of God's law, and thus a speedy conclusion is put to the whole controversy between Universalists and anti-Universalists. But who is prepared to say that God has threatened a penalty which never will, and never can be executed? that he has announced a curse which no sinner is ever exposed to? If none, then none will say the curse of God's law is limited punishment, but greater than the damned will ever experience.

3. As it appears this curse, if limited, can be neither more nor less than the damned will actually suffer, we will next examine whether it be just equal to what the damned will actually suffer. To this view of the subject there are several insurmountable objections: for, in the first place, this would destroy the idea of salvation altogether. Salvation is deliverance from sin and its consequences—it

is deliverance from the guilt of sin, and the condemnation of sin, and the punishment of sin. But this idea supposes that we are not delivered from these, but actually endure them to their full extent. It is not being saved from the curse of God's law, for it is taking the whole of that curse; it is wringing out and drinking the very last dregs of the cup of wrath. It would be ludicrous for a criminal to say he had been saved from the state prison, and from a fine, because he had actually suffered out his full term of confinement, and had had his goods confiscated to satisfy the law. It would be the height of absurdity to say that Christ was saved from *that hour*, and from *the cup* of affliction that his Father had given him, because he endured it all, and exhausted entirely his full cup of sorrow. Equally ridiculous and absurd is it to talk of salvation where the sinner is damned to the full extent of his guilt. When salvation and damnation can be made to mean the same thing, then, and not before, may this supposition be maintained. But yet, absurd as this idea is, it is a very popular one at the present day. We have been told in this desk again and again that *all* men suffer to the full extent of their crimes: and this sentiment is taught by most modern Universalist preachers, and by almost all their periodical publications. Never was there a greater misnomer than to call this the doctrine of universal salvation; it is to all intents the doctrine of *universal dam-*

nation,—universal damnation not only as it relates to its extent of application to the whole human family, but also as it relates to the *universal* qualities of the doctrine itself, for there is not a particle of salvation about it.

But another serious objection to this idea is—that it destroys the idea of forgiveness. The doctrine of pardon and of justification from sin is a leading feature in the Gospel plan—it is abundantly taught by Christ and his apostles. But are they forgiven who suffer the whole of the curse of the law? I know we have been told, during the late controversy, that the doctrine of forgiveness is perfectly consonant with the idea of suffering all the penalty of the law. So we have been virtually told, that damnation was salvation, but who believes it? What if a man should stand up in this desk, and with all the sanctity of a minister of God, should tell us that the rising of the sun means its setting, or that guilt means innocency, or that the wrath of God means his love; are men such fools as to believe these palpable contradictions? But they might as well do this as to believe the sinner is pardoned, and still suffers the full extent of the curse of the law. Such a sentiment is in direct opposition to all our ideas of pardon and forgiveness. If, therefore, the Bible means, by pardon and forgiveness, what all the world understand these terms to mean, such a sentiment is most certainly false. This supposition, therefore, that the curse of God's law is limited, and is just equal to what the

damned will suffer, as it destroys the idea of pardon, must be false.

But there is still another serious objection to this sentiment: it destroys the idea of grace. That salvation is of grace, that the whole Gospel system is a system of grace, is every where taught in the Bible. But if the sinner actually endures the whole penalty of the law, he owes nothing to justice, and therefore cannot be indebted to grace. For it should be recollected that the Gospel is emphatically called grace, because it is mercy shown to sinners—it is favour conferred upon the undeserving and the ungodly. But those who by dint of suffering have borne the whole penalty of God's law, and thus discharged all its claims, cannot say, "by grace I am saved," but "by suffering I am delivered;" and now strict justice demands that I should be admitted into heaven. Their song, therefore, will not be the song of redeeming grace, for they are under no obligations to redeeming grace. Does the criminal praise the lenity and clemency of that government which has inflicted upon him the whole demerit of his crime? Does he ever think he owes his enlargement to the mercy of that government? Neither can a sinner, who has suffered the curse of the law to its full extent, ascribe his deliverance to mercy. There is not a particle of mercy in it.

Here then is a system of religion in which there is for the sinner no salvation! no pardon! no grace! no mercy! And yet the sin-

ner gets to heaven—this *graceless, unpardoned, damned sinner* goes to heaven all covered with glory, to shout among the angels, and enjoy the rich reward of “the inheritance that is incorruptible, undefiled, and that fadeth not away.” If men had seriously set themselves to work to devise a system directly opposite to the Bible, it is clear they could not have hit upon one more suited to their purpose than this. If the Bible be true, then it cannot be true that the curse of God’s law is limited, and yet just what the sinner will actually suffer; therefore this idea also must be given up.

4. On the supposition that the curse of God’s law is a temporary punishment, we have but one alternative more to examine, and that is—this curse is an indefinite punishment, just enough to bring the sinner to repentance, be the same more or less. Let us carefully examine this last hope of those who would limit the curse of God; and if we mistake not, it will be found as delusive as the former.

It might at first seem useless to propose this last alternative, since it is evident this indefinite punishment, whatever it may be, must come under some one or more of the three forms already stated; that is, it must be a suffering *more or less*, or *just equal* to what the damned will actually suffer: and if all these positions have been proved untenable, then this must be relinquished of course. But I know

the Universalists have a manner of representing this subject, which may seem to them to free it from all the difficulties that have been found to exist in the other positions that have been examined. They represent the punishment of the sinner as purely disciplinary, designed wholly for the sufferer's good. If it takes so much, or more, or less, to humble and reform the sinner, just in that proportion he is to be cursed, or made to suffer: that is, the curse of God's law is measured solely by this rule, that the sinner's suffering must be meted out so as to make him penitent. And therefore, strictly speaking, he *deserves* no *punishment* for *sin*, but only *needs* a *remedy* for an intellectual *disease*; or, to use the term *deserves* in an improper sense, the sinner deserves just as much, and no more, for breaking the law, as will repair the injury sustained by *himself*. The government of God, and the interests of the universe, are not insulted nor injured by this violation; and therefore no reparation is to be made to them. If they are affected by it at all, it is just as community is affected, when one of its active members falls sick, and needs a remedy to restore him to health. If you take any other view of this subject, you throw it back upon one of the forms already examined; for the moment it is acknowledged that the transgressor sins against God, and injures his government, and that the justice of God, and the dignity of his authority, and the interests of the universe, require punishment to repair the

injuries done to them, and that for these purposes God has annexed penalties to his laws; that moment the ground of men's disciplinary punishment is abandoned, and we then acknowledge a curse of a fixed and definite character, and it must be if it is of limited duration, more or less, or just equal to what the damned will actually suffer. But we have seen it can be none of these: it remains only to examine this curse then in the light of a mere disciplinary punishment, a wholesome, though somewhat painful remedy for a moral disease; having for its sole object the welfare of the sufferer. And as this is a favourite topic with Universalists, and as they think it a position of great strength, I desire to sift it thoroughly, though it must be done in a few words.

1. This idea makes the law of God worse than useless; it is a snare and an incumbrance; it makes evil where otherwise no evil would exist. The law it seems was not made in reference to the Lawgiver, or the dignity of his government, or the good of the universe, for these are not affected by its violation. The transgressor has made no wastes to be repaired, has insulted no dignity to be vindicated, has exerted no injurious influence to be counteracted, except so far as relates to himself: and how can the interests of a government require a law, when those interests are not affected by its violation? And if the interests of the government did not require the law,

certainly the interests of the individual did not ; for those very acts which the law now criminalizes, are not criminal in themselves, but only become so by being prohibited. The universe would have suffered nothing if there had been no law, and since where there is no law there is no transgression, and where there is no sin there is no suffering, this law has been the cause of all the evil, and all the suffering in the universe, and therefore ought not to have existed. We should think that lawgiver guilty of something more than folly, who should multiply laws which the good of the general government did not require ; and especially if those laws made those acts criminal and injurious to the individual, which in any case, law or no law, could not harm the government ; and which, were it not for those enactments, would be perfectly innocent and harmless to the actor himself. And yet this is precisely the state of the question with regard to the Divine law, on the supposition that the violation of this law does not injure the Divine government, and the interests of the universe.

2. Another objection to this view of the subject is, that while this needless law is thus made the cause of all the evil in the universe, and the Divine lawgiver has thereby ensnared men's feet and brought them into difficulty, he has provided a *remedy* for this *evil*, an *antidote* for this *poison*, under the form and in the name of a *curse*. This not only makes the whole appear absurd, but it savours very

much of the ludicrous. The *law curses* men, but the *curse blesses* them! But for the *law* they would have had no hell; and but for its curse they would have had no heaven. When every thing else has failed to save the sinner, then the *wrath without mixture*, the *judgment without mercy* that comes upon him in the curse of the law, accomplishes this great and glorious work, and brings the soul to holiness and heaven! How this potent man of grace, this last and only safe hope of the sinner, came to be called a curse, we cannot tell. It was perhaps a mistake of the Law giver, or it may have been a design to hold out false colours, and a false alarm to the transgressor. Be this as it may, that design is now wholly frustrated: and since men have discerned that the whole intent of this curse is to bring them to heaven, and that it is the last and the only certain resort of Divine goodness to bring the soul to glory, they will now doubtless learn to love and value this curse as they would value an infallible specific to cure their constitutional disease. Why should we dread its momentary bitterness? for it shall afterward *yield the peaceable fruits of righteousness*; it shall work out a *far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory*. Such is the ludicrous, not to say blasphemous, character of this definition of the curse of the law.

3. This explanation also destroys all interest we have in Christ: yea, it makes him the minister of evil rather than of good. Our text

expresses the common doctrine of the New Testament, where it teaches us that Christ came to redeem, that is, to buy off and deliver sinners from the curse of the law. But should he succeed in his work, how ruinous would be the consequences to a world of sinners. What! redeem sinners from the effects of God's love! from the visitations of his mercy! from the most certain and most powerful means of grace that God ever uses! deliver them from their remedy! their Saviour! their last and only safe hope of getting to heaven! God forbid. To be saved from such a curse is to shut the door of mercy for ever; it is to be damned without hope. If Christ succeeds in this work he does much harm; if he fails, his mission and work are useless, and in either case his coming to redeem men from the curse of the law is any thing but a proof of the love of God the Father, or of the benevolence of his own character.

4. In short—for we must sum up, under one head, a number of arguments—in this view of the curse of the law the Bible description of the ill desert of the sinner is false, for the sinner deserves no punishment at the hand of God; he only needs a remedy for his intellectual disease. All declarations in the Scriptures, that the sufferings of the sinner are the fruits of the Divine displeasure and of the wrath of God, are but figurative nonsense, for these sufferings are all the fruit of his love to the sufferers, and the full visit-

ation of his curse upon the transgressor, is the mightiest and most effectual effort of his goodness to bring him to heaven. All descriptions in the Bible that the sinner robs God, dishonours his character, *quenches, grieves, and vexes* his Holy Spirit, *tramples under foot the Son of God*, and does *despite to the Spirit of grace*, are metaphorical folly; for the evils of sin are confined wholly to the sinner himself; the doctrine of pardon is futile, unless we say the transgressor pardons himself for injuring himself, since there is no one else that has been injured or offended by his sins: and finally, the doctrine which teaches that Christ came to magnify the law and make it honourable, or that God appears in judgments, and in great power, to vindicate his own character as the righteous Governor of the universe, and to establish the dignity of his government, is empty declamation; since the law has never been broken or dishonoured, God's character has never been insulted, his government and cause have never been scandalized. Now as no believer in the Bible can support a supposition that involves such unreasonable, unscriptural, and anti-scriptural consequences as the foregoing, so we trust this definition of the curse of the law cannot be embraced by such as have candour and discrimination enough to see it in its true character.

We have now gone over all the possible forms of the curse of the law, on the suppo-

sition that it threatens a limited punishment ; and if our reasoning be sound, we have proved that all these positions are untenable ; and since we had before proved that this penalty could not be annihilation, one only alternative remains—an awful alternative—such as may well strike the heart of the impenitent sinner with terror and horror—the *curse of God's law is endless torment.*

To the foregoing some Universalists perhaps will say they have no serious objection. They are willing to own, that possibly the curse of the law, according to its original tenure, did threaten an endless punishment ; but that the Gospel has removed this penalty, for “ Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us.” It is thus that Universalism keeps itself in countenance between different and contradictory systems ; at one time saying that the goodness of God, and the finite demerit of sin, will not admit of an endless penalty to the Divine law ; and when driven from this ground, they will then take shelter under the redemption of Christ, maintaining that the law is met, or in some way removed in its claims, or set aside as to its penalties, by the provisions of the Gospel. Into this, as into every retreat and entrenchment, we are willing to follow this doctrine. But we are not willing to leap back and forth, from one system to another, as each in turn is found to be false. Let those who are fairly driven from their first position

renounce it for ever, or until they find some new arguments to support it: and if they can find no new ground to rest upon, let them give up the system, or give up the Bible. With these remarks we are prepared to enter upon our third proposition.

III. How does the redemption of Christ affect this law or its curse.

1. The redemption of Christ does not abrogate the law. Against such an idea many strong arguments might be urged: but two only will now be mentioned. The first is, redemption does not imply an abrogation or repeal; but the manner in which it is used in the Scriptures implies the reverse of this. If, as the Bible says, Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, it follows that this law is still in force, exerting and enforcing its claims; and hence the necessity that something should be done to avert its curse. But another consideration is, this law, being a transcript of the Divine mind, and what he is bound by the very perfections of his nature to require of his intelligent creatures, is utterly unrepealable. One might as well talk of changing the nature of God, and of inverting the order of his government, as to talk of repealing his moral law. The fact is, and so the Scriptures teach us, the whole object of the Divine economy, in all its dispensations, has been to enforce the observance, and vindicate the claims of the moral law.

And since the law is not repealed, it follows,

of course, that the sanction of the law, the penalty annexed, is in full force, and must have its satisfaction whenever the law is violated.

2. This penalty of the law is not unconditionally met, and satisfied by the redemption of Jesus Christ: if this were true there would be no forgiveness; for a complete satisfaction of the law, either in its preceptive or penal claims, shuts out the idea, and destroys the possibility of pardon, since there is nothing to be pardoned. Beside, the compunctions of conscience, and a sense of guilt, are perfectly inconsistent with the idea that the curse of the law is unconditionally cancelled by the redemption of Christ: for how could one be condemned by a law that was perfectly satisfied? And who does not see, moreover, that this idea of redemption would open wide the door of licentiousness, and would, in fact, make Christ a minister of sin: for it would give every one liberty to sin as much and as long as he might please without fear or hazard, because Christ has removed the penalty of the law. Such a representation of the Gospel would be in direct opposition to its whole tenor and spirit, and especially to those binding obligations to lead a holy life, so frequently insisted upon by Christ and his apostles.

The view of redemption is contrary to many express passages of Scripture. "He that believeth not," saith the Saviour, "is condemned already, and the wrath of God abideth on

him." Are there not some who believe not? Then are there some who are under the curse. "If any man love not the Lord Jesus Christ," saith an apostle, "let him be anathema maranatha." Do all men love the Lord Jesus Christ? Is it not true now as when the Saviour uttered it, "Me the world hateth because I testify of it, that the works thereof are evil?" Then are there some, who, notwithstanding the redemption, are under the curse. Again: "If ye be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing." But how can this be true, if Christ saves unconditionally from the curse of the law? No matter whether a man trust in the Jewish ceremonies, or in Pagan idolatries, since all men are redeemed, and this redemption is absolute and unconditional, all are delivered by Christ from the curse of the law.

The sentiment we are opposing is contrary to the conditions of the Gospel, which have been so clearly maintained of late in this house; and which are so conclusively established by the author of our text in this very chapter and paragraph from which the text is taken; in which he declares most explicitly that those who have Abraham's faith, have Abraham's blessing, that is, *justification, righteousness*; but those who have not, are still under the curse. And with this agree these scriptures, which declare that those who "deny the Lord that bought them, bring upon themselves swift destruction;" those that

"obey not the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ, shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord and the glory of his power:"—together with a great number of scriptures of similar import.

3. But though this redemption neither repeals the law, nor unconditionally removes the curse, still it does much. It has, or may have, if its provisions and remedies are properly apprehended and embraced, a direct and an important bearing upon the relation sinners stand in to the law, both as it respects its past violations, and its future claims. In respect to the former, it provides for the removal of the curse on terms honourable to God's law and government, and at the same time perfectly consistent with man's accountability and obligations to future obedience; and with respect to the latter, it provides for the keeping of the law, on the principle of faith in the atonement, that begets love, and produces that holiness of heart and life which is the fulfilling of the law. And preparatory to this object, a season of probation and trial, the means of grace, the discipline of Divine Providence, and all the calls of the Gospel are secured to man through this redemption; and when under these advantages the sinner *receives the atonement*, God for *Christ's sake*, and through the merits of *his sacrifice*, blots out the sentence of condemnation that the law had already passed upon him, and removes the anathema that hung over his devoted head.

And there is a propriety in calling this provision a redemption from the curse, for it is the only meritorious ground for the removal of the curse, and it is that without which it could not be removed. Hence these strong representations in the Scriptures: "He sent his Son to be a propitiation for the sins of the whole world,"—"a sacrifice for sin,"—"a merciful High Priest in things pertaining to God." Christ "bare our sins in his own body on the tree;" he "suffered the just for the unjust to bring us to God:" God "laid on him the iniquities of us all, and by his stripes we are healed." From these and other scriptures, yea, from the whole representation of this subject, both in the types and prophecies of the Old Testament, and in the doctrinal and experimental teaching of the New, we learn that the sacrifice of Jesus Christ is the only efficient and meritorious provision for deliverance from the curse of the law; and that without this provision there could be no such deliverance. Hence this sacrifice is represented in the Scriptures as a *satisfaction* of the curse, or the penal claim of the law, because when received on the prescribed conditions the law is satisfied, and the sinner is discharged. Nor does this view of redemption destroy the idea of grace and pardon; for the redemption itself is a gracious provision, and it just lays the foundation for pardon; so that through this, "God can be just, and the justifier of all that believe on his Son." Nor does this view

of the redemption destroy the necessity of personal holiness and obedience to the law, but on the contrary, it is through this the soul is made holy, and is prepared to keep the law. "The blood of Jesus Christ cleanseth from all sin," and the Holy Spirit which the Father sendeth in Christ's name, renews the heart, and writes upon it the law of love, and imparts that personal holiness without which none shall see the Lord. This view of the atonement appears rational and Scriptural, but any other view of it immediately involves us in difficulties. The fact is, we may mar the Gospel system in two ways—we may attribute *too much* to the atonement, or *too little*. In either case we open an inlet for dangerous errors. The following appear to me to be so plain, and so well established in God's word, as to be almost entitled to the appellation of Gospel axioms. The atonement has vindicated the law of God, and satisfied its claims, and secured the dignity of the Divine government in such a manner, that the vilest transgressor *may be saved*. The atonement has not met the claims of the law so as to preclude the necessity of pardon, or the direct exercise of grace toward the sinner. Without the atonement there can be no acceptable repentance and faith, no pardon or holiness:—notwithstanding the atonement, without repentance and faith, and consequent pardon and holiness, there can be no final salvation. These propositions are written as with a sun-

beam in all the book of God. If any are disposed to contend, and say, "salvation is unconditional, because Christ has satisfied the law," or, "the atonement is not a redemption from the curse of the law, because the sinner must, nevertheless, either be pardoned, or suffer the penalty," they must do it; but in these cases they contend not with us, but with the Bible. And in either case they strike equally at the very foundation of the Gospel system, though they are the opposite extremes of error. They are as much or more opposed to each other as they are to truth; and yet paradoxical as it may seem, Universalism has espoused them both: for we are told, in one breath, by this unaccountable system, that as Christ has redeemed all from the curse of the law, all will be unconditionally saved, and also that the atonement has done nothing for us, since all *must inevitably suffer* the full penalty of the law! We are prepared to show, and we think have shown, that both of these propositions, taken separately, are directly contrary to Scripture; but when taken together and united in the same system, they are palpable contradictions, and monstrous absurdities. Like an acid and an alkali, when taken separately, they are equally removed from the healthful and refreshing cordials of Gospel truth; and when blended, they mutually destroy each other, and form a compound *vapid and tasteless and useless*.

And in this view of the subject where will

Universalism flee for support? It has sought to shelter itself under the idea that the curse of God's law threatens only a temporary punishment. But this on examination could not be supported; for it was found such an idea would be incompatible with the very genius and general tenor of the Gospel. Such a curse, it has been shown, could not be a temporary punishment, but less than the transgressor would actually suffer, for in that case this excess of suffering would be unjust; it could not be more than any condemned sinner will actually suffer, for no such curse is revealed: it would be a scare-crow terror, hung up to indicate a punishment to which the sinner was never exposed, and which he never could suffer; this would be a trifling and an inconsistency of which God could never be guilty. Again it was seen that this punishment could not be temporary, and just equal to what the damned would actually suffer, for that would blot out at once all the prominent features of the Gospel,—it would destroy the idea of *salvation*, of *forgiveness*, and of *grace*; neither could this curse be an indefinite temporary punishment, threatening only just enough to bring the sinner to repentance and salvation, for this would involve a numerous train of unscriptural and irrational absurdities. The curse, therefore, viewed separate from the atonement, and as a part of the Divine law, must be *endless torment*. Driven from this ground, we have followed

this system to its vain and unscriptural confidence, that whatever the law threatens to the transgressor, Christ has unconditionally redeemed him from its curse. And we have found that the atonement neither repeals the law, nor unconditionally satisfies the curse, but only makes provision for repentance and salvation when the sinner repents and believes. All, therefore, who love not the Lord Jesus Christ, are under the curse; and all who continue to reject the Gospel, and obey not its truths, *are damned,—shall not see life; for the wrath of God abideth on them,—where Christ is gone they cannot go; but must go into hell fire, where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched,—and the smoke of their torment ascendeth up for ever and ever.* Impenitent sinner! tremble at the thought. Do you say it is impossible God should punish a sinner thus! for you cannot think of it without horror! God never intended you should—he never intended to make a tolerable hell. It is only perhaps because you have imagined the curse of the law to be trifling, that you have hitherto continued in sin. Now, then, look at your danger in all its fearful and terrible character; and fly, while you may, to the atoning sacrifice, “For Christ hath redeemed you from the curse of the law, being made a curse for you.”

OBJECTIONS

AGAINST THE

DOCTRINE OF UNIVERSAL SALVATION ;

BEING THE SUBSTANCE OF A DISCOURSE

Delivered in the Methodist Church in Springfield,
Mass., at the close of the preceding Discussion.

BY REV. W. FISK, A. M.

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“ But I have a few things against thee, because thou hast there them that hold the doctrine of Balaam, who taught Balak to cast a stumbling block before the children of Israel, to eat things sacrificed unto idols, and to commit fornication.

“ So hast thou also them that hold the doctrine of the Nicolaitanes, which thing I hate,” Rev. ii, 14, 15.

THERE is no system of religion, philosophy, or politics, however long established, and however strongly supported, but may, in some of its forms, and in some of its parts, be opposed and objected to with some appearance of plausibility. And so long as the opposers of any system exert themselves to find fault with that system, without attempting to build one of their own, they may long keep the field, and make work for the friends of truth. Such hitherto has been the contest between Universalists and anti-Universalists. The long-established doctrine of future pun-

ishment has been assailed, and various arguments have been brought up to disprove it. The friends of truth have met these arguments, and pointed out their futility, and in their turn have held forth the arguments in favour of their system, conscious that they would bear examination and opposition. In the mean time the numbers of the opposers have increased,—not because the foundations of the old system have been shaken, but because those in the opposition had no system of their own to be demolished; therefore, though always repulsed in their assaults upon others, yet they could still keep the field, and were always ready to rally anew. I say, *had no system* of their own: one *idea* of their own they have indeed annexed, and that is, that all men will ultimately be saved; but this, as will soon be seen, was rather a loose and undigested notion, than a system of religious truth; and was exhibited under such different forms that it could not well be attacked. Nevertheless, it was sufficient for a rallying point; and one more congenial with the depraved heart could not be devised. It affords such a comfortable hope for those who wish to procrastinate repentance, or entirely dispense with it; it is such a pleasing substitute for the self-denying, cross-bearing doctrines of the Gospel, that quite a proportion of the world of sinners are disposed to favour this doctrine, on first hearing it named, before they have examined any of the arguments by which it is

defended. Every man, in any degree acquainted with the operations of the human mind, must see at once what an influence this predisposition, in favour of an idea, must have on the judgment:—it will make sophistry appear like sound argument, and the slightest appearance of support like a strong defence. To this principally is to be attributed the increase of Universalists at the present day. They have also derived quite an accession of influence and of numbers from another source. The last century teemed with open infidels. These exhausted all their resources of wit, learning, and argument, to disprove the validity and Divine authenticity of the Scriptures. But their efforts were vain, and worse than vain, for the cause of infidelity; for their arguments were so ably refuted, and the proofs of revelation were so clearly exhibited, by the friends of the Bible, that infidelity was obliged to yield to the force of argument, and either leave the ground or put on a mask. The latter alternative was chosen by many; and Universalism presented itself as a mask, exactly suited to their wishes. Here they could keep up the appearance of being believers in revelation, and yet deny all that was offensive in its doctrines, and throw off all that was uncomfortable in its restraints. Thus strengthened and encouraged, Universalism has gradually put on a more systematic form, and in proportion as it has been met by its opposers, it has been driven to the necessity of

taking some positions, and advancing some indistinct features of a system that are more visible and tangible than before. Now, therefore, those who stand by the ancient landmark have other work beside mere defence. They may assail Universalism on its own ground,—show the weakness of its positions,—the absurdity of its arguments,—the incoherency of its parts—the unreasonable and unscriptural character of its doctrines;—and where it does not assume a form that can be approached, at least its indefiniteness and confusion can be pointed out; and these, in the mind of the candid and reflecting, cannot fail of constituting an objection to the system itself.

In this way I propose, at this time, to do something; bringing all that I advance in the form of objections against Universalism itself. And this I do the more readily because I think Universalism a great error,—and if so, a very dangerous error,—one that will probably prove fatal to most of its supporters. I do it, too, because I think controversy on this subject will elicit light, and because I consider the objections against this doctrine of a serious and important character, and such as, if they cannot be removed, ought to prevail to the destruction of the system. But if they can be removed fairly, they should be, that those who now feel their force, may give them up and become Universalists. I do not expect, however, that those who are deter-

mined to be Universalists, and who rest on that system for their only hope, will be likely to be convinced, or even staggered in their opinion by the strongest objections; for,

“A man convinced against his will,
Is of the same opinion still.”

My appeal is to the candid. If any man is willingly ignorant, “let him be ignorant.”

I. I object to the indefinite manner in which the doctrine of universal salvation is held; and the confusion and shifting of the arguments by which it is defended.

I make this my first objection, because, as has been already intimated, this looseness and confusion is that which of all other circumstances, contributes most, perhaps, to keep the doctrine in countenance, and prevent its being fully overthrown. If Universalism be true, never was a system of truth, it is believed, so confused: if it is false, never did error put on an appearance more like itself.

It is indefinite. One point is assumed, and it is this, and this alone which characterizes the doctrine, viz., *that all men will ultimately get to heaven*; but when, or by what means they will get there, are subjects in which the advocates of this doctrine are not agreed. Some, and perhaps the greater part of modern Universalists, think all will be purified here, and at death go immediately to heaven; others think there will be a preparatory process between death and the resurrection; and others expect a period of punishment indefinitely

long after the resurrection. Nor is there a greater uniformity in respect to the means or manner of their salvation. Some expect to be saved through the infinite merits of Christ; and others because of the trifling demerit of sin. One expects irresistible grace here will draw him, another that irresistible justice hereafter, will drive him to holiness and heaven. This one talks of free agency, another of fatality. Some expect to be purified by the blood of Christ, and others by fire, or some other disciplinary process. One is expecting salvation by the forgiveness of sins, another by suffering out the whole demerit of his transgressions, and a third, "with a confusion worse confounded," thinks he cannot fail of salvation, because he expects to suffer the whole penalty of his sins, and be forgiven too, and thus by a double claim he enters the gate of paradise. And the arguments by which, not only different persons, but the same person, at different times, defend their system, are equally various, and inconsistent with each other: insomuch that it has become proverbial, that a Universalist cannot, in argument, be confined to any one point. It may be said, this is prejudice and misrepresentation. But if it is, why is the impression so generally made upon the minds of anti-Universalists? Arminians do not complain that Calvinists do not reason clearly, nor Calvinists that Arminians do not; but both Calvinists and Arminians complain that they cannot confine Uni-

versalists steady to any point. And I believe this is a general impression on the public mind. It may be denied, I know, and like all other similar subjects which do not admit of demonstration, it must be left to the observation and judgment of those who are disposed to look into it. One thing, however, is certain; the system itself is very loose and indefinite: and we should of course infer that the arguments in favour of it must be so too. To prove that this is a loose and an indefinite system, we need only quote the language of Mr. Hosea Ballou, in his Treatise on the Atonement,* a work which has been triumphantly termed, "unanswered, and unanswerable." He says, "perhaps the reader will say, he has read a number of authors on the doctrine of Universalism, and finds considerable difference in their systems. *That I acknowledge is true.*" (Mark, he acknowledges our objection true.) "But," he adds, "all agree in the main point, viz., that universal holiness and happiness is the great object of the Gospel plan." Mr. Ballou means undoubtedly that all men will finally be holy and happy. This is precisely what we say, that they assume the one desired, *much desired* point to be true, and then go about to prove it as they can; if one way will not do, another *must*; for the *main point must stand* at any rate. Mr. Ballou says farther: "As for the different ways in which individuals believe their work will be done, it

* More properly a treatise against the atonement.

proves nothing against the *main point*." Does it not? In my view it proves much against the *main point*; and for the following reasons:—

1. Truth is clear and definite, but error is always confused. Truth starts from the same point, and moves in a direct line, but error is always changing its position and direction. The proofs of a true system are always consistent with each other, as well as with the system itself, but the arguments by which error is maintained, having no accurate, common measure among themselves, are therefore inconsistent and contradictory. Though the advocates of a false system may begin to build together on the same foundation, yet like the builders of ancient Babel, before they progress far their language becomes confounded, so that they can neither be understood by each other, nor by those around them. When therefore a doctrine is found to possess all these marks of error, it becomes at least very doubtful.

2. When the proofs of a system professedly founded on revelation vary so much, and are so contradictory in the hands of its supporters, this is almost demonstration that these proofs are not clearly revealed. If all men are ultimately to be saved, we should expect the thing itself, and the means by which it is to be brought about, would be revealed in the Bible; especially when the Scriptures are designed to reveal salvation to man, and to point out to him the way by

which it is accomplished. Has infinite wisdom so failed in its work, as to blind the minds of the great body of believers in the Bible from the beginning until now, so that they have not believed in Universalism? And at last when some men have got a glimpse of the system, it is so darkly revealed that they differ in their views as widely as the poles, and their plans are as contradictory as truth and error!

3. This union in the main proposition, and this variety and contradiction in the proofs, very naturally lead us to the conclusion that the main proposition is first *assumed* as true, without regard to the proofs. Indeed the conviction seems almost irresistible, that if this *main point* had been reached by a chain of evidences that led to it, all who arrived at this conclusion would do it by pursuing a corresponding course; and therefore would support their position by corresponding arguments. On the contrary, when a point is assumed without proof, and its supporters are pressed for their reasons, we might expect the different individuals would bring up the best thing they could think of at the time, and when these were taken away they would resort to some other, and so would keep changing the character of their proofs precisely as Universalism now does. Such a course very justly brings suspicion upon a system. That edifice must be air-hung that is commenced at the top; and that system is

no better which starts with what ought to be the conclusions, and ends with the premises.

4. Once more. When a system in the hands of its advocates is continually changing its forms and its evidences, when it is obscure and indefinite in its parts and proofs, it is no breach of charity to conclude that its supporters themselves are afraid to define it, lest it should not bear examination. If they who have examined it so much, and therefore best know its strength, if those who extol it so highly, and profess to trust in it so confidently, dare not define it clearly, and arrange all its parts systematically, there is certainly strong presumption that they fear to venture an engagement on fair and open ground. If they can intrench themselves behind a rampart of negatives, and define nothing clearly, they have, at least, more hope that they shall avoid a general defeat. Mr. Ballou has acknowledged his fears on this point, and given our objection its full force. "I had been often solicited," he says in his Treatise on the Atonement, "to write and publish my general ideas on the Gospel, &c.; but I have declined, on the ground that it might be attended with disagreeable consequences, as it is impossible to determine whether the ideas which we entertain at the present time are agreeable to those which we shall be under the necessity of adopting after we have had more experience!" This is a very important concession, not only as it shows their system

to be of recent date, as we shall notice more particularly hereafter, but also as it shows the reason why Universalists dare not define their doctrine,—they are afraid of *disagreeable consequences*,—they fear they shall be under the “*necessity*” of changing their ground, as indeed they have been. Who does not know that they have been “under the necessity,” in very deed, of adopting new ideas, and varying the features and proofs of their system until the present day. And even now if one would attack it, he hardly knows what to attack; he finds it a very Proteus, it changes its shape before one can describe it; and after labouring long to prove it false, it is found to have assumed another form, and the man has lost all his labour. Like the fabled Hydra of antiquity, this system has many heads, and when one is cut off there are others left, and when these are assailed the former springs out anew. Not only does it change its shape, but like an *ignis fatuus*, it changes its place before one can get his hand on it. It stays nowhere long enough to be described and examined by the rule of truth, or attacked by the arguments of truth. If this doctrine is true, I should be glad to embrace it; but I certainly could never consent to embrace, I know not what. Let Universalists inform us what their system is, let them give a consistency to its parts, a distinct portraiture to its features, and a permanency to its proofs; then they may submit it

to the examination of the public, and if it will bear the test, we will all become Universalists. But till then, thinking men, candid men, and men who love the truth, and dig after it as for hid treasures, will not embrace the doctrine. But so long as Universalists are afraid to define their system, lest, as Mr. Ballou says, they should meet with disagreeable consequences, their system will be deservedly suspected. Truth is afraid of nothing: it dares face a world; but a system that shows itself so partially and fearfully; that builds itself up more by pulling down others than by establishing any thing of its own, that puts on so many turnings and windings as it partially presents itself to view, is so much like error, if it is not error itself, that we fear to confide in it.

It is worthy of notice too, that as this diversity and confusion on the subject does not make them fall out with the system itself, so neither, in the general, does it make them fall out with each other. It is true there is of late a little stir in the camp of Universalism, and some of the Restorationists begin to oppose the modern school of Universalists. This is an encouraging symptom. It is encouraging to its opposers; for we believe if Universalists once begin to examine their own ground, and probe each other's views, anti-Universalists will have little to do. And this too is the only ground on which Universalists themselves, if their system be true, can

hope to succeed. For though their numbers have been increased from the causes already shown, yet it is not in the nature of things that so crude and indigested and multiform a system as Universalism now is, can long keep itself in countenance before an intelligent public. If it is all erroneous, the heterogeneous mass cannot long cohere; and if it has any of the precious metal of truth about it, it cannot pass as current coin until it has purged itself from the dross, and has put on the distinct and pure form of the currency of truth. We hope, therefore, Universalists will look about themselves, and purify their own system, if they can. At present, they have done but little in this way. When they have accomplished this work, it is believed there will be but little left of Universalism. And this is evidently what Universalists fear. Therefore, they use every means to prevent a rupture among themselves. Fatalists, Freewillers, Unitarians, Trinitarians, the followers of Winchester and of Ballou, Deists, New Harmonists, all unite in associations and in societies, in settling ministers and supporting periodicals, and all is well, if they can only agree in the *main point*, as Mr. B. calls it. The impenitent multitude throng after them, and seem to say, Only tell us we shall all get to heaven, —only assure us there is no danger of that eternal fire, which we have been taught to dread, and to expect, and prove it by saying many

hard things and shrewd things against the partial sects, and by talking much, in general terms, about the love of God; and for the rest, you may point out many ways, different ways, or new ways,—it is all the same to us. This is the practical language of Universalists. And it is evidently the fruit, not of Christian love, but of an indifference to truth, and a determination to adhere to a favourite proposition, by *supporting* it, if they can, or *without support*, if they must.

OBJECTION II.

UNIVERSALISM is supported by arguments which prove too much for the system, and which, when pursued, run into absurdities, and contradict matter of fact.

We have already seen that Universalism supports itself principally by attacking others, and by intrenching itself behind negative propositions. It sometimes, however, ventures upon assertions; but these assertions are so framed, as to take the form of objections to other systems. And since this is the chosen weapon to carry on the controversy, it becomes the advocates of truth to array themselves in the same armour. For in this way alone can the arguments on each side have their proper, comparative weight. If this is a wise method of contending for the truth, we shall have the honour of answering wise men according to their wisdom; if otherwise,

we shall obey Solomon, who directs to "answer a fool according to his folly." If the objections made to the doctrine of eternal punishment, when they have their full weight, contradict matter of fact; or if they lie with equal weight against the doctrine which they are supposed to support, it must follow of necessity, that these objections are too *objectionable* to be of any service to the cause of Universalism, and too futile to be of any weight against the doctrine of endless misery.

"This doctrine," it is said, "is derogatory to the character of God." Wherein? "Why it proves, either that God is unable to save all mankind, or he is not willing! If you say he is able, and not willing, you impeach his goodness;—if you say he is willing, but not able, you deny his omnipotence." This argument lies equally strong against limited punishment hereafter, and even against suffering in this world. The sufferings of this life are proverbial. All ages and classes of beings are exposed to sufferings of mind and of body, of the most severe kinds, which finally terminate in death. Now, either God is unable to prevent these sufferings, or he is unwilling. If you say he is unable, you deny his omnipotence; or if you acknowledge his power, and yet say he is unwilling, you impeach his goodness. But it is replied, "There is more propriety in temporary suffering than in eternal misery!" Not if temporary suffering is unnecessary. If eternal

punishment is necessary, there is a propriety in it, and not otherwise; and if temporary punishment is unnecessary, there is no man of common sense and candour that would say there is the least propriety in it. And if you can conceive of God being guilty of a small impropriety, in punishing men so severely in this world, I can as readily conceive that the same defective God may be guilty of a great impropriety, and punish them eternally. A perfect God can no more conduct improperly in one case than in another. "True, but temporary suffering is necessary, in order that man may know how to prize and enjoy happiness. For much of our relish of happiness is by comparing it with pain, with which we have been experimentally acquainted." And can God give us this relish for happiness in no other way? Must there be *some* pain, in order that there may be a *good deal* of happiness? Must there be some suffering, that heaven may be the sweeter!—Give me that argument, and it is all I want to do away your objection to endless misery. "But," it is replied, "God must certainly be deficient in wisdom, if not in power and goodness, if he could devise no other system by which to govern his creatures, and make heaven glorious, than one that involves the eternal misery of a part of mankind." And we in our turn beg leave to say, on the same principles God is certainly deficient in wisdom, if not in power and good-

ness, if he could devise no other system by which to govern his creatures, and give them a relish for happiness, but such a one as involves so much temporary suffering of all mankind. If eternal misery, as a part of God's system of moral government, proves him greatly deficient in wisdom, certainly the temporary sufferings of all his creatures, as a necessary part of his moral government, proves him some deficient in wisdom. And a *perfectly* wise God could no more be deficient in the one case than in the other. Again, it is objected to the doctrine of endless misery, "Would not that God, who is infinitely powerful and good, if he foresaw (as he must, unless he was imperfect in knowledge) that the introduction of sin would be attended with endless consequences of misery to some of his creatures, have prevented the introduction of sin into the world? Surely he had power to prevent it; why did he suffer it?" And on the same principles we ask, Would not that same God have prevented sin, if he had foreseen (as he must, or be imperfect in knowledge) that it would have involved his creatures in so much suffering and pain, and that it would occasion so much confusion and disorder in the world? Surely he had power to prevent it. Why did he suffer it? Does it make him any the less an imperfect God in the one case than in the other? But in reply to this we are told, "If sin had not been introduced, we never should

have seen the perfections of God displayed in the plan of redemption." With the same propriety it may be said, if God had not suffered free agents to transgress, he never could have displayed his character as a moral Governor,—his faithfulness in performing his promise,—his justice in punishing men,—his goodness in rewarding obedience. And if it was not derogatory to the character of God, to suffer *that* to take place, which involved so much temporary misery and disorder, because it gave him an opportunity of displaying his perfections in the plan of salvation, so neither is it derogatory to the character of God, to suffer *that* to take place, which will undoubtedly involve the endless misery of some, because it gives him an opportunity of displaying his perfections, as the moral Governor of the world. "But God," it is urged, "will permit no more suffering and seeming disorder in this world, than he will overrule for the general good. They shall all 'work out a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory.' The individual suffering here shall promote the general happiness of all hereafter." So neither will God permit or inflict any more suffering, in case of the endless misery of some, than he will overrule for the general good of the universe. And none can prove that the general good of the universe does not require that endless misery should be a part of God's system of moral government. Till that is done, no ra-

tional objection can lie against the doctrine. "But I cannot see how the punishment of some souls eternally, can be required by God's system of government." Your seeing or not seeing has nothing to do with the argument. Neither could you have seen how any misery would be connected with God's system of government, if matter of fact had not proved that it was so. If you do not believe, because you cannot see why it should be so, you should be consistent with yourself, and believe nothing till you could account for it. You should believe nothing till you could comprehend the Almighty, and understand all that his wisdom can devise;—that is, you should not believe in God, nor in any of his works, till you yourself have become a god. The sum is, If it was necessary that sin, though it involved so much evil as we know exists, should be suffered, because it was the only way in which such a display of God's perfections could be made as was made, in the plan of redemption, so it may be necessary that sin, though it involves the eternal misery of some, should be suffered to be, because God saw it was the best way in which he could display his perfections, as the moral Governor of the universe. In the same way it might be shown, as will be seen in some subsequent objection, that the argument which Universalists draw, from the circumstance that endless punishment is abhorrent to their feelings, and that

God will not inflict it, lies equally against the sufferings of this world, and against matter of fact, and therefore it cannot be sound. The fact is, on this subject, as on all others, feelings, opinions, theories *à priori*, must all yield to matter of fact, and to actual experience; and with the candid and intelligent it is only necessary to show, that any argument, on which they rely to support any system, if pushed out into its legitimate consequences, would contradict what we know to be true, and they will immediately relinquish it. Men have become too intelligent to be syllogized out of their senses. The spirit of the present age will not permit it. When the philosophy and divinity of the schools were in vigour,—when metaphysical reasonings had the precedence of the senses, such arguments might have weight. But, happy for us, and fortunate for the cause of truth, those days have gone by. We have only to say, *Such things are*, and all objections must cease. The assertion of what *is*, is truth; that which denies or contradicts what *is*, is falsehood.

OBJECTION III.

UNIVERSALISM makes God *cruel, unjust, and false* to his creatures.

It may be a matter of surprise, that we object *that* to Universalism, which it brings as an objection to our system ; for Universalists profess to have found out a system which alone frees the Divine character from cruelty and injustice. But let the candid judge whether our charge is not supported.

Universalism is founded upon predestination. It is a fact which, it is presumed, will not be denied, that most of the Universalists through our country are fatalists ; and those who are not, are evidently ignorant of their system. To believe in the final salvation of all men, and not believe in predestination and irresistible grace, is an inconsistency, which few men of sense and thought have long persisted in. Hence many, who when they first embraced the doctrine of universal salvation, were Arminians as to human agency and the work of grace upon the heart, have either given up Universalism, or embraced predestination. The more general motto now is, "Whatever *is*, is right." Every thing is according to the will of God. And laying these premises, they go on to prove their doctrine logically, thus :—

A merciful God will never punish his creatures eternally, for unavoidable acts.

All the actions of men are unavoidable being fixed by the decree of God.

Therefore, God will never punish men eternally.

Again:—A merciful God will never punish his creatures eternally, for doing his will.

All the actions of men are according to his will and desire.

Therefore, he will never punish men eternally.

But God does punish men for their sins in this world, if not in another, Universalists themselves being judges. They talk about suffering the penalty of the law, the hell of conscience. And indeed the Scriptures abundantly show that sinners are punished for their sins. It follows then, on this plan, that God is not merciful; for he actually punishes men for what they cannot help, and for what is according to his will. This conclusion from the premises, is as clear as the shining of the sun, and I challenge Universalists to get rid of it. It is folly to say he is merciful, in this punishment, because he designs it to reclaim them, and thus prepare them for greater happiness. For, 1. If they are now in their character and conduct just what he would have them be, which must be granted, on the ground of predestination, then to talk of reclaiming them is to talk nonsense. Reclaim them from what? From being and doing what God willed they should be and do? Altered they may be, but this can never be called a

reclaim. 2. But why punish them to effect this alteration? Such an arbitrary act of inflicting suffering upon an innocent being, whether for an hour or an age, is, as to the principle of misery, equally oppressive and cruel. Certainly, an infinitely wise and powerful God must be unmerciful to cause his creatures to suffer in undergoing an alteration from a state in which he placed them, into another state of his own choosing. If man was allowed to be a free agent in this affair, having power to choose and act either way, and in the exercise of this power went contrary to God's will, there would be justice, and mercy too, in causing him to be put under the discipline of suffering; but in case of necessity, I am astonished that men, who believe as they profess, in a system which above all others represents God in his true dress of mercy and justice, should hold to such a cruel doctrine as this,—that God punishes his creatures for doing what they could not help, and for what was agreeable to his will. I freely confess this is charging more upon God than I can ever believe. Of all cruel aspersions that has ever been cast upon his character, this takes the lead. This vindication of the character of God is like Joab's saluting Amasa, or Judas Christ. It stabs what it professes to embrace,—while it pretends a friendly salute, it betrays. I do not mean to say that Universalists see and moralize all the bearings of this doctrine. But if they are igno-

rant of it, it affords a striking proof of the delusion the mind is subject to, when it determines to carry a favourite point, at all events.

Predestination then must be given up,—that is, the *certain* salvation of all mankind must be given up; for that doctrine is built on predestination, or else God is cruel and unjust. Let Universalism avoid this dilemma if it can.

But once more, under this objection. Universalism not only makes God cruel and unjust, but it makes him *false* to his creatures.

The Scriptures represent many things as contrary to the will of God; but how can that be, if every thing takes place *according to his will*? Has God forbidden murder, and all other crimes, and yet are all these crimes according to his will? Has he given us a rule to walk by, and yet influences us to transgress it? So it seems, if predestination be true. Is not this deception? Is it not an imposition?—But again, if God made us just as we are, he certainly made conscience, that inward monitor, which becomes so troublesome to the transgressor. And what does conscience say? It says, "Thou hast done wrong." It smites the sinner, and excites such anguish in the breast, as induces Universalism to give it the name of "*the hell of conscience*;" supposing it to be all that is meant by those strong expressions in Scripture which describe the sinner's hell. But how false are all these

reprovings of conscience, when the man has only been doing the will of God! that which God necessitated him to do;—that which it was absolutely necessary he should do, in order to qualify him for heaven! Does God then raise up witnesses to testify to a lie? To make a man believe that he is to blame for doing that which he could not avoid? Does God influence a man to pass a judgment upon himself, that he has been doing wrong, when he has only been doing the will of God. merely for a pretence to punish him after with all the horrors of a “hell of conscience?” Not only the Scriptures then must be thrown aside, but conscience must be accounted a bugbear,—the creation of a false education. For to call it the messenger of God in the soul, is to say God has sent a messenger to raise false alarms, to testify to untruths. But even this will not rid us of the difficulty. For though conscience be the fruit of a bad education, yet if God controls all things irresistibly, that education was his work, the result of his influence. God caused him to be thus educated and deceived, and thus the deception, after all, comes from God. Pursue the idea a little farther. God, according to this doctrine, subjected man to all his ignorance here;—he is the direct and determining cause of all his ideas, and of all his volitions, and of all his sentiments. Now, whatever the Bible teaches, it is certain many believe it teaches eternal punishment. This has an in-

fluence upon their conduct, and so God's will is preferred by them, through this false idea, which, since God intended it should have the very effect it does have, was, of course, brought upon them for this very end. That is, God deceives his creatures in order to accomplish his purposes. But to proceed a little farther. A man believing in eternal punishment is taken sick,—expects to die,—supposes he has outstood his day of grace, and an endless hell must be his portion; mark how he writhes in an agony of despair,—hear his groans and shrieks,—see his face gather blackness,—his imagination pictures a gaping hell opening to receive him,—devils already surround his bed to hurry him away!—he cries out, I am going to hell!—I am in hell!—and expires. His beloved companion goes frantic with grief,—his friends are in the same delusion, and suppose their friend has gone to an interminable hell. Their feelings who can describe? Even the stranger that looks on, feels his blood curdle in his veins, while such a horror runs over him, as to make him feel that the room is the antichamber of the damned. Now whence is all this, and what is it for? I tell thee, kind hearer, the God that fixes and determines every thing, has imposed a false belief on this wretched being;—he has made him believe there is an endless hell, but there is, in reality, no such thing;—he has driven him to despair of mercy, but he will, in the other world, show him mercy;—in short,

the whole was a piece of deception. But you must know God has his object in all this ;— this man, if he had never known despair, never could have realized so fully his deliverance ! God brought him into this agony, and lashed and tormented him awhile, that he might surprise and ravish him the more with the joys of his deliverance ! What trifling ! what deception ! what cruelty is this, to attribute to the Almighty ! Whatever else I may believe, may I never believe, may I *never* believe this, of the infinitely perfect God. May I never embrace a system that involves this idea. Having gone so far, I should be driven into Atheism, and maintain there was no God, rather than believe in such a trifling, deceiving, cruel God as this.

OBJECTION IV.

UNIVERSALISM does not draw its chief support from the Bible.

That it professes to draw its support from the Bible, I am not disposed to deny. But in practice and profession it does not agree. Even when recourse is had to Scripture, in proving or defending their system, how is the sacred text tortured ! Who that has read Mr. Ballou's account of the fall, his denial of the existence of evil spirits, his explanation of the parables, &c., &c. ; or who that has heard the arguments and explanations a short time

since in this desk, but, in the spirit of candour, must say, If this is the way to explain Scripture, then *any thing* may be affirmed or denied, and the Scripture can be made to support it? Who that has heard the explanation generally given by Universalists to the last paragraph of Matt. xxv, but must say, Universalists make the Scriptures mean *any thing*, or nothing, as suits their system. It is a common answer from Universalists, at the present day, when a passage of Scripture is brought up, "Ah! that is figurative." And with this short and easy answer, every passage against them is set aside. For having once decided that it is figurative, they then assume the right to understand the figure as they please. I do not deny that there are figures and metaphors in the Bible; and some of them, especially in the Old Testament, difficult to be understood. But for men to suppose a figure when they please, and then explain it as they please, with no reference to the rules of language or of criticism, nor to any thing else, but their own particular creed, is trifling with, and misusing any author;—to do so with the Bible is impious. It may serve the turn of those who have a *main point* to defend at all hazards; but it can never satisfy the intelligent mind of an honest inquirer after truth. To explain away the Bible in this way carries every unbiassed reflecting mind to the conclusion, that those who do it know little of the meaning of the Bible,

and care less, provided they can, in a plausible and apparently *decent* manner, set it aside, or wrest it to serve their own purposes. I am driven to this conclusion, by the force of the evidence which Universalists themselves exhibit, in their defence of their system. If it is thought the opinion is a hard one, let Universalists remove the evidence;—we must judge from what we see. And we are more confirmed in this opinion from another consideration:—A great proportion of Universalists, when you quote Scripture to them, will answer, Whatever it means, it does not mean as you say, for it contradicts my reason. Here the whole system of infidelity throws off its mask;—another standard than the Scriptures is found, to which the word of God is brought, to try its truth. Nothing more is wanting to complete this system of infidelity, than, like the French philosophers, to bring out their goddess Reason, and openly pay to her Divine honours. “But are we not to be reasonable men?” Yes; and then only are you reasonable men, when you acknowledge the Almighty to be infinitely your superior,—and that he must be true, though every man is thereby made a liar. His word must and will stand, when all your limited reasoning, yea, when heaven and earth shall pass away. “But is the word of God contrary to reason?” Not contrary to eternal reason, which is nothing less than the will of God. But it is often contrary to the reason of man, who is a crea-

ture of yesterday, and knows comparatively nothing. If not, then man's reason is infinite and infallible. And if so, we have, as before observed, only to worship our goddess, for she is already deified. Beside, if our reason is infallible, we need no other revelation. The Bible is altogether superfluous as a standard of faith. In short, the whole of this reasoning goes to say, that the Bible is not the word of God. And if this is what Universalists mean, we wish them to come out, and be open on the subject. There is a species of cowardice attached to a system that does not show itself under its true colours. If Universalists mean to say, that they have their doubts of the inspiration of the Bible, let them be honest and open in their infidelity, and then we shall know where to meet them.

But it is not reason alone that is introduced as a standard of faith. Our feelings,—the short-sighted sympathies of our nature,—are brought up to disprove the doctrine of future punishment. "It is shocking to my feelings," says one, "to think of endless misery; all the tender sympathies of human nature revolt at it." And what does that prove? Are our feelings and our sympathies a standard of truth? If so, we need neither reason nor revelation to help us to our creed. But who before ever discovered that our short-sighted sympathies were given us to form our religious system by? If our feelings are shocked at the miseries of the finally impenitent, I

should infer that they were designed as a spur to excite us to make our escape, and to stir us up in our endeavours, to urge others to flee the wrath to come. This looks consistent and natural. And in this view of the subject I can see they have their use, and are designed to answer an important purpose in the economy of God. But this purpose is entirely frustrated, and these sympathies prevented, when, instead of being used as excitements to our attention to that, which by a proper standard has been found to be truth, they are themselves used as a *standard* of truth. What were designed to prompt us to action, are the cause of our inactivity! What miserable philosophy (not to say divinity) is this! If we had nothing within that would shudder at the idea of punishment, we should have no inducement to make our escape, or persuade others to escape. And yet because we do shudder at the idea of endless punishment, we conclude there is no such thing. What a faculty man possesses of turning the good gifts of God into instruments of his own destruction! Of perverting the truth of God into a lie! But let us try this famous touchstone of truth by matter of fact. If I understand the argument, it is this:—"My feelings, and all the tender sympathies of my nature, are shocked at the idea of endless misery; therefore endless misery is not true. God, whose tender compassion far exceeds mine, will not suffer it." To this I answer:—My feelings, and all the ten-

der sympathies of my nature, are shocked at the idea of the horrible tortures and cruelties of the inquisition; therefore I believe there was never any such thing. God, whose tender compassion infinitely exceeds mine, never could have suffered it. Again, when Christ approached Jerusalem, the idea of its speedy and final destruction shocked the sympathies of the man Christ Jesus, and so harrowed up the feelings of his soul, that he wept over the devoted city. Now as Jesus Christ had all power in heaven and earth, and as the emotions of his holy and sanctified sympathies were a much surer standard of right than ours can be, therefore, on the above principle, we must conclude these evils never did come upon that city; Jesus Christ would not have suffered it. We know Jesus Christ predicted the event, and we have very particular accounts that it came to pass as predicted. But what does that signify? Do not our feelings revolt at it? and must we not believe our feelings? Christ's feelings revolted at it, and are not his feelings a standard? Who does not see the fallacy of such reasoning? and yet such reasoning as this entirely does away the force of Scripture in the minds of Universalists; or so far invalidates it, as to render it of little use in the controversy. It causes them to look upon these passages which prove endless punishment, as meaning nothing, or any thing, but what their most obvious construction requires; and those passages that

appear to have some bearing upon their side of the question, are to them strong proof. For this reason, and for the other stated under this head, we object to Universalism. That system which cannot be supported by the Bible is false. That system which has manifestly led to a false construction of the Scriptures, or has evidently weakened the force of Divine truth upon the mind, is *manifestly and evidently* false.

OBJECTION V.

THE doctrine of universal salvation is the religion of the natural heart; and therefore cannot be the religion of the Bible.

I suppose, not even Universalists themselves will deny that the Bible plainly declares, not merely in particular passages, but in the general scope of its doctrine, that the *carnal mind is enmity against God*;—that men are *strangers to God*, and *enemies by wicked works*;—that sinners are represented as loving sin, and as employed in the service of Satan, and “hate Christ” and “his words;”—that they teach the necessity of being renewed in the spirit of their minds, and that, in order to this, *self must be denied*, and the cross of Christ must be borne;—the deeds of the flesh must be mortified;—the pride of the heart must be humbled;—unholy emotions must be resisted;—unhallowed propensities must be restrained,

&c., &c. All of which are represented under the figures of *dying to sin*;—*crucifying the old man*;—*contending* with our spiritual enemies;—*fighting, wrestling, running, striving, watching, &c.*,—implying not only a vigorous discipline, and great exertion, but also a painful exercise of soul, crossing to the feelings of the human heart, and in-direct opposition to the natural bent of the mind.

To impenitent sinners of both Jews and Gentiles this doctrine was always as obnoxious as Jesus Christ himself was to the Jews. It was to the Greeks foolishness, and to the Jews a stumbling block. Those who felt the sinfulness of sin, and resolved to forsake it, received this doctrine with joy; but those who determined to live according to the course of this world, hated and opposed it; because it testified against its works, that they were evil. And our Lord has taught his disciples that it would be so. For, says he, "Ye are not of the world, therefore the world hateth you." But it is not so with the doctrine we are opposing. No man rejects it, and feels opposed to it, because he means to live in sin. But this is rather the cause of his receiving it *with joy*. The very vilest characters, the most abandoned sinners, can receive this doctrine without any opposition of heart. You may vindicate it with all the zeal you can manifest, and with all the arguments possible, from morning till night, and from Sabbath to Sabbath, to as an abandoned a congregation as

can be found, and it don't offend them. And can this be the doctrine for which Christ was hated, and for which he testified to his disciples that they should be hated by the wicked world?

But it is said, "Such do not receive the doctrine of universal salvation; they only hear the theory, but do not spiritually discern the nature of the doctrine. Universal salvation is universal love and universal holiness; and all who properly receive it will feel that it is opposed to sin of every kind." How many times, in some form or another, has this plea been made in favour of this flesh-pleasing doctrine? But it is as unsound as it is pleasurable. Let us examine it.

It has no weight against the objection we have brought up. The objection states, that impenitent sinners are, and ever have been, opposed to the Gospel, as preached by Christ and his apostles; but they are not opposed to the doctrine of universal salvation; therefore that is not the doctrine taught by our Lord and his apostles. The reply is, "Wicked men, who rejoice in the doctrine of universal salvation do not properly and experimentally receive it." Neither did those who opposed the apostles' doctrine, properly and experimentally receive it. Their hearts were against the very theory of the doctrine. But the foregoing reply acknowledges, that impenitent sinners are pleased with the preaching and theory of Universalism, and if so, one objec-

tion to it stands good. The statement of the argument is,—impenitent sinners are opposed to the Gospel, as preached by our Lord and his apostles; but they are not opposed to the preaching of Universalism; therefore Universalism is not the Gospel preached by our Lord and his apostles.

The drunkard rejoices in Universalism, and belches it out with the fumes of his own fetid breath. The debauchee, the knave, the blasphemer, the worldling, and sinners of every description, are not at all disturbed by this system; but they hail it and receive it as good news of great joy to their unsanctified hearts. And this view of the subject, a view which none can, with any show of reason deny, while it at once shows the unscriptural character of this system, opens the way also to introduce another objection.

OBJECTION VI.

THE doctrine of universal salvation is pernicious to the morals of society.

I know there is no objection made to this doctrine that touches the sensibilities of its advocates so soon and so deeply as this. And I am also well persuaded that there is little hope of its having any influence on the minds of the warm advocates of this system other than to offend or enrage them. It is not to torment them before *their time*,—it is not to

enrage and offend them, that the objection is brought; but from a firm conviction of its truth; and that, if it is true, it ought to have, and will have, much weight in turning the controversial scales against the doctrine of universal salvation, and in favour of the truth of future punishment. And if men continue to fall in with, support, and spread the doctrine we oppose, it is believed that the practical effect which it will have upon community, will one day open their eyes. It may have its run like the French philosophy of the last century. But, like that, it will open the eyes of community to its bad tendencies, by the corrupt fruit which it will bear. Universalists, however, think otherwise; and while many say they should infer that their doctrine would lead to licentiousness, they infer the reverse of this. For, say they, Universalism is love, and by it men are disarmed of their enmity. I grant that where there is salvation there is love. But to infer, because universal salvation is universal love, therefore the *preaching* of the *doctrine*, that all will certainly be saved, will beget universal love, is to beg the question. It is to make *salvation*, and the *doctrine* of salvation the same thing; but we have already seen (Obj. V,) that it is not; and the question now is not, what universal salvation would do, if it were experienced; but the question is, what doctrine will be the most likely to reform the world, and what the most likely to encourage men to

persist in sin,—the doctrine that sinners dying in impenitency will never enjoy heaven, or that all men of every description will certainly be made eternally happy? Nothing more is wanted to decide this question against the latter doctrine, than a slight acquaintance with human nature, and a mind free from any improper bias. But for clearer views of the subject, let us examine it a little more particularly.

1. The nature of the human mind is such, that fear is a necessary restraint, without which man could never be controlled. Mr. Ballou himself maintains, that man is governed by the strongest motive, and that the desire of all is happiness. This implies, that if there be no stronger motive to sway the mind, it will live after the flesh, and seek its happiness therein. Man, therefore, who has no motives of fear to drive him from sin, will most certainly be influenced by the natural bent of his mind, to seek happiness in the indulgence of his propensities, especially when he learns that, on the whole, this will be no injury to him, since it is necessary that he should know sin and its consequences, in order that he may know holiness, and have a relish for happiness; and especially since he is told, that all his unholy passions, so called, are according to the will of God. In such a case, what rein is there to the passions that are constantly urging their gratification? Will you talk to such a person about the *love* of God as a re-

straint to his course? He will answer, "My sinful passions are the fruits of his love to me, and shall I not indulge them? If I do, I am assured it will be according to his will; for 'whatever is, is right.' Beside, I have the declaration of God, by an apostle, that all things shall work together for the good of them that are called according to his purpose. And if Universalism be true, we are all called according to his purpose. In his own time, and in his own way, God will call all in to enjoy the blessings of heaven, where his grace will be superabundant, in consequence of all our sins." What a feeble dyke must such preaching be to the unruly passions of men! Yea, how does it encourage sin!

The plain language of this doctrine is, You ought not to be wicked, it is true; but if you are, God will love you *just as well*. Nay, it is impossible for you, however rebellious you may be, to forfeit his love. Heaven shall be yours; fear not. In the midst of all your blasphemies, and all your uncleanness, and all your excesses; yea, in your extortions, your robberies, your murders, rejoice and be exceeding glad, for heaven, with all its weight of glory, is yours. Now is there nothing in all this to encourage the sinner in his course? In other words, Is there any thing in this system to counteract the temptations of Satan, the blandishments of the world, and the rage of sinful passions? We are told, indeed, that like begets its like, and love will beget love;

that fear will make men Pharisees and hypocrites, but will never make men good. To this there needs but one answer: the Scriptures make use of the fears of men to reform them and deter them from vice;—hence it follows as conclusively as the wisdom of God can make it, that fear is both proper and necessary in the reformation of the sinner. It is, therefore, on this account, that the apostles and their faithful successors save men by fear, *pulling them out of the fire*;—*knowing the terrors of the Lord, they persuade men*. And it is on this same principle, founded in reason and the nature of man, that penal laws are so important and even indispensable in civil governments. He would be accounted a madman, in civil jurisprudence, who should teach that the best way to secure universal obedience and good order in society, would be by proclaiming to the vicious and rebellious, that whatever they might do against the peace of society, they would not forfeit the affection of the government, and the protection of its laws; and that they were just as sure of all the privileges, honours, and emoluments of the government, as the best citizens. And yet that reasoning in politics, which would be deemed sufficient evidence to confine a man in bedlam, is, in matters of religion, palmed off upon us as sound divinity! How evident is it then, that a doctrine which removes all those powerful restraints, which reason, experience, common sense, and Scripture teach are so im-

portant, is, in its very nature and certain tendency, pernicious to the morals of society. Nor can Universalism shield itself from this charge, by pretending to hold to temporary punishment as a reward of sin. For this we are told is all founded in love to the sufferer, and is the fruit of this love. And if so, what is there to be dreaded in it? Nay, it is rather to be desired; for all the terrors of God's law are only marks of his love and superior means of mercy, by which the sinner shall most assuredly gain his eternal crown. The thunderings of the Divine power, the lightnings of his wrath, the yawnings of hell, and the foaming, flaming billows of the burning lake, are so many loud and unequivocal proclamations of Divine love. And the more the gulf yawns, —the hotter the flame burns,—the more may the sinner lift up his head and rejoice, for his redemption draweth nigh. If then the love of God is not only harmless, but profitable, and greatly to be desired, and Universalism teaches, that the more the sinner persists in sin, the stronger will be the efforts of Divine love to make him happy, how can it be supposed the preaching of such a doctrine will reform the world? To pretend it, is the same as to say that the pope took the best way he could to reform the world by his sale of indulgencies; and the planners and abettors of the reformation, as it is called, were in reality opposing that which, soonest of any thing, would have effected a complete reformation among the

people. And by this time, if the rules had been allowed to go on without opposition, we might have had a world without crime. And by the way, it strikes me that there is a great similarity between the pope's sale of indulgences and the doctrine we are opposing. This doctrine, like the pope, offers *beforehand* a security of safety to transgressors, though they commit heinous crimes, and gives a plenary indulgence to all men whatsoever, for all that they may or can do.

But in some respects the pope's indulgences were the less dangerous of the two. For none could obtain these, but such as could pay a round sum for them. And these generally were confined to particular crimes, specified in the certificates; and the numbers, from the necessity of the case, must be considerably restricted. But this doctrine offers, *without money and without price, to all men, every where, and of every description, plenary and universal indulgence*, by which they may be assured, that though they indulge in all manner of crimes whatsoever during their lives, yet they never shall forfeit the love of God, nor endanger their eternal felicity. Should Universalists say I wrong their doctrine, because they do not deny punishment for sin, only they deny that this punishment will be eternal! I answer: Do they not represent all punishment as disciplinary? Do they not say that it is all the effects of Divine love? That their sufferings will make them happier

in heaven? That God, who controls all their actions, and gives them new hearts when he pleases, unconditionally, will not let them commit more sin than will be for their individual good? Then indeed I do their doctrine no wrong; only there is one trait that ought to have a higher colouring in the picture; and here it is. This doctrine not only professes to assure men, that though they indulge in the grossest crimes in this world, and die impenitent, yet it shall be no prejudice to their eternal happiness; but it strongly intimates, and unavoidably implies, that their sins are all *necessary* for their own good; and that whatever short inconveniences they may be subjected to, in consequence of sin, yet these shall work out for them *a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory*. It not only indulges them in sin, then, but lays a necessity upon them to commit it;—it not only promises them, that, on the whole, they shall not be the losers for their crimes and the consequent pain, but that these shall, in the end, greatly increase their happiness in heaven. This is as if the pope, instead of merely permitting his subjects to commit crimes, had laid a necessity upon them to transgress,—and instead of selling them an indulgence at a high price, had actually held out to them a reward for the highest enormities!

This is the picture I am constrained to draw of the doctrine of Universalism. A

horrid picture! but who can say it is beyond the life?

To add weight to the foregoing arguments, we might bring forward the great majority of those who embrace this doctrine. We might instance in several towns where, in the opinion of the judicious, immoralities have increased by the introduction and preaching of these sentiments. We might inquire, where has there been a revival of a work of grace by the preaching of this doctrine? Where has there been a reformation of morals by the preaching of Universalism? We acknowledge there are moral men, and religious men, who profess to believe in this doctrine. But has Universalism made them so? We believe not. But rather, where there can be none produced that it has made better, many may be found that it has made worse. This opinion is found from what has been witnessed of the fruits of Universalism, and we leave others to make up their opinion in the same way. The very lads in the streets, who have heard this doctrine, when reprov'd for their profanity, and immoralities, and told the consequences of their conduct, will answer, "We believe in Universalism; there is no hell!" And to mention one case, as a specimen of the feelings of thousands,—a debauchee was found by one of the missionaries in suspicious company in West Boston. The preacher expostulated with him for his conduct, and asked him, where he supposed such a course of life would

lead him? "I believe in the doctrine of Universalism," replied the man. Here was a shield that warded off all the reproofs of the missionary. This is not a solitary case. All might not be so bold in showing their certificate of indulgences; but He that reads the heart alone can tell how many times conscience has been stifled with this doctrine, how many a trembling youth has at length become audacious in sin, in consequence of believing it; and how many lovers of pleasure, and lovers of this world, who indulge themselves in the lusts of the flesh, or the pride of the eye, or the pride of life, have become insensible to true godliness, and easy in their neglect of it, from having embraced this doctrine.

But it has been said, in reply to this objection to Universalism, Those who believe in eternal punishment, and live where they hear it preached, from week to week, are not all reformed; nor yet the greater part of them. Why is not this an argument against the doctrine of future punishment, as well as the above against Universalism? I answer,

1. If preachers of the Gospel have not had that general success which they desire, when, following the Scriptures, they have not only declared the mercies, but also the judgments of God,—they have not only preached the love of the Redeemer, but also the terrors of the Lord,—we plead in behalf of religion, and

the cause of piety and virtue, that some of the strongest arguments with which these preachers have attacked sin, may not be taken away. For then we should fear, that where they now have considerable success, they would have none. That where *now* hundreds are turning from sin to righteousness, there would be hundreds made easy and satisfied in their present state. It is certainly a new mode of reasoning, that because certain arguments do not succeed in reforming men, therefore, by taking off all the most powerful of these arguments, the remainder will be most likely to succeed. For it must be recollected, that those who preach the justice of God, in the punishment of the wicked, have the same opportunity with Universalists of describing the mercy of God, in receiving the penitent, and rewarding the righteous. Only in this respect, Universalism can represent the mercy of God in different colours from its opposers. It represents God as equally merciful whether sinners repent, in this world, or not; that they will not endanger their eternal felicity, nor forfeit the favour of their Prince, though they live in rebellion, and die in arms against him. And I am willing to leave it with the candid to decide, which will give their arguments the most weight, in the minds of those they wish to reform, such as represent the mercy of God as infinitely great toward them, *if they reform*, but not otherwise; or such as represent the mercy of God as infi-

nately great toward sinners, whether they reform or not. If the former have the advantage, even when preaching the mercy of God, and also the additional advantage of urging the *terrors of the Lord*, which latter argument reason, Scripture, and experience, all unite in proving is by far the most effectual in reproving the vicious and impious, then it is a miserable shift to say; we may as well preach Universalism as eternal punishment, because those who preach the latter doctrine have not reformed all their hearers.

2. But another reason why the foregoing objection does not lie with equal weight against our doctrine, as against that we are opposing, is this:—none urge the doctrine of eternal punishment as an excuse for sinning;—they are not made easy by it;—they cannot silence conscience by it:—but, on the contrary, it is a powerful motive against sin,—it makes all who believe it uneasy in their sins;—it enforces the remonstrances of conscience, with the most powerful appeals to the judgment, the understanding, and the self love of man. And a man to continue in sin, with these views, has these strong motives drawing him in the opposite direction continually. Whereas Universalism, if believed, enlists the judgment, the understanding, and even self love itself, on the side of sinful indulgence. In preaching to the one we have only to enforce upon the heart the rational convictions of his mind, and we effect our

object. In preaching to the other, the appeals to the heart are warded off by the doctrine of the head, and the arguments to the understanding have but little weight, because the unhallowed affections of the heart conspire therewith in resisting the call to a virtuous reform.

3. But as a farther answer to the reply, which endeavours to turn the above objection against our doctrine, as well as against Universalism, we add, that so long as any man, whatever may be his professed sentiments, lives in sin and opposition to God, so far he is a Universalist. I do not say but that a man may have his judgment convinced that all men will not get to heaven, and yet live in impenitency; but if he is living thus, and yet expects, in some way or other, to get to heaven, this, with respect to himself, is the very essence of Universalism. What is that doctrine but this:—all men, their sins to the contrary notwithstanding, will get to heaven? And what is this man's principle but this:—I shall, my sins to the contrary notwithstanding, get to heaven? If it be answered, that Universalists do not expect to get to heaven with their sins, but expect a preparation for heaven,—so does this man. They think, some time or other, they know not when; some how or other, they know not how, they shall be prepared for heaven, and then, without fail, shall get there. Precisely so do all think who are living in their sins, and yet are

calculating that they shall be saved. So that the reason why all men who hear the doctrine of endless punishment preached, and give their assent to it, as a true doctrine, do not repent, is clearly and evidently this:—such men are, with respect to their own particular cases, building, to all intents and purposes, on the foundation of the Universalists. From this foundation, on which such a man builds his hopes of his own individual happiness, it is the business of the faithful preacher to shake him, by pointing out to him the inconsistency of his individual hopes, even according to his own general system; and by urging upon him that danger which his better understanding acknowledges, with respect to men in general who live in sin. But it is the business of Universalism to build him up in these hopes, by making him believe that the foundation on which they rest is sufficient, not only for himself, but for all mankind; and that he may make his individual hopes and general principles consistent with each other, and so remove all occasion of uneasiness. If *then* it was difficult to reform him, when his own general system was against him, how much more now, that his general theory in all respects coincides with his individual hopes and inclinations?*

* On this principle we account, in part, for the spread of Universalism of late through the northern states. Men had a vague idea of a final retribution, as a general principle, but each had hope, by some means

OBJECTION VII.

UNIVERSALISM has never been received nor supported by the orthodox Church, Jewish or Christian.

This objection certainly ought to have weight, and will have weight, in all candid, or other in his own case. And as long as he was allowed to indulge that hope undisturbed, he rested quite easy. But when a faithful ministry urged, upon his own principles, the necessity of repentance, and the danger of delay, he was made uneasy; he saw the inconsistency of his general faith with his practice; and he was driven to a kind of necessity, either to get a new doctrine, or a new heart. Many, to their great joy, chose the latter. But many others saw in the Universalist doctrine a system that would permit them to live as they had done, while it relieved them from a scourge that was knotted with their own doctrine, and therefore cut to the quick at every stroke. So that the present apparent prevalence of Universalism is only reducing to a system, and giving a regular form, and establishing upon general principles, feelings and views which already existed in the hearts of many, and which were the foundation on which they built their hopes of escaping misery, each for himself. In proportion as the Gospel is faithfully preached, in the same proportion will such errors show themselves. Hence, as true religion has increased among us, so has this. Existing none the less before, because it was not seen, though now becoming visible, more systematic, and more formidable. As the champions of truth become more active, and engage unitedly and vigorously in the cause, so the advocates of error more systematically arrange their forces, and more warily engage in their opposition. But we are not alarmed about the result of the contest; we only fear for those that may fall in the ranks of the opposition. If we are wrong, our very

reflecting minds. Such cannot but think, if God intended to make a revelation of truth, he would not have made it so obscure, that almost all receive and understand it in a sense infinitely removed from its real meaning. They cannot but believe that the great body of the Jews, the fathers, and in a manner the whole Christian Church, down to the present day, must have had the truth on this point. Universalists are aware of this, and therefore use every means in their power to do away its force. In the very language of the infidels of the last century, they talk much of tradition and superstition, with which they say the world has long been shackled. In the true spirit of their prototype of the last century, I mean the spirit of downright infidelity, they rank the doctrine that they wish to decry on a level with the most absurd doctrines and ridiculous ceremonies that have, for any period, disgraced any part of the professed Christian Church.

We should suppose that men, professing to be believers in revelation, and even assuming the title of Christian ministers, would not run

fall will be our heaven,—and upon our opponents' own ground, that evil is necessary to make us prize the good,—darkness, that we may value the light,—how much brighter and sweeter will be our heaven! But if they fail, alas for them! their disappointment and misery will be the greater, for having built strong hopes upon a sandy foundation. And what will the end be of them that have acted the chief part in these delusions?

so readily into the footsteps of infidel philosophers. But they have no other way to get rid of our objection but by taking this course,—and the *main point* must stand at all hazards. Hence you hear Universalists talking so much about the superstitions of former ages; representing some of our important ideas and feelings on the subject of religion, to be impressions received in the nursery from our old superstitious grandmothers. Indeed if we were to believe the Universalists, a new dispensation of light and truth is just now dawning upon the world. Read their periodical publications, and you will find that, wherever a new Universal society is formed, there light and truth are beginning to shine in all their heavenly lustre! The true light (the Messiah) we should be led to conclude, from these statements, has just made its appearance. At any rate, the latter day glory, it would seem, is now commencing, through the instrumentality of Universalism. 'Tis true, we do not learn by these communications that the debauchee is made chaste, or the drunkard sober, or the blasphemer devotional; but we learn that tradition is falling, and that the darkness of superstition is fleeing, before the light of this new luminary in the Church,—the *doctrine of universal salvation!*

On their own concessions then we might rest the truth of the proposition that constitutes our present objection. But, as we have seen, this system is not very uniform in its

course of reasoning, or in its proofs; it may be that what has been conceded in one part of the argument, may, when the consequences come out, be denied in another. It may be proper therefore to bring forward some proof of the proposition that constitutes the ground of this objection.

1. The Jews held the endless punishment of the wicked. This may be abundantly proved from the rabbinical writings and from the targums. And if this was an error of that people, which, from the corruptions of the Church, they had run into, why did not our Lord and his apostles plainly point out their error, as they did the other errors which had been introduced?—why did they use the very terms which the Jews used, to express the eternal torments of the wicked, and that too when speaking of that very subject, and yet not explain their meaning? No man in his senses, I think, can deny, that by this course they either designedly left them in the dark upon this subject, yea, designedly confirmed them in their error, or else they meant to give their authority to this doctrine. The former I suppose no Universalist at the present day will support. It is true, Origen held that “the apostles would have this a mystery;”—and on this principle I suppose he would account for the singular conduct of our Lord and his apostles. But modern Universalists, I conclude, do not suppose that the apostles meant to have it kept a secret. If they did, they

certainly have been very injudicious in their choice of confidants, when they suffered it to be known by those who now profess to have a knowledge of it; for they are unwearied in proclaiming it upon the house top. But to return;—if our Lord or the apostles did not intend to confirm the Jews in their error, then they meant to stamp with their authority the doctrine of the endless punishment of the wicked. I see no means of avoiding this conclusion; and the argument must certainly have great weight. It will outweigh a thousand verbal criticisms upon Greek or Hebrew terms. It has certainly been well said, that “Scripture is to be taken in that sense in which the common people who heard it at first took it.” If so, then we are to understand those passages in the New Testament in the manner that the Jews must necessarily have understood them. We have already seen that these terms were understood by the Jews as applying to the eternal punishment of the impenitent. This gives the doctrine of the Jews additional weight, while it leads to a clue, which, beyond the power of successful contradiction, will determine that our Lord and his apostles held the same doctrine, and thus they both unite to corroborate it. And this argument gathers more strength from the consideration, that the advocates for the two systems, Jewish and Christian, were at variance. When a new system is introduced to take the place of an old one; in all those points of any

importance in which the two disagree there will be a controversy, as was the case in many instances between Christ and the Jews, the apostles and their countrymen. But there was no controversy between them on the subject of the duration of punishment. Also such opposing advocates for different systems will be careful not to use terms that will establish what they conceive to be the errors of their opponents; but not only is no such caution used by our Lord and his apostles, but they frequently and commonly used the same terms that the Jews used when speaking on the subject of future punishment, and that without any explanation, or even a hint, that they meant to be understood differently from the current opinion;—a strong proof that they used the current terms on this subject according to their current meaning. And the other consideration, that in no other case have they given intimations that such a doctrine which was then prevailing was false, is sufficient, I think, to establish the point, that Jesus Christ and his apostles held the punishment of the wicked the same as the Jews. And these general principles laid down, with respect to any conflicting systems, have the more weight in this case, because Christ came to reform the errors of the world, and introduce the true system. And neither he nor his apostles were actuated by any motives of worldly prudence or policy; they declared the whole truth, and that boldly.

To support the doctrine that the apostolic Church held no such doctrine as is held by Universalists, we might quote the many scriptures that have so often been quoted, and never answered to the satisfaction of the discerning. We might say that the uniform representation of these evangelical records and apostolic writings, is, that some do and will reject this Gospel, and will *continus* to reject, in consequence of which they will be *shut out, rejected, cast off*, and that *then* even prayers and entreaties will not prevail for their admission into the kingdom. But we pass on to notice that the primitive fathers were no Universalists. The very earliest of their writings that have come down to us are express and pointed on the doctrine of endless punishments. Origen was the first that dissented; and he did not pretend that he received his doctrine from the Bible, but from the Platonic philosophy. His ideas however were condemned as erroneous, unscriptural, and absurd, by the main body of the bishops and clergy in the Christian Church of his age, and the succeeding ages.

To show the opinion of some of the early fathers of the Church on this subject, I take the following, ready prepared to my hand, from an appendix to a pamphlet by another.*

“Clemens Romanus says, ‘If we do not the will of Christ, nothing will deliver us from eternal punishment.’

* Rev. George Peck.

“Barnabas says, ‘The way of darkness is crooked and full of cursing; for it is the way of eternal death with punishment.’

“Justin Martyr says, ‘The punishment of the damned is endless punishment and torment in eternal fire.’

“‘Christ,’ says Iræneus, ‘will send the ungodly and unjust into everlasting fire.’

“Tertullian says, ‘All men are appointed unto eternal torments or refreshments. And if any man think that the wicked are to be consumed, and not punished, let him remember that hell fire is styled eternal, because designed for eternal punishment;’ and thence concludes; ‘Their substance will remain for ever, whose punishment doth so.’

“St. Cyprian says, ‘The souls of the wicked are kept, with their bodies, to be grieved with endless torments.’

“And even Origen himself, who embraced the doctrine of a restoration from hell, nevertheless records this, among the doctrines of the Church, ‘That every soul, when it goes out of this world, will either enjoy the inheritance of eternal life and bliss, if its deeds have rendered it fit for life, or it is to be delivered up to eternal fire and punishment, if its sins have deserved that state.’”

Thus the first advocate for Universalism in the Church by his own concession, maintained a doctrine contrary to the doctrines of the primitive Church. Is not this an accredited witness? And even Origen’s system was

no more like the modern system of Universalism, than it was like the true system of the apostles. After Origenism was purged from the Church, we know of no other advocates for even the *main point* of Universalism till *Bishop Burnet*.

Neither has such a thing been known, so far as I can learn, in the Greek Church, that any man has espoused and maintained this doctrine.

From the above arguments then, as well as from the forementioned concessions of Universalists themselves, we rest the truth of the proposition, which constitutes this objection to Universalism. The proposition is true, the proofs are clear, and the objection stands with all its weight. If Jews and Christians, in all ages of their respective dispensations, have been in error with respect to one of their fundamental doctrines, then Universalism *may* be true; but if they have not been in such an error, then Universalism *is most certainly false*.

The sum of all the foregoing is, that the system of Universalism as held and taught at the present day, is highly objectionable,—from the indefinite manner in which the doctrine is held, and the confusion and shifting of the arguments by which it is supported; because it is supported by arguments which prove too much for the system, and which, when pursued, run into absurdities, and contradict matter of fact;—it makes God *cruel, unjust, and false*;—it does not draw its chief support from the Bible: it is the religion of the natural

heart, and therefore cannot be the religion of the Bible. It is pernicious to the morals of society; and, finally, it has never been received nor supported by the orthodox Church, Jewish or Christian. These objections have not only been stated and sustained by positive proofs, but some of the strongest and most common replies to them have been anticipated and met. And now what has Universalism to say in answer to these charges? It will, doubtless, plead not guilty. But is it not guilty? Can it clear itself? Can it clear itself fairly and ingenuously, and with arguments that ought to have weight with thinking, candid men? That it can make a shuffle of words, and by evasions, and sophisms, and witticisms, give the gaping multitudes who wish to sin on, and die, and go to heaven, new confidence in their conscience-lulling system, there can be no doubt. That such a course is possible we have abundant evidence; and such a course may answer the present purposes of those who are taking the lead in this system; but it will not give permanency to the system—it will not satisfy the candid—it will not answer a good conscience before God. As the truth is important; as the results of our investigations may carry with them eternal consequences, both to ourselves and others, let us seek the truth with candour, embrace it with joy, and be saved by its influence.

THE END

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